










Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Fidrmucova, J. (2003). The impact of blockholders on information signalling, productivity, and managerial
disciplining. CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.









The Impact of Blockholders on Information 













The Impact of Blockholders on Information 











ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Universiteit van Tilburg, op gezag van de 
rector magnificus, prof.dr. F.A. van der Duyn 
Schouten, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten 
overstaan van een door het college voor 
promoties aangewezen commissie in de aula 
van de Universiteit op 
 
 















Promotor: Prof.dr. P.W. Moerland 
Copromoteres: Dr. R. Kabir 



































“Our dreams are our own, and only we can 









It is a great feeling of achievement to put final touches to my thesis. It is also time to 
look back and acknowledge those who helped me to get here. 
Coming from a university in Slovakia with a strong ideological heritage, I have got a 
real sense of scientific research in economics and finance only here at CentER in Tilburg 
during my Master’s studies. I was struck by the academic openness and freedom as well as 
strong intellectual potential and friendliness of the place. I appreciated these perks again 
and again over the years of my PhD studies and they also helped to convince me to stay in 
academics throughout my future career. 
My special thanks go to my supervisors Rez and Luc. Rez guided me through the first 
years, provided support, advice and expertise up to the final point. Luc stepped in a little 
later when we started working together on a research project that resulted in Chapters 2 
and 3. Our cooperation has been a very valuable experience for me, provided me with 
lively discussions, scientific insights, and endless motivation. I am deeply indebted to both 
Rez and Luc for strong personal support when life seemed a little more complicated for 
me. I would like to thank also my promotor Piet Moerland who carefully read and 
commented on all chapters of this thesis. 
I would like to express my gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee: 
Piet Duffhues, Pieter Ruys, Marco Becht and Stijn Claessens. It is an honour to have them 
on my committee. I acknowledge also financial support from the European Union’s Phare 
ACE Program 1997. 
It is impossible to imagine my life in Tilburg and my professional growth without my 
fellow PhD students Peter and Grzegorz T. who share my research interests. With both of 
them, I enjoyed countless fruitful discussions on corporate governance, ownership 
structure, performance, but also econometric issues. We commented each other’s papers 
(which was a valuable learning experience for both the reader as well as the writer), 
travelled together to courses, workshops, and conferences. They have been also very good 
friends. I also appreciate patience and company of my office mates: Maarten, Elena and 
Norbert. 
My life in Tilburg would not be so nice and enjoyable without my friends Jana, 
Renata and Michal. We shared together many nice and unforgettable moments. I 
especially appreciate their enormous support when I needed them the most.  
Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my family. My two sons Jan and Daniel have 
convinced me again and again of endless resources and energy of human kind and 
provided me with love and inspiration. Still, it is my husband Jan who is responsible for 
me coming to Tilburg. Over the years, he has not only been my partner but also endless 
source of scientific discussions, guidance and inspiration. He is also a co-author of 
Chapter 5. It would not be fair if I did not mention Ildi as my enormous home support 
during the last stages of writing this thesis and my parents and brother Peter whose love is 
with me all the time.  
Thank you all. 
 





Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
1.1 Large blockholders, corporate control and insider trading in a 
market economy (Part I) 3 
1.2 The role large shareholders in a transition economy (Part II) 5 
 
Part I   9 
Chapter 2 Insider Trading: Background and Literature Review 11 
2.1 Introduction 11 
2.2 Insider trading regulation in the U.S. and U.K. 13 
2.3 Costs and benefits of insider trading regulation 16 
2.3.1 Theoretical models 16 
2.3.2 Empirical evidence 18 
2.4 Market reaction to insider trades 21 
2.4.1 Long-term profitability of insider trades 22 
2.4.2 The immediate market reaction 28 
2.4.3 Determinants of profitable insider trading 30 
2.4.4 Summary on market reaction to insider trades 32 
2.5 Information content of aggregate insider trading 32 
2.6 Timing of insider trades 34 
Chapter 3 Insider Trading and Corporate Control: Evidence from 
the U.K. 41 
3.1 Introduction 41 
3.2 Research hypotheses 44 
3.3 Data sources and descriptive statistics 51 
3.3.1 Directors’ dealings. 51 
3.3.2 Ownership data. 54 
3.3.3 LSPD database 55 
3.3.4 Datastream data. 55 
3.3.5 The combined sample of directors’ transactions 56 
3.4 Methodology 59 
3.4.1 Event study methodology 59 
3.4.2 Robustness checks on the test-statistics 63 
3.5 Results 66 
3.5.1 Market reaction to directors’ trades 66 
3.5.2 Test of the information hierarchy hypothesis 72 
3.5.3 Test of the effect of corporate control 81 
3.5.4 Other determinants of directors’ trades 91 
3.6 Conclusions 95 
 
Part II   111 
Chapter 4 Privatization and Corporate Control in the Czech 
Republic: Institutional Background 113 
4.1 Introduction 113 
4.2 Privatization: how it all started 114 
4.2.1 Restitution and small-scale privatization 115 
4.2.2 Large-scale privatization 116 
4.2.3 Voucher privatization 120 
4.2.4 Investment funds in the voucher privatization 122 
4.3 Development of security markets 128 
4.4 Short summary 132 
Chapter 5 Enterprise Performance and Post-Privatization 
Managerial Turnover: Evidence from the Czech Republic 137 
5.1 Introduction 137 
5.2 Privatization and enterprise restructuring: theory and evidence 141 
5.3 Privatization and corporate-governance regulation in the Czech 
Republic 145 
5.4 Data 148 
5.5 Determinants of CEO turnover 153 
5.6 Does CEO turnover improve performance? 160 
5.7 Conclusions 165 
Chapter 6 Channels of Restructuring in Privatized Czech 
Companies 169 
6.1 Introduction 169 
6.2 Aggregate developments in the Czech Republic 172 
6.3 Enterprise restructuring: hypotheses and previous evidence 175 
6.3.1 Asset contraction policies 177 
6.3.2 Changes in employment policies 178 
6.3.3 Expansion policies 180 
6.3.4 Changes in control 181 
 
6.3.5 Changes in internal organization 182 
6.4 Data 182 
6.5 Methodology 185 
6.6 Results 188 













Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a fair return on their investment (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Within this very broad topic, the role played within the modern corporation 
by large-block shareholders has become an increasingly important and popular issue. It 
has been believed until recently that large shareholders are important only in the 
continental corporate world. However, recent empirical studies show that relatively large 
blockholders control important parts of corporations also in Anglo-Saxon, market oriented 
economies (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1999, Barclay and Holderness, 1989, and 
Franks et al., 2001). Thus, blockholders are part of the corporate world around the globe. 
This fact provokes many interesting questions concerning the reasons for their existence, 
their role, their incentives and goals, and most importantly their value for other 
stakeholders.  
Numerous theoretical papers point out the benefits as well as costs of the presence of 
large blockholders in corporate world. A very important value-increasing activity of large 
blockholders is monitoring of corporate activities. Admati et al. (1994) and Maug (1998) 
show that costly monitoring takes place despite free-rider behaviour of small shareholders. 
Furthermore, the presence of a large blockholder makes a value-increasing takeover 
                                                 
*This thesis benefited from the support of the European Union under the Phare ACE Program 1997. The 
content of the papers/chapters is the sole responsibility of the authors and in no way does it represent the 
views of the Commission or its services. 
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attempt more likely (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
interests of managers and shareholders become increasingly aligned as managerial 
ownership increases. Still, costs associated with concentrated ownership may also be 
substantial. Block ownership reduces market liquidity (Maug, 1998) and risk sharing 
(Admati et al., 1994). Also, monitoring can have negative externalities. For example, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that monitoring can lead to excessive risk taking in 
managerial decisions. Burkart et al. (1997) argue that monitoring leads to ex ante 
reduction in managerial effort. Empirical literature (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988) 
documents that contrary to the general opinion, expropriation or consumption of corporate 
resources is not the main reason for the existence of majority shareholders. Rather, the 
benefits from controlling their firms seem to play a crucial role. Barclay and Holderness 
(1989, 1992) argue that positive price reaction to block trades in the U.S. documents 
expectations of improved management and/or monitoring despite the fact that private 
benefits are also consumed along the process. To the contrary, Franks et al. (2001) argue 
that in the U.K., neither existing shareholders nor large share blocks exert discipline or 
provide monitoring. 
In this thesis, I undertake to analyze the role of large-block shareholders from two 
distinct perspectives. In the first part, I investigate the role large-block shareholders play 
in the U.K. – a developed economy with a long tradition of dispersed ownership. I analyze 
the market’s response to blockholders’ presence in corporate structures. In particular, I 
propose and test a hypothesis that corporate control structures are reflected in the market 
reaction to insider trading. The second part of the thesis investigates the role of new 
private investors in restructuring former state-owned enterprises in a transition economy. 
In transition economies, the need for efficiency improvements, for which high managerial 
effort and skills are required combined with high uncertainty about future developments 
and information asymmetry, highlights the importance of effective corporate-control 
structures. Companies and stakeholders have to improvise and find substitutes for 
disfunctioning market institutions (such as, contract enforcement, reputation, product-
market competition, and managerial labour market). Concentrated ownership seems to 
provide the solution. These two views of the issue provided in the two separate parts of the 




shareholders. The following two sections provide a short summary and main conclusions 
of the two parts. 
1.1 Large blockholders, corporate control and insider trading in a 
market economy (Part I) 
The main contribution of the first part of my thesis is that is connects two important 
broad finance topics – trading of insider in shares of their own firms and corporate 
governance. In particular, it explores corporate-control determinants of information 
content of insider trades in the U.K. Corporate insiders, defined as managers, members of 
the board of directors, and large shareholders of publicly traded corporations tend to 
possess superior information about their company relative to small, dispersed 
shareholders. This informational advantage of corporate insiders relative to outsiders and 
its exploitation through insider trading has raised many questions concerning the fairness 
and efficiency of the financial markets and produced a huge body of theoretical and 
empirical literature. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the main issues. I discuss (i) 
costs and benefits of insider-trading regulation; (ii) abnormal profits from trading to 
insiders; (iii) abnormal profits to mimicking outsiders; (iv) determinants of profitable 
insider trades; (v) insider trading and economy-wide developments; and (vi) insider-
trading timing strategies. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the immediate market reaction to directors’ transactions for 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1991 to 1998.1 The results support 
previous findings that directors’ trades convey new information on the firm’s future 
prospects (see, for example, Seyhun, 1986, and Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, for the U.S. 
and Friederich et al., 2002, for the U.K.). Both directors’ purchases and sales trigger 
significant abnormal returns in the days immediately after their announcement, though the 
market reaction to purchases is higher. Markets seem to discount the information content  
 
                                                 
1 The chapter analyzes directors’ dealings – legal trading by the members of the board of directors of the 
company as defined in the listing rules of the London Stock Exchange (Source Book August 2002, Chapter 
16).  
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of sales more as part of the directors’ sales may be caused by liquidity and diversification 
needs of the directors. 
The main contribution of the study, however, is the analysis of the impact of corporate 
control on the information content of directors’ dealings. To our best knowledge, no 
previous study has explored this relationship so far. In particular, we analyze the impact of 
presence of different blockholder types on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
immediately after the announcement of directors’ transactions.2 It is argued that the 
market takes into account the firm’s corporate control characteristics when reacting to the 
information embedded in the directors’ transactions. For example, a director trade may 
have relatively less informational value in a firm owned by an outside blockholder who 
monitors than in a firm with dispersed ownership that is subject to a more substantial 
asymmetry of information. Our results confirm this notion. In general, the capital market 
differentiates between outsider and insider ownership and also, between blockholders who 
monitor the management and those who do not. If corporations, or individuals or families 
unrelated to the management are blockholders, then the market reaction to directors’ 
purchases is mitigated. This suggests that these types of blockholders reduce informational 
asymmetry. In contrast, the presence of institutional investors triggers the reverse effect: 
the market reacts more positively following directors’ purchases and more negatively 
following directors’ sales. Thus, institutional investors do not reduce the information gap 
between investors and directors, but they rather follow directors’ trades. 
Furthermore, our results confirm that markets perceive directors’ entrenchment and 
accountability as an important factor adjusting the informational content of directors’ 
transactions. For firms with significant directors’ stakes, the positive news contained in 
directors’ purchases is mitigated by the danger that directors become more entrenched and 
hence less accountable. At the same time, the market reacts less negatively when directors 
sell (part of) their shares when they own significant blocks of shares as this reduces the 
likelihood of their entrenchment. In general, increases in directors’ ownership are 
recognized as a negative signal, whereas decreases are perceived as positive news. Finally, 
we find stronger market reactions when firms are performing poorly (making losses or 
decreases its dividends) or are close to financial distress (low interest coverage).  
                                                 




1.2 The role large shareholders in a transition economy (Part II) 
The second part of this thesis deals with the actions that new private owners in the 
Czech Republic undertook immediately after the privatization in order to improve 
efficiency and profitability of the former state-owned enterprises. Privatization of socialist 
state-owned enterprises was an important part of the reform program in all transition 
countries that intended to transform their economies from centrally planned systems to 
market-driven economies. It is widely acknowledged in the economic profession that 
private ownership is the crucial source of incentives for corporate innovation and 
efficiency (Shleifer, 1998). Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that public 
enterprises are highly inefficient since they are under pressures from the politicians who 
control them to pursue political goals. Introduction of private owners removes these 
pressures and reinstalls the profit-maximization goal that leads to efficiency improvements 
and innovation. Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) review 
many recent empirical papers documenting that privatization is highly successful in 
delivering performance improvements. 
After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, the Czechoslovak government opted 
for fast liberalization/reform program (shock therapy) that aimed to introduce the three 
essential steps – price liberalization, stabilization and privatization – at a very high speed 
(Sachs, 1993). Voucher privatization that allowed for a relatively speedy transfer of 
ownership rights to private entities was designed as a very important part of the program. 
Chapter 4 positions the voucher scheme as a part of the whole privatization process in the 
Czech Republic, stresses its main features and highlights its main consequences for future 
developments at the micro level as well as at the equity-market level.  
Transfer of ownership to private hands together with increased competition, and 
hardening of budget constraint should have motivated former state-owned enterprises to 
reorganize their activities so that they become efficient and profitable. Chapters 5 and 6 
analyze these restructuring activities of the voucher-privatized Czech firms in the post-
privatization period and attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of these restructuring 
activities using a data set covering some 917 firms over the period from 1993 to 1998. 
First, Chapter 5 focuses on turnover at top managerial positions and evaluates 
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performance effect of such events. Second, using a production-function framework, 
Chapter 6 analyzes the effect of a wide range of restructuring activities on total factor 
productivity of the privatized firms. 
In market economies, firm performance typically affects decisions concerning the 
CEO’s tenure in the firm. In Chapter 5, we test whether or not the new private owners in 
charge of selecting firm managers in the Czech Republic are influenced by the prior 
relative performance of their firms. If this is the case, managers of firms that perform 
poorly relative to other industry members should have higher probability to be replaced. 
Our results show that the impact of firm performance on the probability of CEO change is 
not significant in the first couple of years directly after the transfer of ownership rights. 
However, the performance effect becomes significant for CEO changes in 1997, some 3-4 
years after the privatization. This effect is profound in firms with less concentrated control 
and firms where investment privatization funds are important blockholders. This may stem 
from the fact that more concentrated stakeholders are more involved in running of their 
companies and have, consequently, more information concerning qualities of the 
incumbent managers. Thus, they may replace their managers when there is a potential for 
performance improvement even though the firm’s relative performance measures 
(compared to other firms in the same industry) do not suggest underperformance.  
Our second finding confirms this proposition. When comparing productivity before 
and after the managerial change, we find that CEO change indeed delivers a positive shift 
in (total factor) productivity. This suggest that the new private owners act on their superior 
information regarding the unfulfilled potential for efficiency improvement of their firms 
and are able to appoint managers whose human capital better matches the firm’s 
productive assets. However, our third important conclusion is that the positive effect of 
CEO turnover is significant only when the CEO has a relatively strong position within the 
firm and is closely linked with the board of directors (which is ultimately responsible for 
all business affairs of the company). Also, replacements of the chairman of the board of 
the directors seem to be important efficiency improving events in this type of firms. To the 
contrary, replacements of the CEO or chairman of the board do not improve productivity 
when the management is relatively weak and the board-of-directors members are (mostly) 




that the newly established owners in the former state-owned enterprises in the Czech 
Republic are quite active in looking for new managers with better human capital who, 
consequently, improve productivity of their firms. 
For transition economies, the literature documents a wide variety of restructuring 
activities among state-owned enterprises in the pre-privatization period (see, for example, 
Carlin et al., 1996, and Agion et al., 1994). Chapter 6 provides an analysis of channels of 
restructuring in the post-privatization period on a panel of Czech voucher-privatized 
companies. The results indicate that asset sale, employee incentives, and CEO change 
serve as channels through which (total factor) productivity of the privatized companies is 
improved. To the contrary, capital expenditure and inventory management are not found to 
be significant determinants of enterprise productivity. Furthermore, the analysis suggests 
that availability of bank loans does not have any effect on productivity, which can be 
interpreted as indication of soft budget constraint imposed on the companies. 
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Corporate insiders, defined as managers, members of the board of directors, and large 
shareholders of publicly traded corporations tend to possess more information about their 
company than small, dispersed shareholders. This informational advantage of corporate 
insiders relative to outsiders and its exploitation through insider trading raises many 
questions concerning the fairness and efficiency of the financial markets (Leland, 1992). 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) document that in the U.S. insiders frequently trade in the 
shares of their firm. Using a data set covering all the companies traded on the NYSE, 
Amex, and NASDAQ over the period from 1975 to 1995, the authors show that there is 
some insider trading in more than 50 percent of the stocks in each year. On average, 
insider purchases (sales) per year amount to 0.6 percent (1.3 percent) of their company’s 
market capitalization. Furthermore, insider purchases of shares through the exercise of 
options and open market sales have significantly increased in the 1990s. 
As Jeng et al. (1999) state: “There are three good reasons to study the profitability of 
trades by corporate insiders: science, profit, and policy. Science examines the 
implications of the findings for market efficiency. Profit hopes to develop optimal trading 
strategies. Policy seeks to determine the effectiveness of insider trading rules, and the 
implications of insider profitability for both fairness and market performance.” These 
Chapter 2 12 
issues have been studied in a substantial body of empirical, but also theoretical research. 
This chapter provides an overview of the main issues regarding insider trading in the law 
and economics literature so far: (i) insider-trading regulation; (ii) abnormal profits from 
trading to insiders; (iii) abnormal profits to mimicking outsiders; (iv) determinants of 
profitable insider trades; (v) insider trading and economy-wide developments; and (vi) 
insider-trading timing strategies. The main flavour of all these issues is provided in the 
text below whereas broad discussion follows in the individual sections. 
A large body of theoretical models focuses on the fairness and desirability of these 
transactions and the consequences for insider-trading regulation. The models normally 
analyse the costs and benefits of insider-trading regulation for insiders and investors. 
Empirical evidence supports arguments both for and against insider-trading regulation and 
highlights the complexity of this issue.  
The most researched empirical issue regarding insider trading is the market reaction to 
insider transactions. On one hand, one can argue that, given that insiders possess superior 
information, it motivates them to trade in stock of their own firms and profit using this 
information. Significant long-term abnormal profits (over 6 to 12 months) to insiders 
following trades in their own companies demonstrate that insiders do indeed possess 
superior information. On the other hand, it can be argued that, given that the stock market 
is efficient and insiders possess superior information, the announcement of insider trading 
should be followed by an almost immediate market adjustment of prices. In general, these 
empirical tests document significant abnormal profits to insiders. 
Another related and equally important issue is the existence of abnormal profits to 
outsiders who based on publicly available information mimic the insiders’ trades. It is 
argued that if outsiders were able to profit following such mimicking strategies, it would 
constitute a serious threat to the semi-strong market efficiency hypothesis. The semi-
strong efficiency hypothesis basically implies that nobody can earn abnormal profits using 
public information. Many studies show statistically and economically insignificant profits 
to mimicking outsiders.  
Several studies try to identify determinants of profitable insider trades. In general, it is 
shown that larger abnormal profits are associated with insiders who are closely engaged in 
the business of their company. Also, smaller firms are expected to have higher 
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informational asymmetry and more profitable insider trades. Intensive insider trading in 
terms of bigger transactions (number of shares traded) and multiple simultaneous trades 
results in higher profits.  
Another interesting hypothesis relates superior insider information and insider trading 
to subsequent economy-wide developments. In particular, it is conjectured and 
documented that insiders are able to predict future economy-wide movements: when 
insiders are optimistic (predominantly purchase shares of their own firms), the subsequent 
aggregate market return increases. To the contrary, when they are pessimistic, markets do 
poorly (decrease). Further tests show that insiders in aggregate are contrarian investors but 
predict future market movements well.  
The information content of insider transactions is also explored by studying insider-
trading strategies around firm earnings announcements. Insiders seem to postpone their 
trades until after important announcements (passive trading strategy) rather than trading 
on their information before the announcements (active strategy). 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the main 
features of the U.S. and U.K. insider-trading regulation. Section 2.3 focuses on theoretical 
and empirical evidence concerning insider-trading regulation. Section 2.4 surveys the 
extensive empirical evidence on market reaction to insider trading and aggregate insider-
trading effects are discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concentrates on insider timing 
strategies and managerial compensation, respectively.  
2.2 Insider trading regulation in the U.S. and U.K. 
In the U.S., the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is the governmental body in 
charge of regulating insider trading. Legal restrictions on insider trading are formulated in 
the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and its amendments. Corporate insiders, such as 
officers3, directors, and other key employees, are required to refrain from trading on 
‘material’ undisclosed information and to fill in statements of their holdings in the first ten 
days of the month following the month in which the trade occurred (Persons, 1997). 
                                                 
3 The term ‘officer’ includes company president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, any 
vice president in charge of any principal business unit, division, or function (such as sales, administration, or 
finance), and any other person who performs a policy-making function for the company (Bettis et al., 2000). 
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Shareholders who hold more than 10 percent of any equity class must also report their 
trading activity to the SEC. The SEC publishes these transactions in its monthly Official 
Summary of Insider Transactions. However, investors learn about insider transactions 
sooner. Chang and Suk (1998) report that the primary information dissemination 
concerning corporate insiders’ trades is when the insider-trading information becomes 
available to investors through an online service or in the SEC reading room. This is 
usually on the same day as the transaction was performed. Shortly after, information about 
insider trading appears in the Wall Street Journal or other financial press. Finally, it is 
published in the SEC’s Official Summary of Securities Transactions and Holdings.  Profits 
that insiders made on short-term swings in prices (formally within six months) must be 
repaid to the company. In general, the essence of the existing laws on insider trading in the 
U.S. is that insiders must either abstain from trading on such information or release it to 
the public before they trade (Hu and Noe, 1997).  
Prosecution of insider trading was not very common until the last two decades of 
1900s (Hu and Noe, 1997). In 1975, the 1934 Act was amended to increase the maximum 
criminal penalty and the maximum prison sentence. The 1984 Insider Trading Sanctions 
Act and 1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act further increased the 
penalties for illegal insider trading. This resulted in an increased number of insider-trading 
cases. Meulbroek (1992) reported that the SEC prosecuted more than 400 cases of insider 
trading between 1980 and 1989. 
To the contrary, U.K. regulators have taken a different approach. The insider trading 
regulation contained in the Model Code of the London Stock Exchange and the 1985 
Companies’ Act is stricter than the corresponding regulation in the U.S. (Hillier and 
Marshall, 1998). Directors (all members of the board of directors) must inform their 
company as soon as possible after the transaction and no later than the fifth business day 
of any transaction carried out for their personal account (Friederich et al., 2002). In turn, a 
listed company must inform the Stock Exchange of the transaction without delay and no 
later than the end of the business day following receipt of the information by the 
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company.4 The Stock Exchange disseminates this information immediately to data 
vendors as well as via its own ‘Regulator News Service’. The company should also enter 
this information in the Company Register, which is available for public inspection within 
three days of reporting by insider, but this way of disseminating the information is 
nowadays much less important. An important difference with the U.K. regulatory regime 
is that in the U.S., insiders are more broadly defined and also include large shareholders.  
Additional insider-trading restrictions in the U.K. stem from the fact that directors of 
the companies traded on the London Stock Exchange are prohibited from trading for two 
months prior to a final or interim earnings announcement and one month prior to a 
quarterly earnings announcement. Furthermore, outside the restricted periods, directors are 
required to receive clearance to trade from the chair of the board of directors. According to 
Hillier and Marshall (1998) insider trading is almost non-existent for a two-month period 
prior to the final and interim announcements. In general, there is no such regulation in the 
U.S. Lustgarten and Mande (1995) show that the volume of U.S. insider trading declines 
as an earning announcement approaches but it does not decline to zero. The U.S. system 
seems to favour frequent disclosure to remove possible insider advantages while the U.K. 
system prefers less frequent disclosure accompanied by a ban at price sensitive times 
(Hillier and Marshall, 2002). 
It should be noted, however, that besides the federal regulation, a large fraction of U.S. 
firms impose additional insider-trading restrictions on their directors and officers (Bettis et 
al., 2000). In particular, Bettis et al. (2000) report that in 1996 as much as 92 percent of 
their sample firms had some type of policy regarding insider trading and 78 percent of the 
sample firms had explicit blackout periods during which the company prohibits trading by 
its insiders. The single most common policy disallows trading by insiders at all times 
except during a trading window that is open during the period 3 through 12 trading days 
after the quarterly earnings announcement.  
                                                 
4 This indicates that information about an insider transaction reaches the market as late as 6 days after the 
transaction. However, in reality this information is revealed faster since directors of listed companies are 
required to get clearance before each transaction from the chair of board of directors. 
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2.3 Costs and benefits of insider trading regulation 
An important part of the insider-trading discussion among the law and economics 
scholars is the question regarding fairness of insider trading and usefulness of insider-
trading regulation. Several analytical models show the costs and benefits of insider-trading 
regulation. Is it more beneficial for the society to regulate (prohibit) transactions of 
insiders in the shares of their own firms? Or, to the contrary, is it more efficient to leave 
managers to trade these shares freely?  
2.3.1 Theoretical models 
Economic analysis of insider trading usually considers four parties: insiders, informed 
market professionals, liquidity traders, and investors (Hu and Noe, 1997). Insiders, as 
defined by the law, are the officers and directors who obtain confidential information due 
to the nature of their employment. Market professionals are informed outsiders, such as 
securities analysts, brokers, or arbitrageurs, who spend their own resources to acquire 
private information. Liquidity traders are short-term stock market participants who trade in 
order to hedge risk or balance their portfolio. They usually have only a limited share stake 
in the firm. Finally, investors are shareholders who have a long-term interest in the firm; 
they ‘buy and hold.’ The law and economics literature tries to weigh the costs and benefits 
for these different groups affected by insider trading.  
In general, two main theoretical approaches are used to discuss the costs and benefits 
of insider trading: agency theory considers only insiders and investors whereas market 
theories look at the aggregate economic effects of insider trading (Beny, 1999). According 
to agency theory, insider trading represents an efficient form of managerial compensation 
because it reduces the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders and 
increases managers’ incentives to engage in value-maximizing activities (Manne, 1966, 
Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1993, Hu and Noe, 2001). In contrast, Noe (1997) shows that 
relaxation of insider trading restrictions may lead to a lower lever of managerial effort as 
inefficient private benefits of control accrue to insiders at outsider shareholders’ expense. 
Market theories put costs and benefits of insider trading into a broader perspective of 
equity markets. Leland’s (1992) pioneering model on the topic shows that permission of 
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insider trading has several concequencies: stock prices better reflect information and are 
higher on average, expected real investment rises, markets are less liquid, owners of 
investment projects and insiders do benefit, and, finally, outside investors and liquidity 
traders are hurt. Total welfare may increase or decrease depending on the economic 
environment. This model has inspired a quite extensive body of analytical models that 
further develop the individual issues raised in Leland (1992). Proponents of unregulated 
insider trading claim that insider trading contributes to the overall market efficiency 
because it enables prices to reflect information more accurately such that firms do not 
have to rely on more costly traditional forms of disclosure (Carlton and Fischel, 1983). 
This impounding of information allows shareholders to make better personal portfolio 
allocations (Hu and Noe, 2001). Opponents argue that unregulated insider trading reduces 
the overall level of market efficiency: it may hamper investor confidence and, hence, 
participation in equity markets (Ausubel, 1990), distort managers’ incentives to engage in 
timely disclosure of information (Kraakman, 1991), discourage the production of 
information by outside analysts and, thus, reduce the net informational efficiency of a 
stock market (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992), and, finally, reduce market liquidity for firm’s 
stocks leading to higher cost of capital (Copeland and Galai, 1983). 
Shin (1996) provides an interesting insight concerning insider-trading regulation that 
indicates that direct restrictions of insider trading are not the only way to reduce negative 
consequences of insider trading on liquidity traders in the market. His model shows that 
when the regulator pursues the objective of minimal losses to liquidity traders, he can 
either directly restrict insider trading, or, with the same effect, allow more market 
professionals to enter the market (so that they compete with insiders) and enforce higher 
information disclosure. Competition between market professionals and insiders in using 
their information will influence the stock price, improve informational efficiency, and may 
also reduce trading losses to liquidity traders.  
The social welfare impact of insider trading is analyzed in Estrada (1995). He shows 
that insider trading regulation has both beneficial and detrimental effects on a security 
market. Insider trading regulation has positive effect on market liquidity and current-price 
volatility, and a detrimental effect on future-price volatility, informational efficiency and 
price predictability. However, he shows that insider-trading regulation has a negative 
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impact on society as a whole – social welfare is higher when insider trading is not 
regulated. This is because in an unregulated market (i) the price volatility is lower, and the 
market is consequently less risky; (ii) insiders bear part of the price risk and there is 
increased risk sharing among investors in the market; and (iii) no resources are diverted to 
the enforcement of insider trading regulation, so, no production is foregone in this market. 
In short, Estrada (1995) shows that imposition of insider-trading regulation forces a 
reallocation of wealth and risk that decreases social welfare. In contrast, Ausubel (1990) 
using a competitive market framework concludes that society is better off when insider 
trading is restricted. However, price-taking behaviour in a competitive market may not be 
the adequate framework to analyze issues of informed trading since transactions based on 
private information tend to be rather large and move prise significantly (Estrada, 1995).  
The divergence of conclusions of the different models stems from disagreement over 
which effects of insider trading would have the most significant impact on economic well 
being (Hu and Noe, 1997). In summary, there is a large degree of consensus regarding the 
following issues.  First, whenever other informationally advantaged investors are absent or 
insignificant, insider trading increases losses to investors and liquidity traders and makes 
the markets less liquid. Second, unless other informed traders are forced out of the market, 
insider trading has positive effect on price informativeness and market efficiency, and 
potentially improves capital budgeting decisions. Third, insider trading provides low-cost 
and effective incentives for managers. However, insider trading also encourages managers 
to undertake risky projects. At the same time, insider trading substitutes for explicit forms 
of compensation (e.g. salary and bonuses) that themselves may lead to satisfactory 
managerial performance and reduced risk taking. 
2.3.2 Empirical evidence 
The debate on the cost and benefits of insider-trading regulation is supported by 
several empirical studies. A majority of papers argue against insider-trading restrictions 
and document, the positive impact of the insiders’ transactions on information available in 
the stock market. To the contrary, proponents of insider-trading regulation show evidence 
concerning decreased liquidity and increased trading costs. 
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Kabir and Vermaelen (1996) exploit an interesting opportunity for a controlled 
experimental setting that was provided by the introduction of insider-trading prohibition 
two months before an annual earnings announcement for firms listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange since 1987. They document that trading volume decreased (stocks 
became less liquid) during the two months when insiders were not allowed to trade. 
Moreover, their results indicate that introduction of insider-trading restrictions resulted in 
slower market adjustment to positive earnings news. Overall, this analysis provides 
evidence against insider-trading regulation as it decreases liquidity and informativeness of 
the stock market. 
Lustgarten and Mande (1998) also argue against insider-trading prohibition as they 
show that insider trading provides additional information to the market participant which 
increases market efficiency. Their study also documents that the announcement of insider 
trading increases the amount of information available to financial analysts who forecast 
corporate earnings. In particular, insider purchase announcements have a diminishing 
impact on the dispersion of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and magnitude of 
analysts’ earnings errors.  
A similar argument regarding the information revelation via insider trading is put 
forward in Givoly and Palmon (1985). They state that a large part of the abnormal 
performance of insider trades is due to price changes arising from the information revealed 
through the trades themselves, lending support to the conjecture that investors accept the 
superior knowledge of insiders and follow the insiders’ footsteps (the leading-indicator 
effect). A major shortcoming of the paper, however, is that it does not recognize passive 
trading strategies by insiders. That is, the analysis tries to identify news announcements 
that follow insider trades but ignore announcements that precede them. It has been shown, 
however, that insiders are more inclined to trade passively – following news 
announcements – rather than actively (Lustgarten and Mande, 1995).5 Nevertheless, 
passive trading strategies of insiders, which oppose the news of the earnings 
announcement, were shown to earn significant abnormal returns that more than cancel out 
the announcement information effect (Hillier and Marshall, 2002). This finding supports 
Givoly and Palmon’s claim that a large part of the abnormal performance of insider trades 
                                                 
5 Active and passive trading strategies are described in more detail in Section 2.6. 
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is likely to be due to price changes arising from the information revealed through the 
trades themselves. 
Meulbroek (1992) argues that insider trades in her sample, which SEC has alleged as 
based on superior inside information (were labelled as illegal), provided the market with 
information before it was officially announced and they increased market informativeness 
and price efficiency. In particular, Meulbroek (1992) documents that insider trading is 
associated with immediate price movements and quick price discovery. Thus, insider 
trading transmits private information and increases the accuracy of securities prices. 
Further analysis indicates that both the amount traded by insiders and trade-specific 
characteristics (such as trade size, direction, and frequency) signal the presence of an 
informed trader to the market, which Jabbour et al. (2000) also confirm for a sample of 
Canadian corporate takeovers.  
Persons (1997) argues in favour of insider-trading regulation. He studies the market 
reaction to announcement of Security Exchange Commission’s insider trading 
enforcements, defined as illegal insider transactions being prosecuted by the SEC, and 
documents that the announcement of the enforcement action negatively affects the firm’s 
stock value. This negative effect may stem from the fact that firms usually incur a 
significant amount of expenses as a result of the SEC’s investigation (litigation expenses 
and settlement payments), and the enforcement may also provide justified grounds for 
subsequent stockholders’ lawsuits that may negatively influence future cash flows. 
Moreover, it is also highly probable that the enforcement action also damages the firm’s 
reputation, and leads to an increase in its cost of capital. Further analysis indicates that 
larger illegal insider profits are followed by stronger negative market reactions. In 
summary, Persons’ results demonstrate that prosecution of illegal insider trading is costly 
for involved companies. This implies that the SEC sanctions may encourage insiders to 
abstain from illegal insider trading. Still, in this respect, the deterrence effect of an SEC 
prosecution depends on who bears the costs of prosecution and how probable it is for an 
insider that the illegal trade is discovered and prosecuted. 
Further indirect evidence supporting insider-trading regulation – or rather self-
regulation – is presented in Bettis et al. (2000) who show that a large fraction of U.S. firms 
self-regulate insider trading of their directors and officers. Over 92 percent of firms in 
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their sample have some type of policy regarding insider trading, and 78 percent of their 
firms have explicit trading bans, periods during which insiders are not allowed to trade. 
The authors provide two competing explanations for existence of these self-regulating 
restrictions. First, it is possible that these corporate policies limiting insider trading are a 
public relations ploy, providing legal protection for the firm and the firm’s insiders 
without having any detectable effect on insider-trading behaviour or the liquidity of the 
firm’s shares. A second explanation is that these policies are structured to either minimize 
costs (litigation costs and costs associated with lost managerial time, business disruption, 
and negative publicity) or to improve the liquidity of the market for firm’s shares. 
Empirical pricing results support the latter explanation. Corporate trading prohibitions in 
the form of blackout periods are associated with a significant reduction in insider trading. 
In the blackout periods, insider-trading activity is less than one-third of that during 
allowed trading periods. Furthermore, lower insider-trading activity during trading bans 
brings about lower bid-ask spreads and greater liquidity during these periods compared to 
allowed trading days.  
Beny (1999) provides further empirical support for the relationship between insider 
trading regulation and market liquidity. She documents that for a cross-section of 
countries, tougher insider trading laws are positively associated with market liquidity 
(market turnover ratio). Moreover, she shows that the ability of insiders to engage in 
unrestricted trading encourages concentrated share ownership.  
2.4 Market reaction to insider trades 
The most empirically explored issue within the insider-trading literature is the amount 
of superior information available to insiders. The question whether insiders indeed posses 
special information concerning future prospects of their firms can be approached in two 
ways. First, as insiders possess superior information, it motivates them to trade in stock of 
their own firms and profit using this information. Consequently, significant long-term 
abnormal profits (over 6 to 12 months) to insiders would constitute a proof of insiders’ 
superior information. Second, as the stock market is efficient and insiders possess superior 
information, the announcement of insider trading should be followed by a prompt market 
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adjustment of prices. Hence, the information content of insiders’ trades can be 
alternatively tested by an immediate market reaction to announcement of insider 
transactions.  
Another frequently explored question closely associated with insider trading is the 
existence of positive profits to outsiders who mimic insider trades. This issue is quite 
intriguing since positive abnormal profits (net of transaction costs and bid-ask spread) to 
certain strategies of mimicking outsiders would also be inconsistent with market 
efficiency.  
2.4.1 Long-term profitability of insider trades 
Jaffe (1974) is the first study that uses a sound event study methodology and attempts 
to resolve the issue concerning the possession of superior information by corporate 
insiders and profitability of their trades. Some earlier studies find evidence that insiders 
can the predict price movement in their own securities (Rogoff, 1964; Glass, 1966; and 
Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968) but others find no evidence of successful insiders’ 
forecasting (Wu, 1963 and Driscoll, 1956). Jaffe, using monthly abnormal returns after 
insider trades in the largest companies traded in the U.S. over the period from 1962 until 
1968, documents that insiders do indeed trade on privileged information. In particular, he 
shows that over a period of 1 to 8 months following the month of trading insiders earn 
statistically significant abnormal profits that range from 0.6 percent to 1.4 percent. The 
analysis of large trades and of months of intensive trading yield even stronger results. 
Nevertheless, outsiders would earn profits greater than commissions only by following 
insider trades in the intensive trading months.6 Finnerty (1976) uses the CAPM model to 
test for profitability of insider transactions. His results also indicate that insiders can 
outperform the market: they earn above average returns when buying shares of their own 
firms and when they sell shares, prices fall more than the general market decline of the 
period.  
                                                 
6 A month is an intensive (purchase) trading month if the number of purchases is at least 3 times bigger than 
the average number of sales, and conversely, in an intensive (sales) trading month, the number of sales is at 
least 3 times bigger than the number of purchases. 
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Seyhun (1986) reinvestigates stock price behaviour following the insiders’ transactions 
using daily data and event study methodology with the market model as a benchmark. He 
argues that the CAPM-model benchmark, used in the previous studies, results in potential 
biases in measuring expected returns to securities. In particular, the CAPM-based 
residuals are on average positive for small firms and negative for large firms (Banz, 1981 
and Reinganum, 1981). This means that if insiders have predominantly more purchases 
than sales in small firms, biases in the CAPM may result in positive abnormal returns 
following insider purchases. Seyhun documents that insider trading is profitable and that 
most of the abnormal stock price adjustment occurs during the first 100 days following the 
insider-trading day: stock prices rise abnormally by 3.0 percent (t-statistic 4.4) for 
purchases and decline abnormally by 1.7 percent (t-statistic –2.7) for sales. His results also 
document that insiders are able to time their trades properly and strategically. On average, 
insiders’ purchases follow a previous stock price decline (1.4 percent, t-statistic –2.1) and 
insiders sell following a previous stock price increase (2.5 percent, t-statistic 4.0).  
Moreover, Seyhun (1986) explores also abnormal profits to outsiders who mimic the 
insiders’ transactions. The novelty of his analysis is the use of the actual dates insiders 
first report their transactions to the SEC and the dates when insiders’ trading information 
is published in the Official Summary.7 The results indicate that if outsiders trade on the 
basis of insiders’ transactions as soon as the SEC receives insiders’ reports, they can earn 
1.4 percent after 100 days and 1.9 percent after 300 days. If the outsider waits until after 
the Official Summary is available, then the gross abnormal return is only 1.1 percent 
during the next 300 days. However, after the adjustment for the bid-ask spread plus 
transaction costs for a round trip transaction, the realizable abnormal profits to outsiders 
imitating the insiders’ trades are non-positive.8 This evidence is consistent with market 
efficiency. Insiders possess superior information and can predict future abnormal stock 
price changes. Market efficiency is, however, not challenged, as net of trading costs 
                                                 
7 Previous studies generally assume that all insider-trading information becomes publicly available within 
two months. This can cause substantial biases in the measurement of the announcement effect. 
8 The bid-ask spread plus the commission is taken as 6.8 percent for firms less than $25 million, 5.2 percent 
for firms between $25 and $50 million, 3.7 percent for firms between $50 and $250 million, 3.2 percent for 
firms between $250 million and $1 billion, and 2.7 percent for firms greater than $1 billion. These numbers 
correspond to the Stoll and Whaley (1983) estimates. 
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mimicking outsiders cannot earn abnormal profits following the public dissemination of 
insider-trading information. 
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) argue that since the estimates of abnormal returns depend on 
the size and price/earnings ratio of firms, abnormal returns measuring profitability of 
insider trades should be properly adjusted for these effects. Their results show that after 
the size and earnings/price effects adjustments,9 the abnormal profits to insiders are 
reduced by 25-50 percent. When transaction costs of 2 percent are imposed, the only 
profitable trading horizon is the 12-month horizon and the level of profits is 0.26 percent 
per month or 3.12 percent per year. Also, profits to outsiders who mimic insiders’ trades 
are similarly reduced. In particular, the outsider trading profits are close to 0.5 percent per 
month or 6 percent per year when using the traditional market model. However, after 
adjustment for the size and earnings/price effects, the abnormal returns are reduced to 
about 0.3 percent per month at horizons of 3-12 months. Moreover, an additional 
assumption of 2 percent transaction costs makes outsider profits zero or negative. The 
authors conclude (p.43): “Our empirical findings do not strongly support the view that 
corporate insiders have information that the market does not have, for, if it is true that 
corporate insiders posses such inside information on a routine basis, the evidence does 
not suggest that they earn substantial profits from directly using this information in stock 
trading.” However, it is probably the case that the market reacts to the news of insider 
trading directly after it is made available to the public. The event window of 1 to 12 
months after the transaction month may be too wide and too far from the actual event. It 
may be the case that the findings of this paper actually confirm the hypothesis that the 
market reacts to the news of insider trading immediately and fully within the month of the 
transaction. 
Lin and Howe (1990) examine the profitability of insider trading in firms whose 
securities trade in the OTC/NASDAQ market. This is of importance because the market 
microstructure of the OTC market is different from that of organized exchanges. The 
multiplicity of market makers may allow insiders to more carefully conceal their trades.  
                                                 
9 The market model is adjusted using a control portfolio approach that simulates the abnormal returns that an 
uninformed investor could earn by taking into account the size and earnings/price effects. Monthly returns 
are used. 
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Moreover, transaction costs are higher for OTC-listed firms. Finally, the firms traded in 
the OTC market are relatively small. Smaller firms are less closely monitored by financial 
analysts and institutional investors, which might cause a greater degree of informational 
asymmetry. The results (using monthly abnormal returns) suggest that also insiders of the 
OTC/NASDAQ firms trade on privileged information. The abnormal returns after six and 
12 months following the trades are about 2-3 percent and are statistically significant. 
However, high transaction costs (especially bid-ask spreads) appear to eliminate the 
potential for positive abnormal returns to outsiders mimicking insiders’ trades. The overall 
conclusion of Lin and Howe (1990) is that the profitability of insider trading in the OTC 
market is not much different from that in the organized exchanges. 
Bettis et al. (1997) dispute the findings of Seyhun (1986) and Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988) of insignificant abnormal profits to outsiders mimicking insiders’ transactions. 
Bettis et al. (1997) show that outsiders could profit by following the transactions of 
corporate insiders. In particular, their profitable trading strategy prescribes to follow large-
volume trades by high-ranking insiders on NYSE and Amex. Transaction-cost adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns to outsiders following this strategy for insider purchases span 
from 2.95 percent after 26 weeks to 6.96 percent after 52 weeks. For sales, this strategy 
earns 2.05 percent after 26 weeks and 4.86 percent after 52 weeks. All of these results are 
highly significant.  
It is important to note, however, that the stronger results of the more recent study by 
Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey (1997) may also stem from improved information technology 
(online database) available to investors in recent years: the insider-trading information is 
made publicly available significantly faster, usually only one or two days following the 
SEC filing day. Another possible explanation is that assumptions concerning the reporting 
delay (time elapsed between the actual trade and its announcement) in the two previous 
studies (Seyhun, 1986 and Rozeff and Zaman, 1988) may also have biased their results. 
The reporting delays are substantially higher in Seyhun (1986) and Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988) than in Bettis et al. (1997). Too long reporting delays may cause that the event 
window is too far from the actual dissemination date and that some potentially viable 
trades by outsiders are ignored. This may also mean that even though the new information 
moves the market prices significantly, this happens out of the event window and implies 
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too low reported abnormal profits. The last explanation may stem from the fact that Bettis 
et al. (1997) separate purchases and sales and use weekly returns whereas Rozeff and 
Zaman (1988) pool all trades and rely on monthly CAARs.  
Jeng et al. (1999) explore a comprehensive sample of reported insider transactions 
over a period from 1975 to 1996. Their analysis is based on value-weighted portfolios that 
are constructed by placing all insider purchases (sales) into the portfolio on the day they 
are made and are held for exactly one year. Returns to these portfolios are then analyzed 
using performance-evaluation methods.10 The authors argue that this approach is free of 
the statistical difficulties that are connected with event studies on long horizon returns. 
The results suggest that insiders profit from purchases but not from sales. In particular, the 
purchase portfolio outperforms the market by about 7.4 percent per annum. About one-
sixth of these abnormal returns accrue within the first five days after the trade, and one-
third within the first month.  
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also provide evidence on long-term abnormal performance 
of insider trades. Without controlling for size and book-to-market effects, firms with high-
volume insider buys during the prior six months outperform companies with high-volume 
sales by 7.8 percent. However, these findings depend on company size; large companies 
are priced more efficiently than small companies. After adjusting for B/M and size, the 
spread in returns is reduced to 4.8 percent over the first year. 
King and Röell (1988) and Pope et al. (1990) are among the first to explore insider-
trading profits in the U.K. context. In general, the results of Pope et al. (1990) are 
consistent with previous work for the U.S.; they document a considerable abnormal 
market reaction following insider dealings. In particular, the cumulative abnormal returns 
6 months after the announcement of the directors’ trades for purchases and sales are 4.85 
percent, and are highly statistically significant. This is attributed to the abnormal 
performance of the sales portfolio rather than to the purchase portfolio. 
Gregory et al. (1994) reassess the U.K. results adjusting the abnormal returns for size 
and thin trading effects. Their results suggest that abnormal returns can be earned by a 
                                                 
10 The authors use three alternative performance evaluation methods: the standard CAPM model of Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965), 4-factor model of Carhart (1997), and the characteristic-selectivity measure 
method developed by Daniel et al. (1997). Two other studies that employ a similar approach are Finnerty 
(1976) and Eckbo and Smith (1998). 
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simple strategy of buying or selling shares following the disclosure of directors’ trades.11 
However, adjustments for size and thin trading effects lead to an overall reduction of the 
abnormal profits. Insiders earn abnormal returns of 2.29 percent over 6 months and 6.01 
percent over 12 months after purchasing additional shares (only the latter is statistically 
significant). In contrast, none of the sales-related abnormal returns are significant. All 
these returns become insignificant once transaction costs and bid-ask spreads have been 
allowed for. The authors conclude that the size effect is responsible for the apparently 
significant abnormal returns achievable from following directors’ transactions. Once size 
is corrected for, the CAARs become statistically insignificant in the case of sell signals 
and less significant with buy signals. Still, the excess returns may well be lower than 
transaction costs. 
The primary focus of Gregory et al. (1997) is to differentiate effects of various buy and 
sell signals resulting form insider transactions and, so, reconcile and extend the previous 
research on directors’ dealings in the U.K. (King and Röell, 1988, Pope et al., 1990, and 
Gregory et al., 1994). Their insider-trading signals are defined according to the net value 
and net number of shares transacted. In summary, the results suggest that outsiders can 
indeed earn abnormal returns by following mimicking strategies. However, their 
conclusions regarding market efficiency should be interpreted with caution as the 
abnormal profits may still not be high enough to cover transaction costs of a full 
transaction round trip. First, using the monthly net volume of directors’ trades as a signal 
leads to small but significantly positive abnormal returns of 2.16 percent and 2.88 percent 
after 6 and 12 months, respectively. The returns for the sales are statistically insignificant. 
Second, using the net number of directors’ trades as a signal gives similar results. Finally, 
when the signal is refined to examine the importance of large-volume trades, absolute 
values of the cumulative abnormal returns for the purchase portfolio are smaller but still 
significant (1.14 percent and 0.48 percent after six and 12 months, respectively). However, 
on the sales side, the large-volume signals generate relatively large abnormal returns (–
2.46 percent (significant) and –3.96 percent (not significant) after six and 12 months,  
                                                 
11 The date of the signal to the market is the date on which the documentation provided by the company is 
reported by the stock exchange. If directors buy more shares than they sell, a buy signal arises whereas a sell 
signal is triggered if sales exceed purchases. 
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respectively). This shows that the market acknowledges asymmetry in the directors’ 
purchases, liquidity sales and large sales which may be caused by other than liquidity 
reasons. 
2.4.2 The immediate market reaction 
Even though a majority of the empirical evidence on superior information by insiders 
regarding future prospects of their firms focuses on long-term profitability of insider 
trading, several studies complement these findings by providing evidence on the 
immediate market reaction to insider-trading announcements. 
Jaffe (1974) is among the first to document that the publication of information in the 
SEC’s Official Summary of Securities Transactions and Holdings moves prices 
significantly. The one-month CAAR after the announcement is 0.9 percent.12 Likewise, 
Chang and Suk (1998) test secondary information dissemination effects at the stock 
market (by looking at the publication of the Insider Trading Spotlight column in the Wall 
Street Journal).13 The results show significant abnormal stock performance of 0.39 percent 
at the SEC filing date, which is the primary dissemination day. In addition, the publishing 
day in the Wall Street Journal is also associated with a positive and significant market 
adjustment, the four-day CAAR following this day is 0.92 percent (significant at the one-
percent level). Moreover, increased trading volume provides additional evidence of the 
existence of dissemination of information. Significant abnormal stock performance at the 
secondary dissemination day does not necessarily imply market inefficiency. Instead, it is 
more likely that individual investors consider the expected costs of obtaining new 
information from the SEC filing to exceed the expected benefits. 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) do not document any economically meaningful stock price 
reaction around the time when insiders trade or around the reporting dates. The average 
cumulative abnormal returns over 5 days following the announcement of purchases (sales) 
                                                 
12 He uses a data set covering the largest 200 firms and assumes that insiders’ transactions are announced 
(the Official Summary publishes an insider-trading event) two months after the event occurred. 
13 First, insider-trading information is available to investors through an online service or in the SEC reading 
room usually on the same day as the transaction was performed. This is the primary information 
dissemination concerning corporate insiders’ trades. Shortly after, information about insider trading appears 
in the Wall Street Journal or other financial press. Finally, it is published in the SEC’s Official Summary of 
Securities Transactions and Holdings. 
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by managers are 0.13 percent (-0.23 percent), whereas the transaction-day CAARs are 
0.59 percent and 0.17 percent for purchases and sales, respectively. The differences in 
conclusions between Lakonishok and Lee (2001) versus Chang and Suk (1998) are 
substantial. First, it has to be noted that the Insider Trading Spotlight column in the Wall 
Street Journal (analyzed in Chang and Suk, 1998) covers only the larger transactions 
whereas the data set of Lakonishok and Lee (2001) is more comprehensive and covers all 
insider-trading transactions on the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ over the period from 
1975 until 1995. Second, the differences in the conclusions by the two studies also result 
from differences in transaction size as larger transactions lead to stronger signals 
conveying more information. Moreover, it is possible that the Wall Street Journal 
publications are biased towards the more important and informationally richer 
transactions. 
Examining the patterns of returns immediately around the trades of U.K. directors, 
Friederich et al. (2002) suggest that directors of less liquid and relatively smaller firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange trade on price-sensitive information. For director 
purchases, abnormal returns turn positive on the transaction day and stay positive over the 
whole event window of 20 days following the net purchase. The cumulative abnormal 
returns are on average –2.85 percent over the pre-event period of 20 days, and 1.96 
percent 20 days after the net purchase. The patterns are symmetrical for the directors’ 
sales, though the magnitude of abnormal returns is lower. Directors typically sell shares 
after a run of positive price movements (1.23 percent over 20 days). Abnormal returns are 
predominantly negative after the directors’ net sale, so that cumulative abnormal returns 
reach on average –1.46 percent. These findings are robust to different sensitivity checks 
concerning thin trading, outliers, variance changes, non-normality, and time dependence.  
In summary, the empirical literature analyzing (short- and long-term) abnormal returns 
after insider trading documents that insiders indeed possess superior information regarding 
future prospects of their firms and market participants use this information to adjust prices 
accordingly. At the same time, however, many studies document that mimicking strategies 
net of transaction costs are not profitable. 
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2.4.3 Determinants of profitable insider trading 
Some of the above mentioned empirical studies on profitability of insider trading 
explore also other firm and trade-related characteristics that may have impact on the CARs 
to insiders after their transactions. Firm size, intensity of trades (transaction size and 
number of insiders trading), and insiders’ type are shown in some studies to influence the 
CARs.  
It is more likely that insiders in small firms have a stronger informational advantage 
since small firms receive less attention from analysts (Jeng et al., 1999). This implies a 
negative correlation between information content of directors’ dealings and firm size. 
Empirical results concerning this conjecture are mixed. Seyhun (1986) reports a 
significantly negative relationship and concludes that the most profitable insider trading 
occurs in small firms. However, more recent studies fail to support his finding (Lin and 
Howe, 1990 and Jeng et al., 1999). They argue that the Seyhun’s (1986) finding is a result 
of size-related measurement error in abnormal returns. In other words, the relationship 
disappears ones abnormal returns are size-adjusted. So far, no empirical evidence has been 
provided on this relation between firm size and CARs following the announcement of 
insider trades for a U.K. sample. However, Gregory et al. (1997) report more insider-
trading activity for less liquid and smaller stocks that may indicate higher information 
asymmetry and larger CARs for these firms. 
Another notion is that insiders may be aware of the value of their informational 
advantage and trade more when they have more information (Seyhun, 1986). To put it 
differently: more intensive insider trading can be interpreted as a signal of higher 
information asymmetry. Lin and Howe (1990) propose two measures to assess the 
intensity of insider trading: number of insiders trading and the size of trades. Both the 
measures are expected to have a strengthening effect on the abnormal returns because the 
information content may be stronger for large trades and the information content is 
confirmed by multiple insiders’ transactions. The empirical results are mixed, though 
Seyhun (1986) confirms the hypothesis: the market reaction to net insider transactions is 
significantly more positive for large trades (in terms of the (log-) value (in dollars) and the 
(log-) proportion of the firm traded). His results for the net number of trading insiders is, 
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however, not so clear-cut; it becomes insignificant after controlling for firm size.14 Jeng et 
al. (1999) confirm Seyhun’s results and show that medium-volume and high-volume 
insider purchases are more profitable compared to low-volume purchases15. In contrast, 
Lin and Howe (1990) show that neither number of insiders trading nor the dollar amount 
of insider trading are important determinants of insider’s abnormal returns. For a U.K. 
sample of mid-cap firms, Friederich et al. (2002) report that clustered (repeated) buys and 
sells are associated with CAARs that are substantially higher than the full sample of 
insider buys and sells: CAARs 20 days after the clustered purchases are 4.5 percent 
compared to 1.9 percent for all purchases. For sales, the corresponding CAARs equal to –
2.4 and –1.5 percent for the clustered and full sample, respectively. Furthermore, this 
study reports that medium-sized buys (between GBP 5,000 and 70,000) predict higher 20-
day CAARs than large buys. Insider sales do not trigger a similar relationship. 
The information hierarchy hypothesis postulates that directors who are familiar with 
the day-to-day operations of the company trade on more valuable information. Seyhun 
(1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) partially confirm this hypothesis using U.S. insider 
trading data.16 The former study shows that cumulative abnormal returns after directors’ 
dealings are significantly higher when ‘officer-directors’ trade compared to when 
‘officers’ trade. Lin and Howe (1990) demonstrate that trades by chairmen, directors’, 
officer-directors’, and officers contain more information than those of large shareholders. 
In contrast, the results of Jeng et al. (1999) indicate that top executives’ financial 
performance from share purchases in their own firm is lower (though not significantly) 
than that of officers or non-executive directors.17 They propose two explanations. First, 
top executives are more carefully scrutinized by both market participants and regulators, 
and, consequently, they may be more reluctant to trade using their informational 
advantage. Second, trades by top executives are on average twice as large as those of 
                                                 
14 Net number of insiders is defined as absolute value of the difference between number of buyers and 
sellers. 
15 The portfolios are decomposed according to the fraction of equity traded. 
16 Seyhun (1986) uses daily CARs from 1 to 50 (and 100) day following the insider-trading day. Lin and 
Howe (1990) use 6- and 12-month CARs. 
17 Results of Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) on the one hand and Jeng et al. (1999) on the other 
hand are not directly comparable as they use different methodology. The latter study uses a performance 
measure based on value-weighted portfolios comprised of all insider trades. All insider purchases (sales) are 
placed into a portfolio on the day that they are made and held in the portfolio exactly one year. 
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officers or directors, and larger transactions trigger stronger market price reactions. 
Therefore, the early results of Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) may be driven by 
transaction size. 
2.4.4 Summary on market reaction to insider trades 
To summarize, overall evidence for both U.S. and U.K. suggests that insiders do 
indeed possess superior information and by trading in the stock of their own companies 
earn positive abnormal profits over horizons from 6 to twelve months. However, many 
studies point out that outsiders mimicking insider trading would not earn abnormal profits 
since the positive and significant CARs diminish after accounting for transaction- or 
announcement delay and transactions costs for a round-trip transaction. Nevertheless, 
some evidence exists that large insider transactions may be more profitable and imply 
profitable mimicking strategies for outsiders. Evidence also suggests that the market 
adjusts prices significantly immediately after the announcements of these trades. The 
analysis of insider-trading characteristics indicates that large and clustered insider 
transactions may contain more information. Also, CARs following transactions by 
managers and officers are higher than CARs of other insiders. 
2.5 Information content of aggregate insider trading 
Another interesting hypothesis, put forward in Seyhun (1988), relates the insiders’ 
information to the economy-wide factors. In particular, it is hypothesized that information-
based trading by corporate insiders is both due to firm-specific information as well as 
industry-wide or economy-wide factors. If part of the insiders’ information is due to the 
economy-wide factors, one should find a positive relation between aggregate insider-
trading activity and subsequent market returns. For instance, insiders purchase stock of 
their own firm based on observation of mispricing partially caused by an increase of 
economy-wide activity which is unanticipated by the market. Subsequently, stock prices 
rise after market participants recognize the increase in economy-wide activity. This, 
however, implies that insiders’ purchases appear to forecast the market rise. In general, the 
relation between the aggregate insider trading and market return does not require that 
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insiders are aware whether they trade on the basis of firm-specific or economy-wide 
factors. It is only necessary that insiders observe an unanticipated change in the cash flows 
of their firms and trade based on this information. In contrast, if insiders trade strictly on 
the basis of firm-specific information, insider trading and changes in economy-wide 
activity should not be related. 
The findings of Seyhun (1988) support the hypothesis that insider trading forecasts 
changes in economy-wide returns: net aggregate insider trading activity18 in a given month 
is significantly positively correlated with the return to the market portfolio during the 
subsequent two months. Furthermore, firm size and risk are positively associated with the 
insider ability to identify mispricing caused by economy-wide factors. Insiders in larger 
firms are more likely to observe and trade on the basis of economy-wide factors rather 
than firm-specific factors. Even though the evidence suggests that future market returns 
remain predictable (to some extent) after the publication of insider transactions, it cannot 
be used to obtain a profitable switching strategy between the Treasury bills and the stock 
market. 
Seyhun (1992) further elaborates these findings and tests two competing hypotheses 
on the reasons behind this positive relation between aggregate insider transactions and 
future economy-wide returns. The first hypothesis (the cash flow hypothesis) postulates 
that changes in business conditions contribute to the forecasting ability of corporate 
insiders. In other words, if corporate insiders can predict the future cash flows in their own 
firms before other market participants and these changes are due to the economy-wide 
factors, insiders in all firms observe similar signals and trade in shares of their own firms 
in the same direction. An adjustment of stock prices of all firms will follow once the 
changes in economy-wide factors are recognized by other market participants. The 
competing hypothesis (the fads hypothesis) argues that the reason behind this relation is 
the fact that insiders can observe substantial deviations of prices from fundamentals in 
their own firms. If the mispricing is market-wide, then the aggregate insider trading will 
predict future market returns. In particular, when prices are in general too low relative to 
                                                 
18 Net aggregate trading activity in a given month is defined as the sum across firms of standardized net 
number of transactions. 
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the fundamentals, insiders in aggregate will buy stock. Similarly, when the prices are too 
high, insiders in aggregate will sell the stock of their companies. 
The result that current aggregate insider trading is positively related to future real 
activity19 supports the cash flow hypothesis. However, simple predictive tests indicate that 
signals from aggregate insider trading can be used to predict negative future stock returns 
on portfolios of large number of firms. This casts doubt on the view that all predictive 
ability of aggregate insider trading can be attributed to business conditions only. Instead, 
aggregate insider trading also identifies periods when prices move away from fundamental 
values, which supports the fads hypothesis. In summary, the overall evidence suggests that 
both the changes in business conditions as well as movements away from fundamentals 
contribute to the information content of aggregate insider trading.  
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) provide further evidence that insider activity seems to 
predict stock returns in excess of a simple contrarian strategy. When insiders are 
optimistic (they buy more than sell), markets on average do well and when they are 
pessimistic, markets do poorly, with an annual spread in returns exceeding 10 percent.  
2.6 Timing of insider trades 
Several empirical papers analyze the timing of insiders’ trades relative to earnings 
announcements. Insiders with prior knowledge of earnings can identify the expected 
market reaction to the earnings announcement and strategically time their trades. For 
example, for an insider who is willing to sell some shares and has knowledge that his firm 
is about to announce unexpectedly high earnings it is optimal to delay the planned 
transaction until after the favourable announcement. His profit is higher if he postpones 
his sale until after the announcement since the announcement moves prices up. This is a 
passive trading strategy, similarly to insider purchases after unfavourable earnings 
announcements. Active trading strategies, on the other hand, represent insider trading 
before earnings announcements: purchases before announcements of good news and sales 
before announcements of bad news.  
                                                 
19 Real activity is measured here by the growth rates of after-tax corporate profits, the index of industrial 
production, and the gross national product. 
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In the U.S., active insider trading is an explicit violation of the SEC’s regulation. 
Nevertheless, insiders may still decide to trade using active strategies because they believe 
that detection or enforcement by the SEC is unlikely (Lustgarten and Mande, 1995). In 
contrast, purchases or sales delayed until after the announcement do not violate the law as 
the private knowledge of earnings that led insiders to delay trading no longer exists at the 
time of the transactions. Lustgarten and Mande (1995) document that insiders in the U.S. 
do time their transactions. Insiders decrease their purchases (measured by dollar value and 
number of shares transacted) after the announcement of good earnings news and increase 
them after announcement of bad news. The results for sales are not as straightforward. 
There is some weak evidence for passive timing of sales (more selling after favourable 
announcement). Still, insiders do not use their private knowledge of negative earnings 
announcement and do not sell their shares before the announcement of this unfavourable 
news: the dollar value and number of shares sold is lower before than after such 
announcement. The authors argue that this is due to the fact that sales may represent a 
consumption and diversification decision, whereas purchases reflect a portfolio decision to 
buy one security rather than another. Another explanation is that insiders are more likely 
to attract shareholder lawsuits after sales rather than purchases (Bettis et al., 2000). It 
seems that it is more acceptable for shareholders when managers profit on good news, but 
unacceptable when they profit on firm failure (Hu and Noe, 1997).  
Bettis et al. (2000) document that in addition to the federal regulation, a large fraction 
of U.S. firms self-regulates insider trading of their directors and officers. In particular, in 
1996, 78 percent of their sample firms had explicit blackout periods during which the 
company prohibits trading by its insiders. These restrictions have consequences on the 
timing strategies by insiders since they make active trading almost impossible. Insider-
trading statistics provided in Bettis et al. (2000) confirm that insider-trading activity in the 
blackout period is less than one-third of that during allowed trading periods. This effect is 
more pronounced for sales than for purchases.  
Insider-trading regulation is stricter in the U.K. In particular, insiders of firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange are banned from trading for a period of two months prior to 
interim and final company earnings announcements. The trading ban implies that active 
trading strategies are more difficult to implement in the U.K. Thus, one may expect that 
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relative to the U.S. insiders, directors in the U.K. rely more on passive trading strategies. 
Hillier and Marshall (2002) document that the incidence of director trading is more than 
400 percent larger in the 10-day period post earnings announcement than in the 10-day 
period prior to the trading ban. Moreover, approximately 23 percent of all trades by 
company directors take place within the 10-day period after the earnings announcement. 
The direction of insider trading goes in line with passive trading strategies: directors tend 
to buy after an unexpectedly poor earnings result and sell after a good earnings result. 
Although the timing of directors’ trades is affected by the trading ban, the performance of 
their trades is not. In almost all periods, directors earn abnormal positive returns after 
buying while firms suffer abnormal negative returns after directors sell. Interestingly, 
Hillier and Marshall (2002) show that directors earn positive abnormal profits even when 
purchasing after an announcement of good news and selling after bad news is 
announced.20  
In summary, the analysis of the relationship between earnings announcements and 
insider-trading strategies further confirms that insiders possess superior information and 
that they use this information to time their trades. Moreover, the evidence suggests that 
insiders rely more on passive trading strategies that do not violate insider-trading 
regulation. 
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Chapter 3  
Insider Trading and Corporate Control: Evidence 







Under asymmetric information, insiders, defined as managers, and members of the 
board of directors of publicly traded corporations, possess more information about their 
company than small, dispersed shareholders. The informational advantage of insiders and 
its exploitation through insider trading raises many questions about the fairness and 
efficiency of financial markets (Leland, 1992). The importance of these questions is 
highlighted by Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who document that U.S. insiders trade 
frequently in the shares of their firm. Using a data set covering all the companies traded on 
the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ over the period from 1975 to 1995, the authors show 
that there is insider trading in more than 50 percent of the stocks in each year. On average, 
insider purchases (sales) per year amount to 0.6 percent (1.3 percent) of a company’s 
market capitalization. 
The major argument in favour of insider trading is that it is believed to convey new 
information about the firm’s prospects to outsiders. Leland’s (1992) model shows that 
when trading by insiders is allowed, share prices are higher and incorporate more  
                                                 
* This chapter will result in a paper joint with Luc Renneboog. We wish to thank Arturo Bris, Marc Goergen, 
Grzegorz Trojanowski and participants to seminars at CentER and Erasmus University and the EFA annual 
meeting 2002 in Berlin for helpful comments. 
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information. Although, an insider purchase conveys positive information about the firm’s 
prospects, it is less clear what information is conveyed by an insider sale. On one hand, an 
insider sale conveys bad information about the firm’s prospects. On the other hand, an 
insider sale may be less informative given that the reason behind the sale may be a need 
for liquidity rather than bad news about the firm. Also, an insider may sell after the 
exercise of stock options which are part of his remuneration package. Such option-related 
sales of shares may therefore be less informative (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). 
The hypothesis that insiders possess superior information which is revealed to the 
market by directors’ share transactions has been tested mostly on U.S. data. Many studies 
argue that given that insider trading earns abnormal returns, insiders hold superior 
information (see e.g. Seyhun, 1986, Lin and Howe, 1990, and Chang and Suk, 1998). In 
contrast, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) document a weak immediate market response to 
trading by managers and major shareholders of U.S. corporations listed on the NYSE, 
Amex, and NASDAQ. They argue that their findings suggest market underreaction to 
insider trading as insiders’ trades become informative over longer investment horizons. 
For the U.K., the early studies (King and Röell, 1988, Pope et al., 1990, Gregory et al., 
1994, and Gregory et al., 1997) focus on determining long-term abnormal returns on 
directors’ trades and confirm the existence of positive excess returns. Friederich et al. 
(2002) add to the existing research on the U.K. by examining the patterns of abnormal 
returns immediately around the trades of corporate insiders using daily data. They 
document positive abnormal stock price movements in the days after the directors buy and 
negative ones after the directors sell. 
Contrary to the countries with a market-oriented corporate governance system, there is 
little empirical evidence on insider trading in continental Europe. This may be due to a 
lack of data caused by lax regulation on the disclosure of insider trades. Eckbo and Smith 
(1998), one of the few exceptions, analyzes the long-term performance of insider trades on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. Still, some studies do not analyze the profitability of insider 
trades directly but rather concentrate on, for example, the effect of insider-trading 
regulation on stock market characteristics (Kabir and Vermaelen, 1996). 
The definition of insider trading frequently causes confusion. We adopt the legal U.K. 
definition. Inside information is, according to the Misuse of Information Act, information 
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that is “material, current, reliable and not available to the market” and is legally qualified 
as “new and fresh”.  In the Criminal Justice Act trading on insider information 
(information not regularly available and obtained through insiders) is a legal offence and 
can be prosecuted. Our paper will not deal with illegal trading on insider information, but 
will focus on directors’ dealings, the legal trading by directors of the company as defined 
in the listing rules of the London Stock Exchange (Source Book August 2002, Chapter 
16). Whereas in the U.K. there is a distinction between illegal and legal directors’ 
dealings, the U.S. regulation does not make such a distinction. We also adopt the U.K. 
definition of a director. In the U.K., the term director covers both the non-executive and 
executives. Conversely, in the U.S., executives are normally referred to as officers and 
non-executives as directors. 
In this study, we analyze the immediate market reaction to directors’ transactions for 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1991 to 1998. Our results support 
previous findings that directors’ trades convey new information on the firm’s prospects. 
The main contribution of this study, however, is the analysis of the impact of corporate 
control on the information content of directors’ dealings. To our best knowledge, no 
previous study has explored this relationship so far. In particular, we analyze the impact of 
presence of different blockholder categories on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
immediately after the announcement of directors’ transactions. We argue that the market 
takes into account all available public information – including the firm’s corporate control 
characteristics – when reacting to the information embedded in the insider transactions. 
For example, directors’ dealings may have relatively less informational value for firms 
owned by outside blockholders who monitor than for firms with dispersed ownership 
which may suffer from a higher asymmetry of information. 
Our results confirm that market participants consider the firm’s control structure when 
reacting to directors’ trades. In general, the market reaction differs depending on the 
degree of outsider and directors’ ownership, as well as the degree of institutional and other 
outsider ownership. Corporations and individuals or families unrelated to the management 
reduce the CARs indicating that monitoring by these blockholders leads to lower 
informational asymmetry. In contrast, institutional investors trigger higher CARs. This 
result confirms the findings by Franks at al. (2001) and Faccio and Lasfer (2002) who 
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conclude that institutional investors in the U.K. are passive investors. These institutions 
seem to trade on public corporate information (including announcements of directors’ 
trades) rather than on inside information. Finally, our results confirm that markets perceive 
directors’ entrenchment and accountability as an important factor when reacting to 
directors’ transactions. For firms with significant directors’ stakes, the positive news 
contained in directors’ purchases is mitigated by the danger that directors become more 
entrenched and hence less accountable. Similarly, the market reacts less negatively when 
directors with significant stakes sell (part of) their shares as this reduces their 
entrenchment.  
In situations of high uncertainty, i.e. when the firm performs poorly or is close to 
financial distress, we find stronger market reactions to directors’ dealings. In such cases, 
the positive (negative) signal of directors’ purchases (sales) is important irrespective of the 
shareholder structure. 
We fail to find support for the information hierarchy hypothesis (Seyhun, 1986). 
Although CEOs are assumed to have the best knowledge about their company’s prospects, 
the information content of CEO trades is lower than that of other director categories. 
Moreover, we report that when former directors (who left the firm within the financial 
year preceding the transaction) purchase shares, the market reaction at the announcement 
of these trades is larger than that associated with the purchases by other categories of 
directors. Conversely, the market does not react to sales transactions by former directors 
as such trading may be related to personal wealth diversification or liquidity needs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
existent literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data sets while the 
event study methodology is explained in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the results and 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Research hypotheses 
Several empirical studies on insider trading confirm that insiders possess superior 
information relating to the future prospects of their firms (Jaffe, 1974, Seyhun, 1986, 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Usually, two approaches are employed to measure the effect 
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of insider information. First, if insiders possess superior information, they can trade on this 
information in order to realize abnormal returns. The fact that insiders achieve significant 
abnormal profits over the 6 to 12 months following their transactions in the stock of their 
own firm is interpreted as proof of their superior information (see, for example, Jaffe, 
1974, Rozeff and Zaman, 1988, Lin and Howe, 1990, and Gregory et al., 1997). Second, 
in (reasonably) efficient stock markets, insider trading may trigger a prompt adjustment of 
share prices when outsiders revise their expectations about the firm’s future value. Thus, 
the information content of insider trades as perceived by the market can be captured by the 
immediate market reaction – abnormal returns on the date of publication of the 
information on the insider trades (Jaffe, 1974, Chang and Suk, 1998, Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001, and Friederich et al., 2002).21  
In this study, we focus to investigate how the abnormal returns to directors’ dealings 
around the announcement day relate to specific corporate control characteristics of the 
firms. However, first, we test the previously confirmed hypothesis of whether directors 
possess superior information about the future value of their firm (or at least, whether the 
market believes that the directors trade on superior information).  
By purchasing their firm’s shares, directors send a positive signal concerning the 
future value of the firm to the market. The signal is costly as the directors, being 
maximizers of their personal wealth, put their own wealth at stake. At the same time, they 
increase risk of their not optimally diversified portfolio as they invest a relatively large 
fraction of their personal wealth to one firm. Hence, insider trades are credible signals to 
outsiders.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: The market reaction to the announcement of directors’ purchases is 
positive. 
 
Conversely, directors emit a negative signal when selling shares. Nevertheless, this 
signal may be less informative than the signal related to purchases as directors may be 
wealth constrained and sales may therefore be motivated by liquidity needs (Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001 and Friederich et al., 2002). Also, they may sell because of diversification  
                                                 
21 For a more detailed literature survey see the previous chapter. 
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reasons. The directors in this study do not only own considerable shareholdings in their 
firm, but the company also provides most of their other sources of income (salary, bonus 
and possibly stock options). 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The market reaction to the announcement of directors’ sales is negative.  
 
Hypothesis 1c: The absolute value of the market reaction associated with directors’ 
sales is smaller than that associated with purchases.  
 
These hypotheses postulate that directors’ trades serve as signals that convey new 
information to the market and decrease the level of information asymmetry. The higher the 
announcement reactions to directors’ trading, the higher the (ex ante) information 
asymmetry between outsiders and directors (Khang and King, 2002).  
Next, we relate the degree of information asymmetry (as measured by the market 
announcement reaction) to specific corporate control characteristics. We first test the 
information hierarchy hypothesis, which postulates that the information content of the 
transactions depends on the category of the trading director (Seyhun, 1986). Second, we 
relate information asymmetry to control structures.   
The information hierarchy hypothesis postulates that directors who are familiar with 
the day-to-day operations of the company trade on more valuable information. Seyhun 
(1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) partially confirm this hypothesis on U.S. data.22 The 
former study shows that cumulative abnormal returns after insider trading are significantly 
higher when ‘officer-directors’ trade compared to when ‘officers’ trade. Lin and Howe 
(1990) demonstrate that trades by chairmen, directors, officer-directors, and officers 
contain more information than large shareholders. In contrast, the results of Jeng et al. 
(1999) indicate that top executives’ financial performance from share purchases in their 
own firm is lower (though not significantly) than that of officers or non-executive 
directors.23 They propose two explanations. First, top executives are more carefully 
                                                 
22 Seyhun (1986) uses daily CARs from 1 to 50 (and 100) day following the insider-trading day. Lin and 
Howe (1990) use 6- and 12-month CARs. 
23 Results of Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) on the one hand and Jeng et al. (1999) on the other 
hand are not directly comparable as they use different methodology. The latter study uses a performance 
measure based on value-weighted portfolios comprised of all insider trades. All insider purchases (sales) are 
placed into a portfolio on the day that they are made and held in the portfolio exactly one year. 
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scrutinized by both market participants and regulators, and consequently, top executives 
may be more reluctant to trade on any informational advantage. Second, trades by top 
executives are on average twice as large as those by officers or directors, and larger 
transactions trigger stronger market price reactions. Thus, the early results of Seyhun 
(1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) may be driven by transaction size.24  
According to the information hierarchy hypothesis, executive directors should have a 
stronger informational advantage than non-executives. Former directors who left the firm 
within the financial year preceding the transaction trigger stronger announcement returns 
when they purchase additional shares than incumbent directors. The reason is that former 
directors may still possess some superior information but can trade more freely on that 
information. In turn, when former directors sell their shareholdings, the market may not 
react as the severed employment/governance tie with the firm may mean that they sell 
because of liquidity needs and not because of negative information.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The abnormal returns associated with directors’ purchases and sales 
depend on the type of director. These returns – positive following 
directors’ purchases of shares and negative following directors’ sales – 
decrease in absolute value with the category of director in the following 
order: chief executive officer, other executive directors, non-executive 
chairman, non-executive directors. When former directors buy shares 
this causes strong positive announcement returns.  
 
Agency theory predicts that large blockholders reduce agency costs provided they are 
good monitors (Maug, 1998, Admati et al., 1994). Blockholders are expected to oversee 
firm activities and ensure that managers act in the interest of shareholders. This means that 
the monitoring activities of concentrated owners create value by forcing the managers to 
spend less on perks and to focus more on firm value. In line with this monitoring effect, 
we conjecture that directors’ dealings contain less information for the market when there 
is strong concentrated outsider ownership. When outsiders monitor the firm, directors 
enjoy fewer private benefits of control and are more likely to make decisions in line with 
shareholder value maximization. As intensive monitoring may lead to better managed 
firms, market participants derive less information from directors’ transactions. Thus, we 
                                                 
24 We are not aware of any U.K. evidence on the subject. 
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conclude that the announcement effect of directors’ dealings is smaller in the presence of 
strong outside blockholders.  
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) show that the nature of corporate control is important. 
Usually, empirical studies distinguish between three categories of outside blockholders: 
corporations, financial institutions, and individuals or families not related to the 
management. For the case of the U.K., financial institutions, such as banks, mutual and 
pension funds, and insurance companies, are deemed not to be active monitors (Franks et 
al., 2001). In 1999, the government set up the Newbold Commission, which was to make 
some propositions to encourage institutions to exercise voting rights (Stapledon and Bates, 
2002). Institutions do not usually have the resources to monitor the (many) firms in their 
investment portfolios. Monitoring may provide the institutions with inside information. 
Consequently, due to insider trading restrictions their portfolio investments may be locked 
in. Therefore, financial institutions may refrain from active monitoring. Thus, we 
conjecture that the monitoring effect holds only for outsiders such as corporations, and 
individuals or families unrelated to management. 
The fact that financial institutions do not monitor gives them the opportunity to trade 
on signals (they do not possess inside information that triggers the regulation on trading). 
Thus, financial institutions may follow directors’ dealings and rebalance their portfolios 
accordingly. If financial institutions rely on information released by the directors or on 
(costly) signals emitted by the directors (such as their dealings) and act (trade) upon this 
information, the positive signal of directors’ purchases may even be strengthened.25 
In summary, we postulate two hypotheses regarding the impact of active blockholders 
on the information content of directors’ trading: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (monitoring effect by active outside blockholders): The announcement 
effect of directors’ purchases and sales is weakened by the presence of a 
monitoring outside blockholder (corporations and individuals or 
families unrelated to the directors). 
 
                                                 
25 Thus, we conjecture that institutional investors are not monitoring the firms in their portfolio – they are 
passive in their corporate governance roles. Still, we consider institutional investors to be active in 
rebalancing their portfolio and buying and selling on publicly available information.  
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Hypothesis 4 (liquidity trading by institutions): The announcement effect of directors’ 
purchases and sales is stronger in the presence of an institutional 
blockholder.  
 
Directors do not only have direct access to restricted corporate information but also 
have different incentives than major outside blockholders (Holderness and Sheehan, 
1988). For directors, the financial performance of their equity stake in the firm may be of 
secondary importance if they can derive private benefits of control from their position 
within the firm. These private benefits are not transferable but are investor specific: they 
may be a salary, perquisites (e.g. company car), prestige or reputation, or value 
expropriated from minority blockholders (Johnson et al., 2000).  
At lower levels, directors’ ownership is believed to align the managerial incentives 
with those of other shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It complements other 
corporate governance mechanisms such as product market competition, the managerial 
labour market, the board of directors, and the market for corporate control (Morck et al., 
1988, Berger et al., 1997). When directors’ ownership stakes increase to high levels, 
however, directors may become entrenched, they may be able to resist many disciplining 
actions. Consequently, the market may react negatively to the announcement of a 
substantial increase in directors’ shareholdings which may insulate directors from outsider 
monitoring. This negative effect may even dominate the positive signal of directors’ 
purchases. Similarly, the negative effect of directors’ selling share stakes may be greeted 
positively for those firms with director entrenchment. Morck et al. (1988) show that the 
effect of increased entrenchment is the strongest for insider ownership between 5 percent 
and 25 percent in the U.S.26 
 
Hypothesis 5a (entrenchment effect):  The positive (negative) announcement effect 
of directors’ purchases (sales) is weaker if control by directors is 
already strong as the purchases (sales) potentially increase (decrease) 
directors’ entrenchment. 
 
                                                 
26 But they also argue that managerial ownership above 25 percent does not entail a further entrenchment 
penalty. 
Chapter 3 50 
The information effect of directors’ purchases and sales should also depend on the 
distribution of voting power within the firm. A high concentration of director ownership 
may create less of an entrenchment problem provided it faces strong outsiders. Strong 
outsiders may prevent directors from making decisions that do not maximise firm value. 
Therefore, the entrenchment effect formulated in Hypothesis 6a may not apply – or apply 
to a lesser extent – to firms in which directors’ voting power is balanced by the presence 
of strong outsiders. This means that the positive signal of purchases and the negative 
signal of sales are stronger when directors own large stakes in the presence of corporations 
and individuals or families unrelated to the management than when directors’ ownership is 
high or in the presence of institutional ownership. 
 
Hypothesis 5b (blockholder power structure): When directors own large stakes in 
the presence of share blocks held by corporations and individuals or 
families unrelated to the directors, the market is less concerned about 
directors’ entrenchment. This leads to a stronger positive signal of 
purchases and a stronger negative signal of sales. 
 
Under high uncertainty, the market is expected to react more strongly to the release of 
new information. Therefore, we expect the CARs associated with the announcement of 
directors’ transactions in poorly performing or financially distressed firms to be higher 
than in well performing firms. Furthermore, Franks et al. (2001) show that the monitoring 
behaviour of blockholders depends largely on corporate performance. In particular, they 
document that blockholders discipline underperforming management in periods of poor 
performance and/or financial distress. Consequently, when directors purchase shares in 
poorly performing companies, stronger positive price reactions can be expected for (i) 
firms with outside blockholders and (ii) firms whose directors already own a substantial 
share stake. In the former group of firms, the presence of outside blockholders may 
increase the likelihood of a restructuring process (Franks and Nyborg, 1996). In the latter 
group of firms, directors are risking marginally more of their own wealth while they have 
already committed a substantial part of their wealth to the firm. This positive signal may 
more than cancel out the negative effect of entrenchment.  
If the directors of poorly performing or financially distressed firms sell (part of) their 
stakes this may reflect their pessimistic expectations about the firm’s progress. The CARs 
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associated with the announcement of such transactions are expected to be strongly 
negative irrespective of the ownership structure. 
 
Hypothesis 6 (performance effect): In poorly performing companies, directors’ 
purchases and sales convey more information to the market and trigger 
stronger announcement reactions than in well performing firms. 
 
Hypothesis 7 (performance and blockholders): Directors’ purchases in poorly 
performing companies with outside blockholders or strong directors’ 
ownership trigger stronger positive price reactions as the presence of 
blockholders may facilitate corporate restructuring.  
 
3.3 Data sources and descriptive statistics 
We use a comprehensive database which covers: (1) directors’ dealings data, (2) 
ownership data, (3) daily return data, (4) London Share Price Data (LSPD) comprising 
company specific information (like capital structure changes, number of shares 
outstanding and industry specification), and (5) accounting data. The data description 
follows. 
3.3.1 Directors’ dealings.  
Data on directors’ dealings cover the transactions of directors in all U.K. listed 
companies over the period of 1991 to 1998. The data set was acquired from Hemmington 
Scott, now BARRA Global Estimates. The original file contains 58,363 entries and 
includes information on: company name, director’s name, director’s holdings, transaction 
and announcement date, number of shares traded, price, security type (90 different 
types),27 transaction type (11 different types),28 and each director’s board position. After 
matching all the transactions with specific companies (by assigning SEDOL numbers), we 
excluded financial firms. Subsequently, we collected the number of shares outstanding for 
                                                 
27 The 90 security types include, for example, ordinary shares, restricted voting shares, options, warrants, 
convertibles. The full list of security types is available on request. 
28 Transaction types are buy, sell, exercise, options granted, sale post exercise, take up, scrip dividend, 
inherited, bed & breakfast, gift given, gift recorded, and scrip issue. 
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each firm at the time of the transaction in order to calculate the relative size of the 
transaction. 
The many duplicate entries and some inaccurate reporting of transactions reduced the 
number of observations by roughly 40 percent. The data cleaning process consisted of 
three steps: first, if a director is trading the same number of shares within the same day 
(e.g. two sales of 1,313 shares; or two purchases of 1,313 shares), we only retain one of 
these transactions. Second, we summed up multiple sales (or purchases) by the same 
director during a given day (e.g. one sale of 10,000 shares and another one of 5,000 shares 
are added up one sale of 15,000 shares). Third, when a director purchases and sells shares 
on the same day, we netted those transactions (e.g. a purchase of 10,000 shares and a sale 
of 5,000 shares results in a net purchase of 5,000 shares). Following all these adjustments, 
we are left with a sample of 35,439 transactions for 1,498 firms.  
We rearranged the 90 security types into 9 groups: (1) ordinary voting shares, (2) non-
voting shares, (3) options on voting shares, (4) options on non-voting shares, (5) 
convertible debt, (6) convertible preferred shares, (7) rights, (8) warrants, and (9) others. 
For the non-financial firms in our sample, Appendix 1 contains the basic statistics for 
these 9 security type groups. The most frequently occurring transactions are on ordinary 
voting shares and the exercising of options: 27,416 trades (78 percent of all reported 
directors’ transactions) and 5,885 transactions (17 percent), respectively. In Appendix 2, 
we show descriptive statistics per transaction types for the most frequently traded security 
types: ordinary voting shares, share options and rights. Appendix 3 shows the distribution 
of the relative size of each type of transaction. Most of the transactions are relatively 
small: as many as 83 percent of all purchase transactions of ordinary voting shares (12,019 
out of 14,500) involve less than 0.1 percent of the company’s shares. The biggest purchase 
transaction of the database relates to 41 percent of the share capital outstanding. The 
average sale transactions are somewhat bigger than the purchase transactions. Only 61 
percent of them (4,101 out of a total of 6,769 transactions) involve less than 0.1 percent of 
a firm’s shares. In this study, we analyze the transactions with respect to their relative size 
(as a percentage of shares outstanding) rather than to their transactional value (in GBP). 
The reason is that one of the focal points of this paper is relative voting power and 
changes in control. The average (median) purchase transaction by directors amounts to 
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GBP 63,626 (14,616) while the average (median) sales transaction is larger with GBP 
107,433 (31,908).  
The summary statistics of directors’ trades in the U.K., as presented in Panel A of 
Appendix 4, are directly comparable with those from Lakonishok and Lee (2001) on U.S. 
data. It seems that directors of U.K. firms are less active in trading the shares of their own 
firms. Even though, the fraction of firms with at least one directors’ share transaction per 
year is almost the same for the two markets, directors in the U.K. make fewer transactions: 
1.49 (1.09) purchase (sale) transactions per listed U.K. firm in each year versus 2.77 (4.74) 
purchase (sale) transactions per firm-year in the U.S. Also, U.K. directors on average 
purchase (sell) 0.2 percent (0.5 percent) of their company’s market capitalization per year, 
while American managers purchase (sell) 0.6 percent (1.3 percent) of their company’s 
market capitalization. The differences between U.K. and U.S. directors’ dealings are 
particularly pronounced for sales. This results from the fact that American managers are 
awarded more stock options than their British counterparts (Conyon and Murphy, 1999). 
Moreover, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) regulation is stricter than U.S. regulation 
(Friederich et al., 2002). For example, directors of firms listed on the LSE are prohibited 
from trading for two months prior to an earnings announcement and one month prior to a 
quarterly earnings announcement. Furthermore, outside those periods, these directors are 
required to receive clearance before they can trade from the chairman of the board of 
directors. In general, there is no such regulation in the U.S. Lustgarden and Mande (1995) 
show that in their sample of U.S. firms the volume of insider trading declines as an 
earning announcement approaches but does not decline to zero. Nevertheless, Bettis et al. 
(2000) document that besides the federal regulation, a large fraction of U.S. firms impose 
additional insider-trading restrictions on their directors and officers that resembles the 
U.K. regulation.29  
The evolution of directors’ dealings between 1991 and 1998 in the U.K. is documented 
in Panel B of Appendix 4. Directors’ trading (measured as the total number of shares 
traded per firm-year) increased throughout the beginning of the period, peaked in 1996, 
and decreased thereafter. However, the average fraction of shares traded by the entire 
                                                 
29 Bettis et al. (2000) report that as much as 78 percent of firms in their sample had explicit blackout periods 
during which the company prohibits trading by its insiders. 
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board per year (as percent of the market capitalization) remained rather stable over the 
period. During the period, directors sell two to three times more shares than they buy. 
However, U.S. managers have even higher sales to purchase ratios (an average of seven 
sales to one purchase per year). Moreover, the value of their sell transactions is growing 
constantly since the mid 1970s.  
3.3.2 Ownership data. 
Information on ownership structure over the period of 1991-1998 was obtained from 
the Worldscope database. The database records all direct ownership stakes of 5 percent or 
more of the ordinary shares outstanding. We classify these stakes into several categories 
according to who owns them: directors, industrial and commercial corporations, the 
government, financial institutions, and individuals or families. Further, financial 
institutions were subdivided into banks, investment/pension funds, insurance companies, 
and real estate firms. As the database does not report whether an individual is a director, 
we used the Stock Exchange Yearbook for every individual reported in the database 
(around 7.400 persons) to check whether he or she is one of the following (i) CEO, (ii) 
executive chairman (iii) person combining the positions of CEO and chairman, (iv) other 
executive directors, (v) non-executive chairman, (vi) other non-executive directors, and 
(vii) individuals and family members who are not directors or related to a director.  
Appendix 5A reports the summary statistics for all the share stakes of at least 5 percent 
for 1992-98. In panels A, B, and C, we record the stake of the largest shareholder, the sum 
of all disclosed shareholdings, and the Herfindahl index of all ownership stakes, 
respectively. The largest shareholder controls on average 21 percent (with a median of 16 
percent). It should be noted that the ownership structure is stable throughout the whole 
sample period. If all blockholders were to form a coalition, they would control almost 40 
percent of the voting rights. The Herfindahl index confirms that control is not concentrated 
in the hands of one or two blockholders. In fact, there are about 6 blockholders in the 
average U.K. firm. 
Appendix 5B contains a detailed analysis of ownership by category of owner. 
Institutions are clearly the most frequent shareholder category: they are present in most 
U.K. firms but their individual stakes usually do not exceed 10 percent. Corporations 
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control the largest equity stake in only 10 percent of listed U.K. firms, but their 
shareholdings are large (about 30 percent). Likewise, families and individuals (not related 
to a director) own share stakes in a minority of sample firms but usually hold large share 
stakes. Since the privatizations of the late 1980s, the government rarely holds equity 
stakes in listed companies. Directors – the CEO, the chairman, executive and non-
executive directors – form another important shareholder category. Their large equity 
stake is partly explained by the fact that yearly a large number of firms are newly admitted 
on the stock exchange.30 At flotation, the initial shareholders (usually the firm’s managers) 
retain a relatively large share stake which they gradually dilute over time (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2003). 
3.3.3 LSPD database  
The LSPD database is offered by the London Business School. The Master Index File 
contains data about approximately 6,700 companies, with a complete history for all U.K. 
companies quoted on the LSE since 1955. It contains among others the SEDOL number, 
birth date, death date, company name, reason for birth, and reason for death. This database 
allowed us to trace SEDOL numbers, and changes in company names. Data concerning 
the number of shares outstanding for each firm-year and the industry code were collected 
and then matched with the directors’ dealings file. 
3.3.4 Datastream data.  
Adjusted daily prices and dividends for all companies over the period since January 
1990 until December 1998 were obtained from Datastream. We also used the database to 
obtain basic accounting control variables concerning, for example, profitability, market 
capitalization, indebtedness, and market-to-book ratio. 
                                                 
30 Newly floated firms account for around 4 percent of all listed companies on a yearly basis measured over 
two decades.  
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3.3.5 The combined sample of directors’ transactions 
Our hypotheses focus on directors’ purchase and sale transactions in ordinary voting 
shares. As the information content of small dealings is small (as shown by previous 
empirical investigations (amongst others e.g. Seyhun, 1986 and Bettis et al., 1997), we 
focus on large transactions involving at least 0.1 percent of company’s shares 
outstanding.31 Summary statistics of these transactions matched with daily returns, 
ownership and accounting data are reported in Table 3.1. Each observation represents an 
event (a firm-day with an directors’ purchase or sale) and is retained when the net 
purchase (sale) on that day is at least 0.1 percent of the corporate market capitalization. A 
net purchase (sale) is defined as the total number of shares purchased (sold) on the given 
day by all directors minus the total number of shares sold (purchased) on the same day. In 
general, since we deal with daily data, only a small fraction (around 4 percent) of all firm-
day observations in our sample needed to be netted. 
On average, directors’ purchases are smaller than sales (Panel A). The median net 
value purchased by directors is £36,000 (representing 0.27 percent of the average market 
capitalization) compared to £147,155 (0.48 percent) sold. In terms of the distribution of 
transactions among the different categories of directors, CEOs and chairmen are the most 
active. In particular, they are involved in 581 and 492 (490 and 350) purchases (sales), 
respectively. Former directors (dismissed or retired within the previous fiscal year) are 
also very actively selling their holdings. However, their purchases – both in number and 
size of the trades – are surprisingly similar to those of the incumbent directors. Over the 
period of 1991-98, former directors made almost 400 purchases each representing at least 
0.1 percent of their firm’s market capitalization. The median purchase transaction by a 
former director amounts to 0.31 percent of company’s shares, which is comparable in size 
to the transactions by other director categories. 
                                                 
31 Appendix 6 provides a useful overview of the process of data cleaning that resulted in the final sample. 
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TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This table reports the summary statistics for all reported purchases and sales of U.K. directors over the 
period since 1991 till 1998 that represent at least 0.1 percent of company’s market capitalization. ‘Trade 
value’ is defined as total number of shares transacted by directors of given company on the corresponding 
day times price per share at the beginning of the calendar year. ‘% market capitalization’ stands for the 
ratio of net number of shares transacted over number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. 
‘Interest coverage’ is computed as earnings before interests and taxes over total interest expenses. ‘CEO’ 
represents reported dealings of chief executive directors and managing directors. ‘Executive’ covers 
dealings of chief executive directors and managing directors, deputy chief executive directors, deputy 
managing directors, and financial directors. ‘Chairman’ corresponds to the dealings of chairmen of the 
board. ‘Other incumbent directors’ represents dealings of all incumbent directors that are not executive, 
chairmen or deputy chairmen. ‘Former directors’ includes dealings of retired, dismissed or deceased 
directors. ‘Book-to-market ratio’ is defined as book value of equity over market capitalization. ‘Debt-equity 
ratio’ is computed as book value of long-term debt to book value of equity. ‘Interest coverage’ is defined 
as earnings before interest and taxes over total interest expenses. 
Panel A: Transaction size # of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max p25% Median p75% 
PURCHASE TRANSACTIONS  
trade value 1861 1,075,571 36,500,000 19 1,590m 12,800 36,000 116,030
% market capitalization  0.96% 3.61% 0.10% 77.45% 0.15% 0.27% 0.58%
% market cap. by category of director  
CEOs 582 1.04% 3.92% 0.10% 77.45% 0.18% 0.31% 0.67%
other top executives 112 1.29% 4.44% 0.10% 44.29% 0.17% 0.28% 0.95%
chairmen 492 1.30% 4.07% 0.10% 52.27% 0.19% 0.36% 0.78%
other incumbent directors 606 1.34% 5.33% 0.10% 77.45% 0.15% 0.29% 0.64%
former directors 396 1.51% 6.00% 0.10% 77.45% 0.14% 0.31% 0.81%
SALE TRANSACTIONS  
trade value 2004 890,679 3,881,658 32 79,700m 37,087 147,155 577,760
% market capitalization  1.38% 2.74% 0.10% 39.05% 0.21% 0.48% 1.28%
% market cap. by category of director  
CEOs 490 1.85% 2.73% 0.10% 18.47% 0.35% 0.82% 1.95%
other top executives 115 1.58% 2.70% 0.11% 14.43% 0.20% 0.54% 1.44%
chairmen 350 2.07% 3.94% 0.10% 39.05% 0.32% 0.69% 2.03%
other incumbent directors 766 1.29% 2.60% 0.10% 39.05% 0.20% 0.46% 1.22%
former directors 626 1.55% 2.95% 0.10% 23.62% 0.20% 0.51% 1.36%
Panel B: Accounting variables # of firms Mean Std. Dev. Min Max p25% Median p75% 
PURCHASE PORTFOLIO  
market capitalization (in million) 551 78 434 0 8,066 7 18 42
number of employees 1,139 3,587 3 62,943 197 431 986
earnings after taxes (in thousands) 1,285 12,435 -93,300 204,300 -142 602 2,221
return on equity 3.99 156.53 -1,859.68 1,944.62 -2.46 8.52 17.41
book-to-market ratio 0.94 1.11 -7.45 10.25 0.36 0.71 1.24
debt-equity ratio 0.41 0.80 -4.89 8.22 0.08 0.24 0.50
interest coverage 71.65 582.19 -992.50 10,777.00 0.61 3.44 9.98
SALE PORTFOLIO  
market capitalization (in million) 628 133 297 0 4,010 18 47 142
number of employees 2,089 6,857 5 93,497 230 551 1,426
earnings after taxes (in thousands) 5,935 18,081 -197,200 177,500 622 2,395 6,200
return on equity -0.95 353.22 -6,775.32 720.68 8.14 15.68 27.41
book-to-market ratio 0.57 0.69 -3.58 7.96 0.24 0.42 0.71
debt-equity ratio 0.09 3.96 -97.53 13.46 0.04 0.16 0.34
interest coverage 73.46 444.33 -3,878.67 6,204.99 3.54 8.87 23.50
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Panel C: Ownership structure # of firms % Mean Std.dev. Min Max p25% Median p75% 
PURCHASE PORTFOLIO    
total stake to:    
all reported shareholders 551 28.5% 24.5% 0.0% 97.0% 0.0% 29.1% 49.0%
all outsiders together  18.2% 18.7% 0.0% 97.0% 0.0% 14.7% 30.0%
corporations  2.6% 8.1% 0.0% 76.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
fin. institution  13.4% 15.8% 0.0% 81.8% 0.0% 7.3% 23.5%
individual outsiders  2.2% 5.0% 0.0% 34.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
all directors together  10.3% 17.6% 0.0% 77.6% 0.0% 0.0% 14.0%
    
conditional total stake to:    
all reported shareholders 378 69% 41.6% 18.2% 2.6% 97.0% 28.3% 40.9% 54.4%
all outsiders together 356 65% 28.2% 16.2% 2.0% 97.0% 16.8% 26.0% 37.4%
corporations 98 18% 14.5% 14.2% 1.5% 76.3% 5.0% 8.7% 19.8%
fin. institution 328 60% 22.6% 14.7% 2.0% 81.8% 11.2% 19.8% 31.6%
individual outsiders 130 24% 9.2% 6.6% 1.1% 34.2% 5.0% 7.5% 11.5%
all directors together 230 42% 24.8% 19.7% 1.0% 77.6% 8.2% 18.2% 38.2%
SALE PORTFOLIO    
total stake to:    
all reported shareholders 628 23.0% 22.5% 0.0% 89.0% 0.0% 18.6% 39.0%
all outsiders together  13.7% 15.5% 0.0% 65.6% 0.0% 9.2% 22.6%
corporations  1.9% 6.7% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
fin. institution  10.2% 12.7% 0.0% 62.3% 0.0% 5.2% 17.3%
individual outsiders  1.6% 4.9% 0.0% 34.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
all directors together  9.2% 16.3% 0.0% 88.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.3%
    
conditional total stake to:    
all reported shareholders 417 66% 34.5% 19.0% 2.0% 89.0% 18.6% 32.2% 47.2%
all outsiders together 391 62% 22.0% 14.2% 1.1% 65.6% 11.4% 18.6% 29.7%
corporations 87 14% 13.6% 12.8% 0.9% 50.0% 3.8% 8.5% 19.9%
fin. institution 351 56% 18.2% 11.9% 1.1% 62.3% 9.1% 16.4% 25.3%
individual outsiders 102 16% 10.0% 8.0% 0.9% 34.7% 4.6% 7.0% 13.6%
all directors together 252 40% 23.0% 18.7% 1.1% 88.0% 7.9% 16.5% 33.2%
 
Panel B shows that directors sell rather than purchase shares in firms that are bigger, 
more profitable, have less debt and have lower book-to-market ratios. According to 
Friederich et al. (2002), directors purchase stock when they believe the stock is 
undervalued (as measured by a high book-to-market ratio) and has performed rather 
poorly in the recent past. We also find that directors sell when their firms are overvalued 
(as suggested by low book-to-market ratio) and perform relatively well.  
Panel C of the table shows ownership structure for firms whose directors buy shares 
and those whose directors sell shares, respectively. Firms whose directors sell shares have 
usually less concentrated ownership. On average, the blockholders hold jointly 28.5 
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percent of the ordinary shares in firms whose directors purchase additional shares versus 
only 23 percent in firms whose directors sell.32 Financial institutions own shares in the 
majority of firms (in 60 and 56 percent of firms for the purchase and sale portfolio, 
respectively) but their ownership stakes tend to be quite low. On average they hold 13 
percent (10 percent) of shares outstanding in firms with net purchases (sales).33 Directors 
are the largest shareholders. In those firms in which they own a stake, they own on 
average around 25 (23) percent for firms with net directors’ purchases (net sales). 
Individuals or families unrelated to the management hold in total only around 9 and 10 
percent for firms with net purchases and sales, respectively, compared to 15 and 14 
percent, respectively, held by corporations. 
3.4 Methodology 
In this section, we present definitions of the abnormal returns (CARs and CAARs) that 
capture the announcement effects of directors’ transactions. We also describe the 
(parametric and non-parametric) statistics used to verify statistical significance.  
3.4.1 Event study methodology 
3.4.1.1 Basic models 
In this chapter, we study the information content of directors’ dealings by analyzing 
short-term share price reactions. We calculate abnormal returns at the announcement using 
the event study methodology.  










R ,  (1) 
                                                 
32 The conditional statistics (based on the cases in which a blockholder of specific category is present) 
confirm the picture. The average ownership concentration in firms that have at least one blockholder is 42 
percent in the purchase portfolio and 35 percent in the sale portfolio. 
33 When calculating the average over the firms in which institutional owners hold at least a 5-percent 
ownership stake, the average combined aggregated institutional stake amounts to 23 percent in companies 
whose directors purchase shares and 18 percent in companies whose directors sell. 
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where i and t denote security and day, respectively. P and D are adjusted daily prices and 
dividends downloaded from Datastream and n stands for the number of new shares for 
each old share in case of a stock split. We compute the abnormal returns (AR) using the 
market model. The abnormal return ARi,t for security i on day t, for each day from the 20th 
day before to 20th day after each event day is defined as follows:  
( )tmiititi RRAR ,,, ˆˆ βα +−=  for 20,...,20−=t , (2) 
where Ri,t is the return on security i on day t defined as in (1), and Rm,t is the market return 
on day t proxied by the FTSE All Share index excluding investment trusts that is 
downloaded from the Datastream. The parameters iα̂ and iβ̂  are estimated using ordinary 
least squares regressions of Ri,t on Rm,t over the estimation period of 200 to 21 days before 
the event day. When fewer daily data are available, the estimation window starts as late as 
121 days before the event day. Let T0i and T1i denote the beginning and the end of the 
estimation window for security i. Li is the number of observations in the estimation 
window for security i. In almost all cases, T0i = -200, T1i = -20 and therefore Li = 180.  
To check the robustness of the results, we use also a market-adjusted return model of 
the form:  
tmtiti RRAR ,,, −=  for 20,...,20−=t  (3) 
The market-adjusted return model can be viewed as a restricted market model with αi 
constrained to zero and βi constrained to one.  
Several studies (e.g. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) on a U.S. sample, and Gregory et al. 
(1994) on a U.K sample) highlight the importance of controlling for size in the case where 
the abnormal returns are calculated over a long post-event window, or for a sample 
including a large number of smaller companies. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) argue that 
abnormal returns are higher for smaller companies. If directors’ purchases tend to be 
concentrated in the stock of smaller firms, and if this stock tends to earn positive abnormal 
returns, then the abnormal returns on directors’ trading might be partly attributable to the 
size effect. Several size-adjustment methods have been proposed. We opt for the method 
of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). According to this method, return Ri,t for 
security i on day t is adjusted by return Rp(i),t on the size control portfolio, p which security 
i belongs to. Usually, ten size control portfolios are formed based on all the market 
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capitalization of all the securities at the beginning of the calendar year. For each size 
control portfolio, an equally weighted average return is then computed. Then, the size 
adjusted abnormal return, ARi,t, for security i on day t is defined as:  
.),(,, tiptiti RRAR −=   for 20,...,20−=t . (4) 
In general, this is a specific form of the market-adjusted model defined in (3). This model 
has the big advantage of reasonably low data requirements. An alternative model would be 
the model of Dimson and Marsh (1986) that accounts for size adjustment using size 
control portfolio betas. However, Gregory et al. (1997) report that the difference between 
the Dimson-Marsh benchmark and the Lakonishok et al. benchmark is relatively small for 
U.K. data.  
3.4.1.2 Test statistics 
The cross-sectional average abnormal return for day t, AARt, is defined as the average 










1  for 20,...,20−=t , (5) 
The cumulative abnormal return for security i from day t1 to day t2 is defined as sum of 









tii ARCAR  for Ni ,...,1= , (6) 
where N is the number of securities. Cumulative average abnormal returns from day t1 
to day t2 are then defined as the cross-sectional average of the cumulative abnormal 
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To test the null hypothesis that the cumulative average abnormal returns are equal to 
zero for a sample of N securities, we use three parametric test statistics:  
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where CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for security i defined as in (6) and 
( )CARs  is the sample (cross-sectional) standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal 
returns. CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return defined as in (7), and ( )CAARs  















1   (11) 
where si is an estimator for the standard error of abnormal returns for security i. A 
suitable choice is the usual sample standard error from the market model regression over 
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ii sCARs  with si
2 defined as in (11). (13) 
The test statistic tCAAR in (8) is based on Barber and Lyon (1997). It is Student-t 
distributed with N-1 degrees of freedom and approaches the normal distribution as N 
increases. J1, and J2 are based on Campbell et al. (1997). Both are asymptotically normally 
distributed. This distributional pattern is not exact for J1 because an estimator of variance 
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appears in the denominator. In turn, J2 gives equal weighting to the individual 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns, CARi / s(CARi). The power of these two tests 
depends on the behaviour of the true abnormal returns. If the true abnormal returns are 
constant across securities, then it is better to opt for a measure which gives more weight to 
the securities with the lower abnormal return variance, which is what J2 does. However, if 
the true abnormal returns are larger for securities with a higher variance, it is better to give 
equal weight to the realized cumulative abnormal return of each security, which is what J1 
does. As the variance of the CARs is of similar magnitude across securities, our results are 
not expected to be sensitive to the use of J1 or J2 (see below). 
3.4.2 Robustness checks on the test-statistics 
The methodology proposed above is based on an assumption that returns are jointly 
normal and temporally independently and identically distributed. Below, we discuss the 
robustness checks we use to test whether the following assumptions are valid: (i) non-
normality of abnormal returns, (ii) non-synchronous trading, (iii) event clustering, (iv) 
autocorrelation of abnormal returns, and (v) event-induced change in variance.  
3.4.2.1 Non-normality of abnormal returns 
Campbell and Wasley (1993) show that the daily returns of NASDAQ shares deviate 
to a much larger extent from the normal distribution than NYSE/ASE stocks. Our sample 
of firms is closer to the characteristics of NASDAQ shares as some suffer from thin 
trading and have higher bid-ask spreads. Still, the violation of normality in daily returns 
may not be a serious issue because our data set is very large. Campbell and Wasley (1993) 
show that for portfolios of 100 securities the distributional characteristics of the returns 
indicate normality.  
To be on the safe side, we employ the non-parametric test of Corrado (1989) to check 
the robustness of our results with respect to non-normality and other possible problems. 
The non-parametric rank statistic, introduced by Corrado (1989), does not require 
abnormal returns to be normally distributed. Campbell and Wasley (1993) document that 
this rank statistic is consistently the best specified and most powerful test statistic across 
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numerous event conditions. It is robust to multi-day event periods, clustered event dates, 
and increases in variance on the event day.34  
The rank test is implemented by ranking the abnormal returns over the estimation and 
event windows: ( )titi ARrankk ,, =  for 20,...,200−=t . This process implies that 
2121 ,,,, titititi
kkARAR <⇒< . The rank statistic is then the ratio of the mean deviation of 
the securities’ day-0 ranks, ki,0, to the estimated standard deviation of the portfolio mean 
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t . (15) 
Both rank statistics approach unit normality as the number of securities in the portfolio 
increases. 
3.4.2.2 Non-synchronous trading 
The nontrading or non-synchronous trading effect arises when prices are assumed to 
be recorded at time intervals of one length when in fact they are recorded at time intervals 
of other, possibly irregular lengths (MacKinlay, 1997). Thus, non-synchronous trading can 
lead to biased betas in the market model. Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) 
present a consistent estimator of beta in the presence of nontrading that adjusts the 
nontrading beta estimates upwards compared to the unadjusted estimates. This results in 
smaller abnormal returns for thinly traded securities. However, Jain (1986) shows that, in 
general, the adjustment for thin trading is not important. Campbell and Wasley (1993) also 
                                                 
34 In comparison to the standardized test statistic and to the portfolio test statistic. 
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conclude that adjustment according to Scholes and Williams (1977) does not improve the 
Type I error or the power of parametric test statistics. Furthermore, they show that the 
rank statistic using the market model abnormal returns performs best. Therefore, we also 
rely on the rank test for the robustness checks of the test-statistics of firms suffering from 
thin trading. 
3.4.2.3 Event clustering 
When computing the variance of cumulative abnormal returns according to (11) or 
(13), we make an assumption that the event windows of the included securities do not 
overlap.35 This assumption of absence of clustering allows us to calculate the variance of 
the aggregated sample’s cumulative abnormal returns without concern about the 
covariances across securities because they are zero (MacKinlay, 1997). Accordingly, 
clustering may bias the parametric tests. Still, Brown and Warner (1985) conclude that, in 
general, the use of daily or weekly data makes clustering of events on a single day much 
less severe than the use of monthly data. Also, diversification across industries further 
mitigates the problem (Bernard, 1987). The rank statistic solves the event-clustering 
problem as it takes cross-sectional dependence into account via the aggregation of 
individual security abnormal returns into time series of portfolio mean ranks. Campbell 
and Wasley (1997) show that the rank test is again well specified, also for multi-day event 
periods. Therefore, the rank test is a good robustness check in case of event clustering. 
3.4.2.4 Autocorrelation of abnormal returns and event-induced variance 
For hypothesis tests over intervals of more than one day, autocorrelation of the 
abnormal returns should be taken into consideration. Failure to do so may result in 
misspecification of the estimated variance of the cumulative average abnormal returns. 
Even though Brown and Warner (1985) show that autocorrelation is present, they 
conclude that the benefits from autocorrelation adjustments appear to be limited. Campbell 
                                                 
35 Event clustering is not a serious problem in this study as the average number of events (insider 
transactions) per firm over the 8-year period 1991-1998 is 2.86 (purchases) and 2.77 (sales) with medians of 
2 for both the sales and the purchases. 
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and Wasley (1993) draw a similar conclusion: they show that test statistic specifications 
are not significantly affected by serial dependence. 
A shift in the variance and the mean of the returns on the event day resulting from the 
release of new information may cause another type of misspecification, namely, event-
induced variance. Still, Campbell and Wasley (1993) show that the rank test is not liable 
to such misspecification. 
3.5 Results 
This section presents the empirical results of the study. First, we report the event study 
results capturing the market reaction to directors’ net purchases and sales. Second, we test 
the information hierarchy hypothesis on the market reaction across different categories of 
directors. And finally, we outline the impact of different types of blockholders on 
information content of directors’ transactions.  
3.5.1 Market reaction to directors’ trades 
To test Hypotheses 1-8, we estimated average abnormal returns around the 
announcement of directors’ transactions using event study methodology.36 
3.5.1.1 Market reaction to purchases 
The results reported in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 strongly support Hypothesis 1a. There 
is a very strong positive market reaction to directors’ purchases. This confirms the high 
information content of these transactions. The average abnormal returns on the 
announcement day and the subsequent day are both significant and over 1.5 percent such 
that the two-day CAAR based on the market model amounts to 3.12 percent (Table 3.2). 
The positive CAAR is strongly statistically significant as are the CAARs based on the 
market-adjusted and size-adjusted models, whatever the type of test used. As the 
transaction day may not necessarily coincide with the announcement day, we also show in  
                                                 
36 The final sample of directors’ purchases and sales in the shares of their own firms is described in Section 
3.3.5 in the text and in Appendix 6. 
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Panel A the market reaction following the transaction day. As in 37 percent of the cases 
the purchase transaction is announced on the same day the trade was executed and in 27 
percent of the cases the transaction is announced the day after the trade was made, the 
results are very similar.37  
 
FIGURE 3.1: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ PURCHASES: CUMULATIVE AVERAGE 
















Positive average abnormal returns associated with a director’s purchases are persistent 
over the whole 20-day period following the transaction (see Figure 3.1) and the CAAR 
amounts to 8.47 percent including the announcement reaction. Table 3.2 also shows that 
the CAAR is significantly negative (–1.27 percent) over the twenty days prior to the 
purchase transaction. This suggests that directors time their purchases of shares well.38 
In summary, our results document that larger directors’ purchases (defined as covering 
at least 0.1 percent of the equity outstanding) contain new information. The directors’  
                                                 
37 In the regressions (results reported in Tables 4-7), we use the two-day CAR(0;1) as the dependent variable 
whereby 0 is the announcement day. Our results indicate that the market reacts positively to directors’ 
purchases already on the transaction date. However, it is possible on the transaction day, the market is not 
aware that the transaction is initiated by an insider. Therefore, we opt for the announcement date. 
38 Our results suggest that directors can properly time their purchases despite the fact that they have to ask 
for clearance to trade from the chairman of the board. It seams that the clearance is usually granted quite 
promptly. 
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TABLE 3.2: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ PURCHASES: EVENT STUDY 
This table reports the results of an event study estimating the market reaction to directors’ purchases of 
ordinary voting shares that represent at least 0.1 percent of company’s market capitalization. Only net 
transactions are taken into consideration. For the estimation, the market model ARit = Rit – (αi + βi * Rmt), 
the market adjusted model, ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t, and the size-adjusted model of Lakonishok et al. (1994), ARi,t 
= Ri,t – Rp(i),t, were used. The parameters αi and βi  were estimated for each stock over the window from day 
–200 to –21 in a regression of the following form: Rit = αi + βi * Rmt + eit. Where less daily returns were 
available, the estimation window was reduced down to (–121; -21). a The number of observations for the 
individual models differs because the models have differing daily-return data requirements and 
consequently some events had to be excluded since abnormal returns could not be computed. 










ANNOUNCEMENT DATE  
market model  
CAAR -1.27% 3.12% 4.30% 4.88% 8.47% 1861 
tCAAR -2.66 14.84 17.06 17.08 19.69  
J1 -3.63 28.29 27.55 25.54 23.67  
J2 -11.81 41.30 40.84 38.24 36.81  
trank -2.50 9.17 9.34 8.25 7.82  
market-adjusted model       
CAAR -2.78% 2.94% 3.91% 4.30% 6.27% 1889 
tCAAR -5.96 14.23 16.01 15.74 16.19  
J1 -7.78 26.05 24.53 22.03 17.14  
J2 -11.99 29.45 28.30 25.28 19.69  
trank -2.82 8.15 8.81 8.27 8.15  
size-adjusted model       
CAAR -3.27% 2.89% 3.94% 4.36% 6.78% 1686 
tCAAR -6.44 13.10 14.98 14.72 15.99  
J1 -8.59 24.04 23.14 20.93 17.40  
J2 -13.56 27.63 26.73 23.87 20.55  
trank -1.66 8.78 8.93 8.13 8.65  
TRANSACTION DATE:       
market model       
CAAR -2.48% 3.15% 4.79% 5.45% 9.43% 1915 
tCAAR -5.57 13.79 17.19 17.94 20.58  
J1 -7.26 29.21 31.42 29.18 26.97  
J2 -16.68 39.70 45.00 42.42 40.71  
trank -3.79 8.91 10.06 9.38 8.79  
market-adjusted model       
CAAR -3.92% 2.93% 4.39% 4.85% 7.24% 1942 
tCAAR -8.97 12.91 16.11 16.48 17.37  
J1 -11.18 26.41 28.02 25.26 20.16  
J2 -15.71 28.94 31.44 28.59 22.69  
trank -3.38 8.94 9.98 9.43 8.13  
size-adjusted model       
CAAR -4.37% 2.77% 4.30% 4.82% 7.63% 1732 
tCAAR -9.07 11.61 14.77 15.31 16.74  
J1 -11.67 23.38 25.72 23.51 19.90  
J2 -17.09 26.62 29.30 26.95 22.93  
trank -2.94 8.25 9.60 9.12 9.28  
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purchase transactions signal positive news about the company value. These findings 
suggest that when informed directors increase their holdings in the company, they signal 
their confidence in the future prospects of the company. This confirms Hypothesis 1a. 
Friederich et al. (2002) document a similar pattern for their sample of directors’ purchases 
in 196 ‘mid-cap’ U.K. companies over the period since 1986 till 1994. Their CAAR over a 
two-day window following the transaction day is 0.42 percent, is highly significant and 
robust to different parametric and non-parametric tests. Also CAARs for the U.S. as 
reported in Lakonishok and Lee (2001) are positive, however, their magnitude is lower. In 
particular, the five-day CAARs are 0.13 and 0.59 percent following the reporting and 
trading day, respectively, for all trades by managers in all U.S. firms listed on the 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ over the period 1975-1995. These two papers report lower 
abnormal returns compared to our CAARs for purchases. We attribute the difference to the 
higher information content of larger directors transactions analyzed in our study. 
All our results regarding the information content of directors’ purchases are robust to 
different model specifications (market model, market-adjusted model and size-adjusted 
model) and to the sensitivity checks of the rank test. 
3.5.1.2 Market reaction to sales 
Table 3.3 shows that the market reacts negatively to announcements of large net 
directors’ sales. The CAAR measured over the two days at and after the announcement is 
–0.37 percent, is significant, and decreases to –1.92 percent after 20 trading days.39 This 
negative stock performance follows a period of positive abnormal returns of 3.07 percent 
over the twenty days preceding the announcement. Figure 3.2 depicts the price 
developments over the 41-day window centred on the announcement day of directors’ 
sales. As with purchases, the positive price movement prior to the directors’ sales suggests 
that directors time their transactions. 
We conclude that directors’ sales are also information-revealing events and are 
interpreted as negative news which confirms the Hypothesis 1b. Table 3.3 also shows that 
the market reaction to the transaction date of the directors’ sales is less robust in terms of  
                                                 
39 The CAARs based on the market-adjusted and size-adjusted models are smaller, -0.21% and –0.24% 
respectively, but are also strongly statistically significant. 
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FIGURE 3.2: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ SALES: CUMULATIVE AVERAGE 
ABNORNAL RETURNS AROUND THE ANNOUNCEMENT DAY, MARKET MODEL 
 
 
statistical significance: the non-parametric rank tests show strong statistical significance 
whereas most parametric tests do not, presumably because the distributional assumptions 
of these tests are not valid. This suggests that the market does not observe the transaction 
itself but reacts to the trade at the announcement of the transaction. This contrasts with 
results for the directors’ purchases event although a deviation between the transaction and 
announcement dates of sales is similar to purchases. In 41 (28) percent of the sales 
transactions, these trades are made public on the same day the trade was made (the next 
day). 
Our findings confirm previous U.K. evidence (Friederich et al., 2002) of significantly 
negative market reaction to directors’ sales (CAAR of –0.17 over two days following the 
transaction). In contrast, U.S. directors’ sales do not seem to convey information to the 
market. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that the CAAR over a five-day period starting 
from the announcement day is –0.23 percent but insignificant. Our CAAR(0,5) amounts to 
a significant –0.62 percent, more than twice as high. How can this difference be 
explained? First, unlike Lakonishok and Lee (2001), we exclude sales following the 
exercising of options by directors. Such sales presumably reveal less information as the 
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TABLE 3.3: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ SALES: EVENT STUDY 
This table reports the results of an event study estimating the market reaction to directors’ sales of ordinary 
voting shares that represent at least 0.1 % of company’s market capitalization. Only net transactions are 
taken into consideration. For the estimation, the market model ARit = Rit – (αi + βi * Rmt), the market 
adjusted model, ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t, and the size-adjusted model of Lakonishok et al. (1994), ARi,t = Ri,t – 
Rp(i),t, were used. The parameters αi and βi  were estimated for each stock over the window from day –200 to 
–21 in a regression of the following form: Rit = αi + βi * Rmt + eit. Where less daily returns were available, 
the estimation window was reduced down to (–121; -21). a The number of observations for the individual 
models differs because the models have differing daily-return data requirements and consequently some 
events had to be excluded since abnormal returns could not be computed. 










ANNOUNCEMENT DATE   
market model   
CAAR 3.07% -0.37% -0.44% -0.62% -1.92% 2004 
tCAAR 8.68 -4.69 -4.18 -4.81 -7.75  
J1 14.38 -5.42 -4.62 -5.32 -8.78  
J2 22.74 -7.01 -6.28 -6.49 -9.58  
trank 7.58 -4.92 -4.34 -3.76 -5.42  
market-adjusted model       
CAAR 4.55% -0.21% -0.12% -0.10% -0.13% 2024 
tCAAR 13.41 -2.63 -1.11 -0.74 -0.55  
J1 20.22 -2.90 -1.16 -0.77 -0.56  
J2 22.98 -4.04 -2.69 -1.69 -1.16  
trank 7.01 -4.81 -4.53 -3.79 -5.27  
size-adjusted model       
CAAR 4.93% -0.24% -0.15% -0.19% -0.15% 1642 
tCAAR 12.29 -2.72 -1.23 -1.30 -0.55  
J1 19.51 -3.06 -1.31 -1.38 -0.59  
J2 20.99 -4.55 -2.95 -2.42 -0.97  
trank 6.63 -4.03 -3.39 -3.30 -4.42  
TRANSACTION DATE:       
market model       
CAAR 3.24% -0.07% -0.25% -0.40% -1.73% 2057 
tCAAR 8.68 -0.75 -2.11 -2.81 -7.07  
J1 15.51 -1.07 -2.71 -3.53 -8.07  
J2 23.74 -2.15 -4.13 -4.39 -8.47  
trank 7.62 -3.22 -4.32 -4.08 -5.42  
market-adjusted model       
CAAR 4.65% 0.07% 0.04% 0.08% -0.04% 2078 
tCAAR 13.03 0.75 0.32 0.53 -0.17  
J1 20.78 1.00 0.38 0.61 -0.18  
J2 22.93 -1.31 -1.87 -0.99 -1.08  
trank 6.77 -3.17 -4.38 -3.82 -5.46  
size-adjusted model       
CAAR 5.13% 0.06% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 1690 
tCAAR 12.11 0.51 0.15 0.10 0.11  
J1 20.41 0.71 0.18 0.12 0.11  
J2 21.63 -2.02 -2.44 -1.74 -0.81  
trank 6.83 -3.13 -3.35 -3.25 -4.18  
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as the proceeds form part of their remuneration package.40 Thus, our sample of sales 
transactions may retain those transactions expected to reveal more information. Second, 
we analyze only the larger transactions (0.1 percent of market capitalization).  
As conjectured in Hypothesis 1c, the market reaction to purchases is higher than that 
to sales, a finding also documented for the U.S. market in Lakonishok and Lee (2001). 
The fact that directors’ purchases seem to contain more information was also observed by 
Jeng et al. (1999) for U.S. firms and Friederich et al. (2002) for the U.K. The reason for 
this phenomenon may be that markets discount the information content of sales more as 
part of directors’ sales may occur for liquidity and diversification needs. In contrast, 
directors’ purchases potentially can have a negative impact on their wealth (and risk) and 
may hence be more informative on their expectations of the future firm value. The results 
for directors’ sales, measured by the various CAARs, are robust to all parametric and non-
parametric sensitivity checks. 
3.5.2 Test of the information hierarchy hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2 relates to the information hierarchy of the different categories of directors. It 
postulates that directors who are more familiar with the day-to-day operations of the 
company trade on more valuable information. We distinguish between five categories of 
directors: CEOs (including joint CEO-chairmen), other executive directors (the deputy 
CEO and the financial officer), chairmen (non-executives in more than 90 percent of the 
cases), other incumbent directors (both executive and non-executive directors that are not 
included in the previous categories), and former directors. The categories are listed in 
decreasing order of the superior information they are supposed to possess. The category of 
‘other incumbent directors’ includes both executive and non-executive directors, as the 
database does not distinguish between the two. Still, as the three more senior executive 
directors are already included in the first two categories and there are usually on average 
three executive directors on the board, the vast majority of directors in this category are  
                                                 
40 Similar argument was put forward, for example, in Friederich et al. (2002), Jeng et al. (1999), and 
Lustgarden and Mande (1995). 
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non-executives. Former directors are those directors who resigned or were dismissed 
within the financial year preceding the transaction. 
We test the information hierarchy hypothesis in two ways. First, we estimate average 
abnormal returns for each of the individual groups of directors and compare the estimates. 
Second, we use a regression analysis with CARs as the dependent variable and dummy 
variables representing the individual groups as explanatory variables. A multivariate 
model allows us to control for other factors such as the transaction size, firm size, 
industry, or accounting variables and determine the relationship more reliably.41 
3.5.2.1 Purchase transactions by director category 
Table 3.4 reports the results of individual event studies for different categories of 
directors. The J-form pattern around purchase transactions that was documented for the 
whole sample (Figure 3.1) persists for all the subsamples. For all the different categories 
of directors, the CAARs are significantly negative over the twenty days prior to the 
announcement but turn positive around the announcement day. In general, the two-day 
CAARs covering the announcement day as well as the next day range from 2.4 percent to 
3.8 percent, and are strongly statistically significant. Still, these results do not support the 
information hierarchy hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) as the differences between the CAARs 
by category of director are not statistically significant, apart from the differences between 
CAARs of CEOs, and, respectively, other incumbent directors and former directors (Table 
3.4). Surprisingly, the market reaction is the weakest when CEOs purchase shares in their 
own company and is the strongest after purchase transactions of former directors (see 
infra).  
Table 3.5 summarizes the regression results for directors’ purchases. The dependent 
variable in these regressions is the two-day CAR covering the announcement day and the 
following day for each firm-event using the market model as a benchmark. In order to 
construct the mutually exclusive director categories (as used in Model 1), we employ the 
following algorithm. The CEO dummy variable is set to one if a CEO is involved in a 
(net) purchase, regardless of whether any other director also purchases on the same day. 
                                                 
41 For a discussion of the control variables see Section 3.5.4. 
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Next, the ‘other top executives’ dummy is set to one whenever a deputy CEO or a 
financial director trades and when the CEO does not trade. The dummies for chairman, 
other incumbent directors, and former directors are constructed in a similar way. We 
control for the transaction size and firm size (market capitalization at the beginning of the 
year) and whether or not there are multiple purchases. The fact that, on some days, more 
than one director of the same company purchases shares may strengthen the signal.  
The results of Table 3.5 confirm that all categories of directors trigger positive and 
statistically significant abnormal returns (Model 1). The information effect of the CEO’s 
share purchases is the smallest although CEOs are assumed to have the best knowledge 
about their company’s prospects. A similar finding was documented in Jeng et al. (1999) 
for a U.S. sample. Even though the low information content of CEO purchases (in relation 
to the other categories of directors) goes against the information hierarchy hypothesis, it 
may be explained as follows. First, as argued in Jeng et al. (1999), market participants  
 
TABLE 3.4: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ PURCHASES BY DIRECTOR CATEGORIES 
This table reports the results of an event study as described in Table 3.2. For each estimation window, 
cumulative average abnormal returns and t-statistics are reported. ‘CEOs’ stands for the announced 
dealings of chief executive officers (or managing director if a firm does not have a CEO). ‘Top executive 
directors‘ covers the transactions by CEOs (including managing directors), deputy CEOs (including deputy 
managing directors), and financial directors. ‘Chairmen’ corresponds to the dealings of the chairmen of the 
board. ‘Other incumbent directors’ represents dealings of all those directors who are not included in the 
categories CEOs, executive directors, or chairmen. ‘All incumbent directors’ comprise the categories of 
CEOs, top executive directors, chairmen, and other incumbent directors. ‘Former directors’ refers to 
transactions dealings of directors who retired, were dismissed or deceased during the preceding fiscal year.  
a For the  (0,1) event window, the difference in CAARs for CEO and former directors is significantly 
different at the 5% level (t=2.07), as is the differences in CAARs of CEOs and other incumbent directors at 
10% (t=1.91).  








(0;20) # obs. 
 t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat 
CEOs -2.76% 2.38%a 3.71% 4.53% 9.28% 582 
 -3.76 6.35 8.55 9.37 11.75  
top executive directors -2.57% 2.71% 4.19% 4.98% 9.72% 677 
(CEO, dep. CEO, Financial Dir.) -3.87 7.54 9.99 10.81 13.18  
chairmen -1.40% 3.17% 5.02% 6.26% 10.97% 493 
 -1.57 6.98 9.02 9.81 11.06  
other incumbent directors -2.12% 3.51% 5.17% 5.64% 9.24% 572 
 -2.52 7.68 9.53 10.07 11.25  
all incumbent directors -2.40% 2.92% 4.43% 5.14% 9.17% 1591 
(top execs., chairmen, other incum. dirs.) -5.12 11.86 14.81 15.74 18.54  
former directors -2.50% 3.83% 6.34% 7.21% 11.55% 396 
 -2.09 6.47 8.61 8.77 9.33  




TABLE 3.5: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ PURCHASES BY DIRECTOR 
CATEGORIES: CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
This table reports cross-sectional OLS regression results with two-day CAR on the announcement day and 
the following day (market model benchmark, reported in Table 3.2) as the dependent variable for all 
explanatory variables, estimation coefficient, standard error and the t-statistic are reported. ‘CEO’ 
represents a dummy that is equal to one if the corresponding director dealing involves a chief executive 
director or a managing director. ‘CEO – multiple purchases’ corresponds to a dummy that is equal to one 
when a chief executive director or a managing director is trading and at least one other company director is 
trading on the same day. ‘Other top executives’ is a dummy that is set equal to one when a deputy chief 
executive director, a deputy managing director, or a financial director is trading and at the same time no 
CEO is trading. ‘Chairman’ corresponds to a dummy that is set to one whenever the corresponding director 
dealing involves a chairman of the board and at the same time no CEO or other executive is trading. ‘Other 
incumbent directors’ represents a dummy that is set equal to one whenever the corresponding dealing 
involves a director that is a incumbent board member but is not CEO, other executive, or chairman and at 
the same time no CEO, other executive, or chairman is trading. ‘Incumbent directors’ represents a dummy 
that is equal to sum of CEO, other top executives, chairman, and other incumbent directors dummies. 
‘Former directors’ represents a dummy that is equal to one in case a retired, dismissed or deceased director 
is trading and at the same time no incumbent director is trading. ‘Other top executives (chairmen, other 
incumbent dirs, or former dirs) – multiple purchases’ corresponds to a dummy that is equal to one when at 
least one director of the corresponding category is trading and at the same time another company director is 
also trading. ‘Multiple purchases’ is a dummy equal to one whenever more than one director trades on the 
same day. ‘Transaction size’ is defined as the total number of shares transacted by directors of given 
company on the corresponding day over total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the calendar 
year. ‘Mrkt. capitalization’ corresponds to total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year 
multiplied by the share price on the first trading day of that year.  
In Models 1, 3, 4, and 6 all directors categories dummies are included as fixed effects (they are mutually 
exclusive and sum up to a vector of ones). In Models 2, and 5 one of the director categories is dropped and 
serves as a corresponding category (consequently, they indicate significance of differences between all the 
categories towards the dropped category). 
Panel A:  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
constant  0.026 0.0091 2.87   
CEO  0.026 0.0091 2.87  0.025 0.0093 2.68 
CEO – multiple purchases   0.019 0.0097 1.95 
other top executives  0.050 0.0134 3.72 0.024 0.0110 2.14 0.045 0.0145 3.08 
other top exec. – multiple purchases   0.033 0.0236 1.41 
chairman 0.034 0.0092 3.68 0.008 0.0065 1.20 0.035 0.0093 3.77 
chairman – multiple purchases   0.003 0.0154 0.19 
other incumbent directors 0.036 0.0093 3.89 0.010 0.0062 1.63 0.037 0.0094 3.93 
other cur. dirs – multiple purchases   0.004 0.0172 0.22 
former directors 0.046 0.0090 5.12 0.020 0.0072 2.76 0.046 0.0091 5.02 
former directors – multiple purchases   0.016 0.0211 0.74 
multiple purchases 0.014 0.0068 2.12 0.014 0.0068 2.12   
transaction size -0.218 0.0647 -3.37 -0.218 0.0647 -3.37 -0.216 0.0650 -3.32 
mrkt. capitalization  -1.102 0.7070 -1.56 -1.102 0.7070 -1.56 -1.092 0.7076 -1.54 
year and industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
Adj. R2 10.44%  1.52%  10.33%  
number of observations 1906  1906  1906  
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Panel B:  Model 4 Model 5 
 coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
constant 0.033 0.0083 3.93 
incumbent directors 0.033 0.0083 3.93    
former directors 0.045 0.0089 5.01 0.012 0.0064 1.88 
transaction size -0.186 0.0633 -2.94 -0.186 0.0633 -2.94 
mrkt. capitalization  0.000 0.0000 -0.33 0.000 0.0000 -0.33 
year and industry dummies yes yes  
Adj. R2 10.14% 1.08%  
number of observations 1907 1907  
Panel C:  Model 6    
CEO  0.026 0.0092 2.78    
CEO x transaction size 0.041 0.3051 0.13    
other top executives  0.063 0.0150 4.19    
other top executives x trans. size -4.156 2.1124 -1.97    
chairman 0.035 0.0092 3.83    
chairman x transaction size -0.216 0.1650 -1.31    
other incumbent directors 0.035 0.0093 3.73    
other incumbent dir. x trans. size 0.301 0.1325 2.27    
former directors 0.051 0.0090 5.70    
former directors x trans. size -0.802 0.1388 -5.77    
multiple purchases 0.015 0.0068 2.22    
mrkt. capitalization  -1.131 0.7031 -1.61    
year and industry dummies yes     
Adj. R2 11.45%     
number of observations 1906     
 
follow the share transactions of CEOs more closely, which may cause CEOs to trade more 
cautiously and at less informative moments. Second, to reduce agency costs, some believe 
that top executives should hold company stock to increase value-maximizing incentives. 
Thus, purchase transactions of CEOs may take place to fulfil this ‘duty’ and have, 
consequently, lower information content. Third, the positive news associated with future 
prospects of the company may be adjusted downwards by the negative news that the CEO 
strengthens his control over the firm to a level that causes entrenchment. 
Model 2 shows that the difference in the two-day CARs triggered by CEOs trading and 
those triggered by chairmen or other incumbent directors’ purchases are not statistically 
significantly different. Still, the coefficient for the other top executive directors has a 
magnitude of almost twice that of the CEOs and the difference is significant. Why does 
the market react more substantially to transactions of deputy CEOs or financial officers 
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compared to transactions of the CEO? Apart from the explanations mentioned above, this 
may be due to the fact that other executive directors trade less often such that their trades 
may come as a bigger surprise to the market. In fact, CEOs are responsible for 30 percent 
of all directors’ purchase transactions compared to only 6 percent for the deputy CEOs or 
CFOs (see Panel A in Table 3.1).42 Another explanation is that deputy CEOs on average 
hold fewer shares and are thus less likely to be entrenched. 
Model 3 of Table 3.5 indicates that purchases by more than one director create a 
stronger positive signal to the market. This model includes interaction terms between 
director-category dummy variables and the dummy that indicates multiple purchases. The 
results indicate that when both the CEO and another incumbent or former director 
purchase shares on the same day, the CAR is on average more than double that when only 
the CEO trades (see the interaction term ‘CEO – multiple purchases’). Note that this is not 
the case for the other categories since the remaining interaction terms do not trigger 
significant effect. Thus, our results show that CEO purchases that are accompanied by 
trades by other directors have higher information content than the purchases of CEOs 
alone.  
In Model 4 (Panel B of Table 3.5), we distinguish between the purchases of incumbent 
and former directors and find that former directors’ trades trigger stronger market 
reactions. The difference in information content of these two types of transactions is 
significantly different from zero (see Model 5). When directors who left the company 
within the financial year before their transaction increase their holdings (but within that 
financial year), the market perceives this as a strong signal: these directors are no longer 
involved in the company’s affairs directly but may still be well informed as they only 
recently left the firm. Furthermore, these directors are not likely to violate insider 
regulation. Thus, their purchase transactions seem to express strong confidence in future 
prospects of the firm.  
In Models 1-5, we find that the market reaction to directors’ purchases is not 
influenced by firm size (measured by market capitalization). Still, larger transactions do 
not bear more information, as the coefficient for the relative size of transactions is 
                                                 
42 Also transaction size may influence the results. For results concerning this issue see Section 5.4. 
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significantly negative in all the models.43 Model 6 investigates the interaction between 
transaction size and whether or not a specific category of director purchases shares in the 
company. We find a negative correction by transaction size for other top executives and 
former directors.44  
In summary, we conclude that information hierarchy hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) does 
not hold for purchases as CEO’s purchase transactions trigger the lowest CARs. Still, our 
results indicate that the CARs associated with former directors’ purchases are high. 
Overall, our models are able to explain up to 11 percent of variation in the CARs. The R2 
is substantially higher for Models 1, 3, 4, and 6 where the directors’ categories form 
mutually exclusive groups (the sum of all these dummy variables adds to one, constant 
term is not included) relative to Models 2 and 5 that rather contain a constant term and one 
of the dummy variables is dropped to serve as a reference category. This indicates that the 
mutually exclusive dummy variables (as fixed effects in panel regressions) pick up some 
unobservable characteristics of the CARs that substantially increase the R2. Previous 
studies, however, report also very low R2. Seyhun (1986), reporting R2 around 1 percent, 
speculates that low coefficients of determination are caused by insider-trading regulation 
that discourages insiders to trade freely on the basis of their privileged information. Lin 
and Howe also report adjusted R2 of 1 percent. 
3.5.2.2 Sales transactions by director category  
The information hierarchy hypothesis is not supported for sales transactions either. 
Table 3.6 shows that the information content of sales in all the directors’ categories is 
approximately the same. CAARs around the announcement date for all directors’ 
categories are negative (below -0.42 percent) and statistically significant. Former directors 
are the only group with an insignificant market reaction, the CAAR is –0.16 percent. Thus, 
the information hierarchy hypothesis is not confirmed for directors’ sales. The pattern of 
the market reaction for the whole sample of sales, as depicted in Figure 3.2, is also  
                                                 
43 In Table 4 and 5, we include a relative measure of transaction size (% of equity purchased or sold). 
Replacing this measure by an absolute measure (in GBP terms) which measures the wealth effect of the 
transactions yields similar results.  
44 For further discussion see Section 3.5.4.2. 




TABLE 3.6: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ SALES BY DIRECTOR CATEGORIES 
All variables are defined as in Table 3.4. For each estimation window, cumulative average abnormal returns 
and t-statistics are reported. a For the (0,1) event window, the difference in CAARs for incumbent and 
former directors is significantly different at 10% significance level. All other pair-wise tests on differences 
of CAARs (0;1) are not statistically significant. 








(0;20) # obs. 
 t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat 
CEOs 3.49% -0.42% -0.58% -0.81% -1.83% 490 
 5.96 -2.86 -2.66 -2.98 -3.52  
top executive directors 3.42% -0.48% -0.67% -0.95% -2.17% 563 
(CEO, dep. CEO, Financial Dir.) 5.88 -3.26 -3.17 -3.60 -4.35  
chairmen 3.19% -0.50% -0.56% -0.88% -1.79% 350 
 4.72 -3.15 -2.46 -3.17 -3.10  
other incumbent directors 3.05% -0.59% -0.77% -1.06% -2.23% 684 
 4.97 -4.52 -4.48 -4.97 -4.96  
all incumbent directors 3.31% -0.46% -0.59% -0.84% -2.10% 1476 
(top execs., chairmen, other incum. dirs.) 8.76 -5.26 -5.05 -5.73 -7.18  
former directors 2.61% -0.16%a -0.20% -0.18% -1.62% 626 
 3.53 -1.10 -0.98 -0.77 -3.85  
 
TABLE 3.7: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ SALES BY DIRECTOR CATEGORIES: 
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
All variables are as defined in Table 3.5. 
Panel A:  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
constant  -0.009 0.0054 -1.65   
CEO / in model 4 CEO alone -0.009 0.0054 -1.65  -0.009 0.0055 -1.7 
CEO – multiple sales   -0.004 0.0033 -1.2 
other top executives  -0.013 0.0066 -1.98 -0.004 0.0045 -0.94 -0.013 0.0069 -1.89 
other top exec. – multiple sales   -0.005 0.0108 -0.51 
chairman -0.010 0.0053 -1.85 -0.001 0.0027 -0.35 -0.010 0.0054 -1.88 
chairman – multiple sales   -0.004 0.0058 -0.67 
other incumbent directors -0.010 0.0053 -1.82 -0.001 0.0022 -0.32 -0.009 0.0053 -1.77 
other cur. dirs – multiple sales   -0.009 0.0049 -1.91 
former directors -0.007 0.0051 -1.33 0.002 0.0024 0.88 -0.007 0.0052 -1.42 
former directors – multiple sales   -0.001 0.0055 -0.1 
multiple sales -0.005 0.0022 -2.02 -0.005 0.0022 -2.02   
transaction size 0.064 0.0297 2.15 0.064 0.0297 2.15 0.065 0.0299 2.16 
mrkt. capitalization  -0.001 0.0005 -1.04 -0.001 0.0005 -1.04 -0.001 0.0005 -1.04 
year and industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
Adj. R2 1.28%  0.26%  1.15%  
number of observations 1997  1997  1997  
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Panel B:  Model 4 Model 5 
 coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
constant  -0.011 0.0051 -2.18 
incumbent directors -0.011 0.0051 -2.18    
former directors -0.008 0.0051 -1.52 0.003 0.0018 1.8 
transaction size 0.052 0.0287 1.81 0.052 0.0287 1.81 
mrkt. capitalization  -0.001 0.0005 -1.19 -0.001 0.0005 -1.19 
year and industry dummies yes  yes   
Adj. R2 1.23%  0.21%   
number of observations 1997  1997   
Panel C:  Model 7    
CEO  -0.008 0.0055 -1.49    
CEO x transaction size 0.036 0.0728 0.49    
other top executives  -0.011 0.0068 -1.56    
other top executives x trans. size -0.343 0.2915 -1.18    
chairman -0.008 0.0054 -1.42    
chairman x transaction size -0.095 0.0605 -1.57    
other incumbent directors -0.011 0.0053 -2.05    
other incumbent dir. x trans. size 0.227 0.0756 3.01    
former directors -0.008 0.0052 -1.46    
former directors x trans. size 0.133 0.0509 2.62    
multiple sales -0.005 0.0022 -2.22    
mrkt. capitalization  -0.001 0.0005 -0.96    
year and industry dummies yes     
Adj. R2 1.76%     
number of observations 1997     
 
observed for all the categories of directors. The announcement of these transactions is 
preceded by a period of positive CAARs that turn negative after the transaction. Hence, it 
seems that directors time the sale of (part of) their shares. 
The regression results in Table 3.7 confirm the conclusions from the event study. 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported. The market reacts negatively to sales transactions by all 
categories of incumbent directors (Model 1), but the market does not distinguish between 
the categories of directors (Model 2). The fact that the parameter estimate for former 
directors is not significant can be interpreted as a natural consequence of these directors’ 
leaving the firm such that those transactions do not carry any information. Models 1-3 
show that when more than one director sells a share stake, the market reaction is on 
average more negative (though this effect is not significant in Model 3). The negative 
share price reaction associated with directors’ transactions only occurs for incumbent 
Insider Trading and Corporate Control: Evidence from the U.K. 
 
81
directors but not for former directors (Models 4 and 5). Finally, Model 6 shows that large 
transactions do not trigger different market reactions than small transactions. The only 
exception is for the category of other incumbent directors: large sale transactions correct 
the negative market reaction (they are less informative). The following section includes 
the impact of control concentration in this analysis. 
3.5.3 Test of the effect of corporate control 
In this subsection we test the impact of ownership concentration on the information 
content of directors’ trades (Hypotheses 3 to 8). The two-day CARs for each firm-event 
around the announcement of directors’ transactions are regressed on a set of ownership 
concentration variables that measure the possible information content of directors’ 
transactions in firms with different categories of blockholders: corporations, individuals or 
families unrelated to the directors, institutional investors, and directors. A specific 
ownership concentration dummy variable is set to one if a shareholder of that category 
owns at least 5 percent of the equity (this is our definition of a blockholder).45. We 
simultaneously control for other determinants that may influence the information content 
of directors’ trades: transaction value, firm size, profitability, leverage, book-to-market 
ratio, and simultaneous trading by several directors.46 The models also include director-
category dummies as presented in the previous section.  
3.5.3.1 Ownership structure: purchase transactions 
In Table 3.8, we investigate the information content of directors’ purchases in firms 
with different categories of blockholders. The results provide strong support for 
Hypothesis 3. The coefficient estimates measuring the information effect of active 
monitors – corporations, and individuals or families – are both negative, though only the 
coefficient for corporations is significant within the 1 percent level of statistical 
significance. This suggests that the positive information content of directors’ purchases is 
mitigated by the presence of monitors. These outside blockholders oversee firm activities 
                                                 
45 Dispersed ownership is the reference category. 
46 The effects of control variables are further discussed in Section 3.5.4. 
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and ensure that their firm is managed to maximize shareholder value. Good monitoring 
leads to less information asymmetry and agency costs. Therefore, the market can afford to 
rely less on information or signals released by the management. Our results confirm that 
directors’ purchases convey less new information when corporations and individuals own 
a considerable stake in the firm. It is also possible, however, that monitoring by 
corporations and individuals or families not related to the management leads to fewer 
directors’ purchases that are bases on superior information. This is because active 
monitors may not allow directors to engage in this type of behaviour.  
 
TABLE 3.8: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ PURCHASES AND OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE: CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
This table reports cross-sectional OLS regression results with dependent variable that is obtained from the 
event study reported in Table 3.2 (Market model) and is defined as cumulative average abnormal return on 
the announcement day plus the day after of all reported U.K. directors’ purchases over the period since 
1991 till 1998 that represent at least 0.1% of company’s market capitalization. For all explanatory 
variables, estimation coefficient, heteroscedasticity-robust (White) standard error and the t-statistic are 
reported.  
‘Concentrated blockholder – corporations, financial institutions, individuals / families and directors’ 
represents a set of dummy variables. The corresponding dummy variable is equal to one when a 
blockholder of the corresponding type holds a stake of at least 5% of the company’s outstanding shares. It 
is set to zero otherwise. ‘Dispersed ownership’ is a dummy that is set to zero whenever any blockholder is 
present in the company and is equal to one otherwise. ‘Dominant blockholder group – corporation, 
financial institution, individual and directors’ represents a set of dummy variables. The corresponding 
dummy variable is equal to one when the combined ownership stake of all blocks of the type is the largest 
compared to combined stakes of other ownership types (for example, if directors together own 30% and 
financial institutions hold together 15%, the dummy ‘dominant blockholder group – directors is set to one). 
‘With corporation, fin. institution, individual, or directors present’ represents an interaction term between 
the ‘dominant’ blockholder group dummy and a ‘concentrated’ blockholder dummy of respective type. 
‘Other top executives’ is a dummy that is equal to one when a deputy chief executive director, a deputy 
managing director, or a financial director is trading and at the same time no CEO is trading. ‘Chairmen’ 
corresponds to a dummy that is set to one whenever a chairman of the board trades and at the same time no 
CEO or other executive is trading. ‘Other incumbent directors’ represents a dummy that is equal to one 
whenever the corresponding dealing involves a director that is not a CEO, other executive, or chairman and 
at the same time no CEO, other executive, or chairman is trading. ‘Former directors’ represents a dummy 
that is equal to one in case a retired, dismissed or deceased director is trading and at the same time no other 
director is trading. ‘Multiple purchases’ is a dummy equal to one whenever more than one director trades 
on the same day. ‘Transaction value’ is defined as natural logarithm of total number of shares transacted by 
directors of given company on the corresponding day times price per share at the beginning of the calendar 
year. ‘Size’ corresponds to natural logarithm of total number of employees at the beginning of the year. 
‘B/M ratio’ is defined as total book value of equity over total market capitalization at the beginning of the 
year (divided by 1 thousand). ‘Profitability’ is represented by returns on equity at the beginning of the 
calendar year (divided by 1 million). ‘Leverage’ stands for debt-equity ratio at the beginning of the year. 
‘Loss’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one when earnings after taxes in the previous fiscal year are 
negative. ‘Low interest coverage’ is a dummy variable that is set to one when interest coverage at the 
beginning of the fiscal year is lower than two. ‘Dividend decrease’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
when firm decreased or omitted dividend over previous fiscal year (over t-2 to t-1) ‘Growth firm’ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one when book-to-market ratio for the previous year is lower than the median. * 
denotes significance at 1% level. ** denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 3.8 continued 
 
Panel A:  Model 1 
 coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
constant 0.050 0.0233 2.16 
other top executives 0.016 0.0106 1.51 
chairmen 0.002 0.0064 0.36 
other incumbent directors 0.009 0.0076 1.16 
former directors 0.015 0.0074 2.00 
concentrated blockholder  
corporations -0.021 0.0074 -2.84 
financial institutions 0.013 0.0056 2.29 
individuals / families -0.010 0.0065 -1.58 
directors -0.014 0.0053 -2.59 
multiple purchases 0.014 0.0090 1.56 
transaction value -0.001 0.0022 -0.67 
size  -0.001 0.0025 -0.20 
B/M ratio -1.609 1.8743 -0.86 
profitability 1.687 0.7000 2.41 
leverage 0.002 0.0025 0.94 
year and industry dummies yes  
R2 3.35%  
F 2.15 *  
number of observations 1428  
 
Hypothesis 4 postulates that the market reaction to directors’ purchases is stronger 
when institutional investors are blockholders. There is little evidence in the literature that  
U.K. institutions monitor the firms whose shares they own (see e.g. Franks et al., 2001, 
Faccio and Lasfer, 2002). If institutions do not monitor firms, their presence as a 
blockholder will not have the same mitigating effect as active corporations, and 
individuals or families. Still, if institutional investors rely on information released by the 
directors or on (costly) signals emitted by the directors (such as their dealings) and act 
(trade) upon this information, the positive signal of directors’ purchases may even be 
strengthened. Our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4. The parameter estimate of the 
presence of financial institutions is positive and highly significant (at the 1 percent level). 
This implies that the market reaction is more positive for firms with institutional 
ownership. It reflects that institutional owners do not act as monitors and hence do not 
lower information asymmetry about firm value. On the contrary, our result shows that they 
seem to follow directors’ purchases and to rebalance their portfolios accordingly.  
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Table 3.8 continued 
 
Panel B: Model 2 
 coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
Constant 0.044 0.0226 1.95 
other top executives 0.015 0.0110 1.35 
Chairman 0.003 0.0064 0.52 
other incumbent directors 0.009 0.0076 1.18 
former directors 0.016 0.0075 2.15 
dominant blockholder group  
dominant corporations 0.007 0.0255 0.28 
with financial inst. present -0.016 0.0233 -0.69 
with indiv’s/families present 0.021 0.0201 1.04 
with directors present -0.027 0.0224 -1.21 
dominant financial institutions 0.027 0.0089 3.08 
with corporation present -0.029 0.0101 -2.90 
with indiv’s/families present -0.013 0.0115 -1.15 
with directors present -0.026 0.0083 -3.10 
dominant individuals/families -0.021 0.0092 -2.28 
with financial inst. present 0.019 0.0197 0.94 
dominant directors 0.011 0.0090 1.26 
with corporation present -0.058 0.0264 -2.20 
with financial inst. present -0.006 0.0084 -0.67 
with indiv’s/families present -0.017 0.0100 -1.75 
multiple purchases 0.014 0.0090 1.62 
transaction value -0.002 0.0022 -0.70 
size  0.000 0.0027 -0.16 
B/M ratio -2.289 1.8704 -1.22 
profitability 1.644 0.7174 2.29 
leverage 0.003 0.0026 0.98 
year and industry dummies yes  
R2 4.57%  
F 2.06 *  
number of observations 1428  
 
The results in Panel A of Table 3.8 also support Hypothesis 5a on the information (and 
entrenchment) effect of directors’ ownership. We postulate that the positive news 
contained in directors’ purchases is attenuated by the danger that directors become more  
entrenched and hence less accountable. The parameter estimate of directors’ ownership is 
negative and statistically significant. In the presence of large directors’ ownership, 
directors’ purchases convey two important counter-acting signals: (i) the positive news 
about the good future prospects and (ii) the negative news associated with increased 
directors’ ownership which may lead to entrenchment. Our results suggest that the latter 
effect is quite strong. 
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Table 3.8 continued 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
loss low int. coverage div. decrease Panel C: 
coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
Constant 0.045 0.0230 1.95 0.044 0.0233 1.87 0.048 0.0234 2.04 
other top executives 0.012 0.0114 1.07 0.015 0.0125 1.17 0.009 0.0107 0.89 
Chairman -0.004 0.0066 -0.58 -0.006 0.0071 -0.89 0.002 0.0073 0.34 
other incumbent directors 0.007 0.0076 0.94 0.010 0.0079 1.28 0.007 0.0082 0.85 
former directors 0.024 0.0090 2.66 0.023 0.0094 2.47 0.017 0.0085 2.02 
concentrated blockholder     
corporations -0.020 0.0064 -3.08 -0.020 0.0068 -2.96 -0.021 0.0090 -2.38 
financial institutions 0.012 0.0061 1.96 0.014 0.0063 2.21 0.012 0.0063 1.97 
individuals / families -0.010 0.0069 -1.38 -0.018 0.0067 -2.61 -0.011 0.0075 -1.52 
directors  -0.011 0.0062 -1.72 -0.010 0.0061 -1.61 -0.010 0.0060 -1.70 
interaction term: dir. category x performance dummy     
CEO 0.052 0.0244 2.11 0.038 0.0213 1.79 0.001 0.0201 0.05 
other top executives 0.063 0.0319 1.97 0.041 0.0277 1.50 0.027 0.0383 0.70 
chairman 0.071 0.0272 2.60 0.056 0.0228 2.45 -0.003 0.0226 -0.13 
other incumbent directors 0.062 0.0278 2.24 0.035 0.0245 1.41 0.010 0.0222 0.44 
former directors 0.023 0.0267 0.87 0.016 0.0236 0.68 -0.013 0.0242 -0.55 
interaction term: blockholder x performance dummy    
corporations -0.011 0.0175 -0.66 -0.011 0.0149 -0.73 0.002 0.0174 0.14 
financial institutions -0.031 0.0200 -1.53 -0.022 0.0172 -1.30 0.006 0.0163 0.40 
individuals / families -0.008 0.0173 -0.48 0.018 0.0149 1.18 0.008 0.0162 0.48 
directors  -0.028 0.0161 -1.72 -0.017 0.0134 -1.25 -0.014 0.0144 -0.94 
dispersed -0.056 0.0253 -2.22 -0.032 0.0220 -1.46 0.016 0.0250 0.63 
multiple purchases 0.013 0.0089 1.48 0.013 0.0090 1.44 0.013 0.0091 1.41 
transaction value -0.001 0.0022 -0.53 -0.001 0.0022 -0.49 -0.001 0.0022 -0.58 
size  -0.001 0.0026 -0.21 0.000 0.0026 -0.19 -0.001 0.0026 -0.24 
B/M ratio -2.456 2.0838 -1.18 -2.594 2.0963 -1.24 -1.602 1.9421 -0.82 
Profitability 1.454 0.7105 2.05 1.717 0.7265 2.36 1.518 0.6639 2.29 
Leverage 0.002 0.0023 0.99 0.002 0.0024 0.83 0.002 0.0024 0.79 
year and industry dummies yes  yes  yes  
R2 4.62%  4.44%  3.74%  
F 2.13 *  2.11 *  1.69 *  
Number of observations 1481  1481  1481  
 
R2 in this model is 3.35 percent, substantially higher than in Models 2 and 5 in Table 
3.5. This indicates that the additional information contained in the corporate-control  
dummy variables (and accounting variables) is quite valuable as it more than doubled the 
R2.  
Whereas in Panel A of Table 3.8 we test the effect of the presence of specific 
categories of blockholders, in Panel B we investigate the impact of the relative power of 
these categories of blockholders on CARs. We focus on the effect of the dominant 
blockholder type (as opposed to the effect of presence of a blockholder type regardless of 
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its relative size). A particular type of blockholder is dominant, if the sum of the 
shareholdings of this category is larger than that of any other category.47 Since this set of 
dummy variables is mutually exclusive, only one dummy variable is equal to one at a time 
and the dummy variables for all the other categories are equal to zero. Once we have 
determined which specific category of shareholder dominates a firm, we also use 
interaction terms that indicate whether the other categories of owners are also among the 
firm’s blockholders.48 
We expect in Hypothesis 5a that the positive effect of directors’ dealings is reduced 
when directors are the dominant blockholders as the directors may run the firm at the 
detriment of other blockholders and may become unaccountable due to their large share 
stakes. Panel B of Table 3.8 does not support this hypothesis as the parameter coefficient 
of dominant directors is not statistically significant. The fact that this finding is 
incongruous with that of Panel A may result from the fact that there are not so many firms 
in which directors are the dominant blockholders (this is only the case in 8 percent of 
firms).49 Moreover, Panel B shows that when directors dominate and corporations are 
present as blockholders, the positive news of directors’ purchases is offset. This finding 
fails to support Hypothesis 5b that predicts that the presence of a monitoring blockholder 
may balance the negative entrenchment effect of Hypothesis 5a.  
Further, we also find, as expected in Hypothesis 3, that when individuals or families 
dominate, directors’ purchases reveal less information to the market, but we find no such 
relation when corporations are the largest blockholder.  
Panel B of Table 3.8 confirms that directors’ purchases trigger positive CARs which 
are even higher when financial institutions are the dominant (or only) blockholder, 
confirming Hypothesis 4. As financial institutions may not be inclined to actively monitor 
the firm (see above), directors’ dealings are powerful signals to the market and it may be 
                                                 
47 When we only consider the largest blockholder by category of owner (rather than the sum of the 
category’s shareholdings), our results remain largely similar. This is due to the fact that in most companies, 
there is only one large blockholder within a specific category. 
48 We multiply the dominant blockholder dummy by the dummies for individual blockholder categories. 
49 Morck et al. (1988) indicate that the marginal entrenchment effect is decreasing as insider concentration 
and power increases. This may imply that the negative entrenchment effect embedded in directors’ 
purchases is less prevailing once directors are strong and quite well entrenched, as in the case of dominant 
insider ownership. When insiders are the largest shareholder group, they may enjoy so much power and 
entrenchment that additional increase in their ownership does not have much more effect on entrenchment. 
The marginal entrenchment effect is very small. 
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that these financial institutions are trading on the directors’ signal. The additional increase 
in CARs when financial institutions are present is offset when other categories of 
blockholders (corporations or directors) are also present. The reason is that outsider 
monitoring reduces the positive informational effect while the danger of managerial 
entrenchment provokes the same reaction.  
Panel C of Table 3.8 tests Hypotheses 6 and 7 on the stronger market reaction to 
directors’ purchases under poor performance and insolvency. Models 3-5 are similar to 
those in Panel A. However, they include additional regressors which are interaction terms 
between director categories and blockholder types on the one side and poor performance 
and/or financial distress on the other side. We measure poor performance and financial 
distress by dummy variables that are set to one if there are earnings losses (Model 3), low 
interest coverage (Model 4)50 and decreased or omitted dividends (Model 5), respectively. 
These variables are expected to trigger more intensive shareholder or creditor monitoring 
(Franks et al., 2001). 
Models 3 and 4 of Panel C reveal some interesting results: directors’ purchases trigger 
positive share price reactions (constant), which are substantially higher when the company 
is generating losses or is financially distressed (see interaction terms of directors’ types 
and losses/interest coverage). Thus, in situations of poor performance and insolvency, the 
market interprets directors’ purchase transactions as confidence-building signals, which 
supports Hypothesis 6.  
The parameter estimates of the blockholder dummies in Models 3-5 of Panel C are 
similar to those in Panel A, but the interaction terms of ownership concentration with poor 
performance (measured by earnings losses and dividend reductions) or with insolvency 
(low interest coverage) are not significant. The fact that in poorly performing companies 
with strong outsiders and directors, who could facilitate corporate recovery, the directors’ 
signal is not stronger suggests that the market expects little from blockholders in making 
the firm profitable. It seems that in the case of poor performance, the signal of directors 
purchasing shares is important irrespective of the shareholder structure. This finding fails 
to support Hypothesis 7.  
                                                 
50 The interest coverage becomes dangerously low when it falls below 2. At this stage a firm’s bonds 
typically lose investment grade.  
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3.5.3.2 Ownership structure: sale transactions 
Table 3.9 documents how ownership structure affects the market reaction to directors’ 
sales. Panel A shows that the information content of sales is much lower than that of 
purchases. As stated in Hypothesis 1c, directors’ sales are less informative as some of the 
sales by directors may be related to liquidity needs even though the firm’s prospects 
remain favourable. Model 1 documents that the presence of specific categories of 
blockholders has little impact on the CARs at the sales announcement and the following 
day. The only type of blockholder that has an impact is directors. This positive effect is in 
line with Hypothesis 5a and may result from the fact that the danger of directors’ 
entrenchment is reduced.  
A more detailed account of the impact of different categories of blockholders is 
presented in Panel B of Table 3.9. We distinguish between dominant and non-dominant 
blockholders. Similar to the results from the purchases, these sales results support 
  
TABLE 3.9: MARKET REACTION TO DIRECTORS’ SALES AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: 
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
All variables are as defined in Table 3.8. * denotes significance at 1% level. ** denotes significance at 5% 
level. 
Panel A:  Model 1 
 coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
constant 0.007 0.0052 1.27 
other top executives 0.001 0.0043 0.15 
chairmen 0.001 0.0024 0.43 
other incumbent directors 0.001 0.0023 0.32 
former directors 0.004 0.0027 1.48 
concentrated blockholder  
corporations -0.001 0.0032 -0.32 
financial institutions -0.002 0.0019 -0.99 
individuals / families -0.004 0.0027 -1.63 
directors 0.004 0.0020 2.01 
multiple sales -0.004 0.0022 -1.61 
size  -0.002 0.0007 -2.36 
B/M ratio -0.714 0.8903 -0.80 
profitability 3.410 3.1194 1.09 
leverage 0.348 0.4392 0.79 
year and industry dummies yes  
R2 2.02%  
F 1.55 **  
number of observations 1681   
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Table 3.9 continued 
 
Panel B: Model 2 
 coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
constant 0.005 0.0051 0.99 
other top executives 0.000 0.0043 -0.05 
chairman 0.001 0.0024 0.49 
other incumbent directors 0.001 0.0023 0.32 
former directors 0.004 0.0027 1.59 
dominant blockholder group  
dominant corporations -0.003 0.0057 -0.57 
with financial inst. present 0.007 0.0068 0.96 
with indiv’s/families present 0.020 0.0146 1.36 
with directors present -0.009 0.0086 -1.03 
dominant financial institutions -0.004 0.0023 -1.83 
with corporation present -0.009 0.0050 -1.82 
with indiv’s/families present -0.005 0.0041 -1.21 
with directors present 0.005 0.0027 1.97 
dominant individuals/families -0.008 0.0064 -1.24 
with financial inst. present 0.016 0.0095 1.65 
with directors present -0.009 0.0107 -0.85 
dominant directors 0.002 0.0034 0.61 
with corporation present 0.010 0.0083 1.15 
with financial inst. present 0.002 0.0040 0.42 
with indiv’s/families present -0.007 0.0042 -1.69 
multiple sales -0.004 0.0022 -1.64 
size  -0.001 0.0007 -2.01 
B/M ratio -0.880 0.9284 -0.95 
profitability 3.710 3.2194 1.15 
leverage 0.505 0.4724 1.07 
year and industry dummies yes  
R2 3.30%  
F 1.57 **  
number of observations 1681  
 
Hypothesis 4: the presence of financial institutions reinforces the negative news conveyed 
by directors’ sales. The reason is that financial institutions are not active monitors such 
that their presence does not reduce the asymmetry of information between directors and 
outsiders, nor does it reduce the potential agency conflicts between directors and outside 
blockholders. Instead, financial institutions may time their sales to closely follow 
directors’ sales and thereby strengthen the negative news. The presence of directors in 
firms where financial institutions are dominant blockholders offsets the negative impact of 
the latter. 
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Table 3.9 continued 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
loss low int. coverage div. decrease Panel C: 
coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. coef. std.dev. t-stat. 
constant 0.008 0.0051 1.54 0.008 0.0052 1.55 0.007 0.0049 1.46
former directors 0.002 0.0023 1.00 0.002 0.0023 0.96 0.004 0.0023 1.72
concentrated blockholder       
corporations 0.000 0.0038 0.09 -0.001 0.0038 -0.31 0.000 0.0031 -0.01
financial institutions -0.001 0.0019 -0.70 -0.002 0.0019 -1.03 0.000 0.0019 -0.11
individuals / families -0.002 0.0028 -0.79 -0.003 0.0027 -1.14 -0.005 0.0028 -1.70
directors  0.004 0.0020 1.96 0.004 0.0020 1.97 0.003 0.0020 1.54
interaction term: dir. category x 
performance dummy 
 
     
incumbent directors -0.038 0.0123 -3.10 -0.031 0.0115 -2.71 -0.015 0.0161 -0.96
former directors 0.031 0.0127 2.41 -0.023 0.0116 -1.98 -0.018 0.0139 -1.27
interaction term: blockholder x 
performance dummy 
 
     
corporations 0.005 0.0084 0.61 0.009 0.0083 1.15 -0.010 0.0175 -0.59
financial institutions 0.020 0.0109 1.88 0.019 0.0099 1.88 -0.006 0.0131 -0.49
individuals / families -0.010 0.0086 -1.18 -0.006 0.0085 -0.69 0.010 0.0101 0.98
directors  0.015 0.0077 1.93 0.009 0.0075 1.18 0.021 0.0116 1.84
dispersed 0.041 0.0129 3.16 0.029 0.0119 2.41 0.025 0.0161 1.53
multiple sales -0.004 0.0020 -1.87 -0.004 0.0020 -1.91 -0.004 0.0021 -1.79
size  -0.002 0.0007 -2.34 -0.002 0.0008 -2.31 -0.002 0.0007 -2.36
B/M ratio -0.663 0.9080 -0.73 -0.394 0.9034 -0.44 -0.642 0.9248 -0.69
profitability 2.666 2.7053 0.99 2.546 2.7889 0.91 3.418 3.0420 1.12
leverage 0.527 0.4408 1.19 0.448 0.4407 1.02 0.315 0.4506 0.70
year and industry dummies yes yes yes  
R2 3.32% 2.79% 3.03%  
F 1.94 *  1.61 **  1.62 **  
number of observations 1681 1681 1681  
 
We find strong support for Hypothesis 6 in Panel C of Table 3.9. The direct 
information effect of directors’ sales is stronger for companies generating losses and 
having low interest coverage (as reflected in the interaction term of incumbent directors 
and losses/low interest coverage in Models 3 and 4). Models 3 and 5 show that in firms 
with directors with significant stakes, a reduction in directors’ control levels attenuates the 
negative news of their sales even in the wake of poor performance (losses, dividend cuts). 
However, there is little consistent evidence that the control structure influences the market 
reaction to directors’ sales (Models 3-5).  
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3.5.4 Other determinants of directors’ trades 
The results in Tables 3.5-3.9 also investigate the impact of firm size, transaction size 
and value, leverage, and book-to-market ratio on the market reaction to directors’ share 
purchases and sales. 
3.5.4.1 Firm size 
We expect a negative correlation between the information content of directors’ 
dealings and firm size. Since analysts tend to follow the larger firms more closely, it is 
likely that directors in small firms hold a more substantial informational advantage (Jeng 
et al., 1999 and Friederich et al., 2002). Empirical results concerning this conjecture are 
mixed. Seyhun (1986) reports a significant negative relationship between the 
announcement effects of directors’ trades in the U.S. and corporate size. He concludes that 
most profitable directors’ trading occurs in small firms. However, more recent studies do 
not support this finding and find no significant relation between market reactions and size 
(Lin and Howe, 1990 and Jeng et al., 1999). In particular, Jeng et al. argue that Seyhun’s 
(1986) finding is a result of size-related measurement error in the abnormal returns. In 
other words, the relationship disappears once abnormal returns are size-adjusted. So far, 
no empirical evidence has been provided on this relation between firm size and CARs 
following the announcement of directors’ trades for a U.K. sample. However, Gregory et 
al. (1997) report more director-trading activity for less liquid and smaller stocks that may 
indicate higher information asymmetry and larger CARs for these firms. 
Our results in Table 3.8 show that for the case of directors’ purchases the relationship 
between corporate size and informational advantage is negative but insignificant. Size is 
measured as the logarithm of the number of employees, but alternative measures such as 
the logarithm of the market capitalization or total assets are also statistically insignificant.  
For directors’ sales, we expect the parameter estimate of firm size to be positive (and 
to attenuate the negative overall market reaction) if the hypothesis that directors’ dealings 
in smaller firms have a higher informational content is true. Our findings do not support 
this hypothesis and are mixed: the parameter estimate of the number of employees in 
Panels A and B of Table 3.9 is significantly negative (rather than positive) whereas those 
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of the market capitalization (Panel C, Table 3.9) and total assets (not reported) are 
insignificant. Thus, we can conclude that our results do not confirm that information 
asymmetry is more substantial in smaller firms. The reason why we find little relation 
between the market reaction to directors’ trades and corporate size is that this result may 
be influenced by the fact that we only study the information content if larger 
transactions51. In general, larger trades may convey more information regardless of the 
firm size. 
3.5.4.2 Intensity of trading 
We also explore the notion that directors may be aware of their informational 
advantage and trade more when they have more information (Seyhun, 1986). To put it 
differently: more intensive insider trading can be interpreted as a signal of higher 
information asymmetry. There are two possible measures of the intensity of insider trading 
(Lin and Howe, 1990): the number of directors trading and the size of trades. Both 
measures are expected to have a positive effect on the abnormal returns.   
Previous empirical results are mixed. Seyhun (1986) confirms the hypothesis: he 
documents that the market reaction to net insider transactions is significantly more 
positive for large trades (as measured by the (log-) value (in dollars) and the (log-) 
proportion of the firm traded). The net number of trading directors, however, becomes 
insignificant after controlling for firm size.52 Jeng et al. (1999) confirm Seyhun’s results 
and show that medium-volume and high-volume insider purchases are more profitable 
compared to low-volume purchases53, but the profitability of the medium and high-volume 
portfolios is very comparable. In contrast, Lin and Howe (1990) do not support the 
hypothesis: neither the number of directors who are trading nor the dollar amount of 
insider trading are important determinants of the CARs measured over the 6 and 12 
months following the insider transaction. For a U.K. sample of mid-cap firms, Friederich 
et al. (2002) report that clustered (repeated) buys and sells are associated with CAARs that  
                                                 
51 For a discussion about the relative versus absolute transaction size: see next section. 
52 The net number of insiders is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the number of buyers 
and the number of sellers. 
53 The portfolios are partitioned according to the fraction of equity traded. 
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are substantially higher than the full sample of insider buys and sells: CAARs 20 days 
after the clustered purchases are 4.5 percent compared to 1.9 percent for all purchases. For 
sales, the corresponding CAARs equal to –2.4 and –1.5 percent for the clustered and full 
sample, respectively. Furthermore, this study reports that medium-sized buys (between 
GBP 5,000 and 70,000) predict higher 20-day CAARs than large buys. Insider sales do not 
trigger a similar relationship. 
Our results are mixed. First, the fact that multiple directors are trading proves to be a 
significant determinant of the information content for purchases and sales in Tables 3.4 
and 3.5. The market price response is markedly larger when more than one director 
purchases the shares of his own firm (Table 3.4). On average, abnormal returns are 1.4 
percent higher when two or more directors purchase on the same day. This finding is not 
surprising as our analysis includes only those transactions that represent more than 0.1 
percent of company’s market capitalization. Two or more such dealings on the same day 
emit a strong signal. We find similar strong (negative) results for repeated directors’ sales 
in Table 3.5. Tables 3.6 and 3.7, however, reveal that after controlling for ownership 
structure (and accounting variables), the significance of these results is diminished. 
Second, we measure the effect of the size of directors’ transactions using a relative and 
an absolute benchmark: the fraction of the market capitalization traded and the total net 
value of the transaction. The former proxy indicates that transaction size mitigates 
abnormal returns (Tables 3.5 and 3.7): the higher the relative share in the company that is 
sold or purchased by a director, the lower is the information content. This is at first sight 
surprising but a more detailed analysis (using piecewise regressions54) shows that 
relatively larger purchases (sales) trigger stronger positive (negative) market reactions up 
to a certain level of shareholding. When directors purchase very large shareholdings (20 
percent or more of the shares outstanding), the market reacts with strongly negative 
(positive) share price adjustments.55 Thus, whereas purchases are perceived to be a 
positive signal in general, very large purchases which give substantial control to directors 
raise substantial fears of entrenchment. Likewise, increased share liquidity and reduced 
domination of the firm in terms of control by directors lead to increases in announcement 
                                                 
54 Not shown: tables available upon request. 
55 Results are not shown in the tables but are available upon request.  
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CARs for sales. Friederich et al. (2002) report similar finding that mid-sized purchases 
trigger the largest CAAR. In Tables 3.8 and 3.9, we re-estimate the models with an 
absolute measure of transaction size (the logarithm of total net value traded) and find 
results (although somewhat less significant) similar to those found for the relative 
transaction size measures.  
As a last step, we investigate whether the information content of the transaction size 
depends on the identity of the directors trading. To do this, we construct an interaction 
term consisting of the transaction size (measured by the fraction of market capitalization 
traded) and the director-category dummies. The results reported in Panel C of Tables 3.5 
and 3.7 indicate that the relationship varies by category of directors. For purchases (Table 
3.5), the transaction size does not matter when the CEO or chairman is buying additional 
shares, whereas it does for other top executives and former directors. It is these last two 
categories that trade the large shareholdings (20 percent or more) referred to above. It is 
only for the category of other incumbent directors that the correlation between share stake 
and CARs is positive. We conjecture that the positive correlation arises due to the fact that 
(i) for this category there are few very large transactions and (ii) other incumbent directors 
consist largely of non-executive directors who have fewer opportunities to take advantage 
of private benefits than top executives. For sales (Table 3.7), the negative information 
content of other incumbent directors is mitigated as the transaction size increases.  
In summary, our results indicate that the market responds to the signal that several 
directors trade while the transaction size is of lesser importance. In fact, medium-sized 
purchases and sales trigger the strongest market reaction. In the case of very large sales (or 
purchases), the market interprets the reduction (increase) in potential entrenchment as 
good (bad) news.  
3.5.4.3 Leverage and book-to-market ratio 
Firm leverage may also have an important impact on (the market response to) 
directors’ dealings as leverage is a corporate governance mechanism which reduces the 
free cash flow available to managers. Furthermore, leverage can also be interpreted as a 
measure of (past and incumbent) financial performance as continuing poor performance 
erodes the equity base and leads to a higher debt-equity ratio. Still, in our models the 
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effect of leverage (measured by the debt/equity and debt/total assets ratios in the year prior 
to the directors’ transactions) is not statistically significant.  
Jenter (2001) documents that high book-to-market (value) firms are regarded as 
undervalued by their managers relative to low book-to-market (growth) firms. Managers 
tend to purchase shares in value firms and sell shares in growth firms. This is also 
illustrated by the summary statistics in Table 3.1: the average book-to-market ratio for the 
purchase sample is considerably higher relative to the sales sample. This indicates that 
directors have better information regarding the true value of their firms and this 
information motivates them to trade.  
We conjecture that it may be the case that the information content of purchases and 
sales for value firms differs from that for growth firms. In general, the coefficient on the 
book-to-market ratio is negative for purchases and sales (Tables 3.6 and 3.7). This 
indicates that market reaction to purchases is the highest for growth firms. This book-to-
market effect may be explained by the fact that the informational asymmetry is larger for 
firms with a high fraction of intangible assets (low book-to-market ratio). Alternatively, 
the overoptimistic market sentiment of the 1990s may have strengthened the strong 
positive market reactions to positive directors’ signals in growth firms. For sales, the 
book-to-market ratio triggers the opposite effect: the information content is the highest for 
high book-to-market firms, but the coefficient is not significant.  
We have also repeated our analysis for different time periods (e.g. 1991-94 and 1995-
98) to check the consistency of our results (not reported) and can conclude that the results 
remain significant.  
Our conclusions also do not change when we replace the ownership dummy variables 
with continuous measures of ownership by categories of blockholder. Moreover, 
piecewise ownership variables indicate that the economic effect with different degrees of 
ownership concentration remains the same.  
3.6 Conclusions 
The main contribution of this chapter is the analysis of the impact of corporate control 
on the information content of directors’ trading measured by two-day CARs on the 
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announcement day and the following day. There are several important conclusions that 
emerge from our research.  
First, we find that both directors’ purchases and sales trigger significant CAARs: 3.12 
percent and –0.37 percent, respectively. The market reaction to purchases is higher 
though. Markets seem to discount the information content of sales more as part of the 
directors’ sales may be caused by liquidity and diversification needs. This leads to 
confirmation of Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c. 
Second, we do not support the information hierarchy hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). 
Although CEOs are assumed to have the best knowledge about their companies’ 
prospects, we find that the information content of CEO purchases and sales is lower than 
that of other director categories. Moreover, we report that when former directors purchase 
shares of their former companies, the market reaction at the announcement of this trade is 
larger than that associated with the purchases by other categories of directors. In contrast, 
the CAAR for former directors’ sales is insignificant, presumably as the market considers 
such transactions as motivated by reasons of wealth diversification. 
Third, we find a strong relation between the presence of specific categories of 
blockholders and the price reaction to the directors’ transactions. It is important to 
distinguish (i) between directors and outsiders and (ii) between blockholders who monitor 
the management and those who do not. As before, the results for purchases are stronger 
than for sales transactions. If corporations, or individuals or families unrelated to the 
management are blockholders, then the CARs are reduced. This suggests that these 
categories of blockholders provide monitoring and reduce informational asymmetry. In 
contrast, the presence of institutional investors triggers the reverse effect as the CARs are 
more positive (negative) following directors’ purchases (sales) when institutional investors 
are blockholders. This suggests that institutions do not reduce the information gap 
between investors and directors, but that they follow directors’ trades.  
Fourth, our results confirm that markets react to a possible increase or decrease in 
directors’ entrenchment. Generally, increases in directors’ ownership are recognized as a 
negative signal, whereas decreases are perceived as positive news.  
Fifth, we find stronger market reactions in situations of high uncertainty: when the 
firm is performing poorly (making losses or decreases its dividends) or is close to financial 
Insider Trading and Corporate Control: Evidence from the U.K. 
 
97
distress (low interest coverage). Neither firm size nor leverage influence the abnormal 
returns of the announcement of directors’ transactions. 
Sixth, our results also document that the market reacts more strongly when more than 
one director purchases or sells. In contrast, transaction size has no significant impact on 
the CARs. This may be due to the fact that our sample includes only the larger 
transactions. 
A natural extension of this study will explore the long-term performance of directors’ 
dealings and will relate it to the corporate control structures of the firms. In the present 
study, we document that the market reacts fast to the new information contained in 
directors’ purchases and sales: the immediate market reaction to directors’ trades is 
economically and statistically significant. The extension will complement this short-term 
approach with a long-term analysis. Even though both short- and long-term approaches 
have been used quite extensively in the literature, not many studies have used the two 
methods simultaneously to document the information revelation process in the market. 
One of the few exceptions is Lakonishok and Lee (2001). Their findings, however, 
indicate insignificant short-term price reaction, which is in contrast with our findings in 
the present study. The extended analysis could provide further evidence on the 
information revelation process in the financial markets and reveal whether market 
incorporates the information contained in directors’ transactions immediately and fully or 
whether stocks picked up by corporate directors outperform the market over longer 
periods. Furthermore, the analysis would provide further evidence on the corporate-control 
determinants of information content of directors’ transactions. The long-term performance 
measure developed by Eckbo and Smith (1998) that extends the traditional event study 
technique to a conditional, weighted, multifactor setting is a suitable performance 
measure.  
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APPENDIX 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS IN LINE WITH LAKONISHOK AND LEE (2001). 
These tables report summary statistics of director dealings for all ordinary voting shares and options listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. The panels were constructed in order to compare dealings of U.K. directors to dealings 
of their U.S. counterparts summarized in Tables 1 and 2 of Lakonishok and Lee (2001). ‘Fraction’ refers to the 
average annual fraction of firms with at least one director trade of each type among all firms listed on the LSE. ‘# 
of trades’ is the average annual number of trades per company, defined as the average of the number of total 
director transactions divided by number of years listed on the LSE during our estimation window (1991-98). 
Companies with no director trades are also included. The conditional # of trades considers only companies with at 
least one directors’ trade during 1991-98. ‘Total shares transacted – per firm’ refers to the average annual number 
of shares transacted per company, defined as the total number of shares transacted divided by number of years 
listed on the LSE during 1991-98. The conditional average considers only companies with at least one directors’ 
trade during 1991-98. ‘% mkt cap’ is the average ratio of the total annual individual company’s number of shares 
transacted to the total number of shares outstanding of the corresponding company at the end of each year. The 
conditional variable considers only companies with at least one directors’ trade. ‘# of firms’ refers to the number 
of firms with at least one share traded of the respective category during 1991-98. ‘All’ includes purchases, sales 
and sales directly after an exercise of all ordinary voting shares plus exercise of all voting options. 
Panel A all purchases sales sales post exercise 
sales & sales 
post exercise exercise 
fraction 0.71 0.51 0.33 0.17 0.50 0.24 
# of trades 4.26 1.49 0.69 0.40 1.09 0.59 
- conditional 5.96 2.90 2.13 2.29 4.42 2.49 
total shares transacted per firm 349,666 93,129 163,036 36,985 200,022 56,515 
- conditional 489,409 181,810 500,919 213,369 714,288 236,760 
% mkt cap – cond. 0.69% 0.24% 0.46% 0.09% 0.48% 0.14% 
# of firms 1492 1385 1119 690 1203 837 
Panel B       
1991 total shares transacted       
 - per firm 305,405 47,928 180,180 29,369  47,297 
 - per firm, conditional 500,739 125,472 550,964 203,750  266,497 
 % mkt cap - conditional 1.07% 0.43% 1.17% 0.22%  0.40% 
        
1992 total shares transacted       
 - per firm 196,190 71,619 66,286 22,381  35,905 
 - per firm, conditional 293,030 148,323 216,822 179,389  198,421 
 % mkt cap - conditional 0.80% 0.52% 0.70% 0.20%  0.27% 
        
1993 total shares transacted       
 - per firm 276,511 73,166 116,876 35,063  51,216 
 - per firm, conditional 379,896 159,091 305,970 168,493  207,308 
 % mkt cap - conditional 0.94% 0.41% 0.93% 0.26%  0.34% 
        
1994 total shares transacted       
 - per firm 255,008 86,686 109,409 21,293  37,452 
 - per firm, conditional 343,148 160,436 328,283 113,964  150,847 
 % mkt cap - conditional 0.99% 0.53% 0.99% 0.21%  0.32% 
        
1995 total shares transacted       
 - per firm 465,889 149,496 190,627 52,996  73,008 
 - per firm, conditional 599,796 261,050 533,186 241,007  258,543 
 % mkt cap - conditional 0.96% 0.41% 1.03% 0.24%  0.32% 
        
1996 total shares transacted       
 - per firm 542,986 109,784 298,939 56,301  78,629 
 - per firm, conditional 704,524 196,809 820,774 265,385  272,494 
 % mkt cap - conditional 1.17% 0.63% 1.03% 0.29%  0.40% 
        
1997 total shares transacted       
 - per firm 386,788 84,021 183,254 43,315  76,054 
 - per firm, conditional 510,029 144,819 591,121 258,874  290,055 
 % mkt cap - conditional 0.96% 0.31% 1.17% 0.41%  0.44% 
        
1998 total shares transacted       
 - per firm 275,665 108,219 94,326 29,321  44,019 
 - per firm, conditional 429,875 222,222 398,148 243,030  215,000 
 % mkt cap - conditional 0.78% 0.45% 0.84% 0.20%  0.28% 





APPENDIX 5A: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF U.K. COMPANIES. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 All years
Panel A: Ownership stake of the largest shareholder 
Mean 0.212 0.216 0.214 0.212 0.206 0.205 0.207 0.210
Median 0.151 0.156 0.153 0.151 0.159 0.159 0.153 0.155
Std. Dev 0.162 0.159 0.155 0.153 0.144 0.142 0.146 0.151
Min 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.050
Max 0.898 0.898 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899
Panel B: Cumulative ownership stake of all large shareholders (owing 5% and more) 
Mean 0.404 0.394 0.388 0.388 0.379 0.377 0.391 0.394
Median 0.385 0.380 0.375 0.378 0.374 0.360 0.384 0.379
Std. Dev 0.206 0.202 0.200 0.190 0.182 0.188 0.186 0.199
Min 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.050
Max 0.988 0.993 0.978 0.938 0.985 0.985 0.899 0.993
Panel C: Herfindahl index of all reported ownership stakes 
Mean 0.092 0.091 0.089 0.087 0.081 0.080 0.084 0.086
Median 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.046
Std. Dev 0.120 0.117 0.110 0.110 0.100 0.099 0.101 0.108
Min 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Max 0.806 0.806 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808
 
APPENDIX 5B: CATEGORIES OF SHAREHOLDERS – CONDITIONAL STATISTICS. 
 # of obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev. Min Q25% Median Q75% Max Skew. Kurt. 
Panel A: Sum of all equity stakes       
Institutions 5631 0.203 0.167 0 0.066 0.177 0.305 0.954 0.89 3.69 
Banks 5631 0.018 0.052 0 0 0 0 0.954 4.88 42.64 
Invest./pension funds 5631 0.159 0.156 0 0 0.126 0.246 0.899 1.27 4.93 
Insurance co’s 5631 0.025 0.047 0 0 0 0.052 0.358 2.22 8.56 
Real estate co’s 5631 0.001 0.017 0 0 0 0 0.520 18.09 428.55 
Corporations 5631 0.044 0.118 0 0 0 0 0.929 3.53 16.73 
Individuals/Families 5631 0.025 0.068 0 0 0 0 0.698 3.86 22.02 
Government 5631 0.0003 0.004 0 0 0 0 0.131 18.31 381.77 
Directors  5631 0.104 0.176 0 0 0 0.148 0.871 1.82 5.41 
CEO 5631 0.051 0.127 0 0 0 0 0.871 3.13 13.26 
Chairman 5631 0.075 0.148 0 0 0 0.092 0.870 2.34 8.14 
Exec Dir (ex CEO) 5631 0.053 0.124 0 0 0 0 0.742 2.81 11.02 
Non-Exec. Dir 5631 0.005 0.030 0 0 0 0 0.513 9.08 105.27 
Panel B: Largest shareholdings        
Institutions 3086 0.158 0.110 0.050 0.100 0.131 0.173 0.899 2.97 14.41 
Banks 267 0.151 0.080 0.051 0.102 0.127 0.173 0.503 1.92 6.95 
Invest./pension funds 2504 0.167 0.116 0.050 0.105 0.137 0.181 0.899 2.90 13.47 
Insurance co’s 287 0.090 0.035 0.050 0.063 0.082 0.109 0.259 1.40 5.70 
Real estate co’s 28 0.191 0.112 0.069 0.146 0.154 0.189 0.520 1.82 6.17 
Corporations 595 0.304 0.177 0.050 0.185 0.256 0.392 0.857 0.96 3.25 
Individuals/Families 236 0.169 0.112 0.050 0.089 0.134 0.239 0.698 1.666 6.75 
Directors  1464 0.287 0.169 0.050 0.156 0.239 0.384 0.870 0.88 2.67 
CEO 710 0.306 0.179 0.050 0.160 0.262 0.426 0.870 0.79 2.55 
Chairman 1133 0.307 0.173 0.054 0.170 0.260 0.434 0.870 0.73 2.94 
Exec Dir (ex CEO) 754 0.271 0.158 0.054 0.151 0.224 0.341 0.742 0.93 4.57 






APPENDIX 6: CONSTRUCTION OF THE PURCHASE AND SALE PORTFOLIO OF DIRECTORS’ 
TRADES. 
This table illustrates the process of data cleaning for the directors’ dealings file obtained from BARRA Global 
Estimates described in section 3.1 in the text section of this chapter. In our analysis, we focus only on directors’ 
trades that represent at least 0.1% of market capitalization of their firms. The number of these larger purchase and 
sale transactions is documented in step 8. Note, however, that the source database reports all transactions of all 
directors as separate events. For the purpose of our event study, we need to consider transactions of different 
directors that happened (were announced) on the same day and regard the same firm as one event. Consequently, 
the number of ‘transactions’ (reflecting all reported trades) is higher than the number of ‘events’ (representing 
only firm-days with trades). ‘Transaction-date (announcement-date) events’ reflect the number of observations 
available for our event study when transaction date (announcement date) is defined as the event date. 
Nevertheless, the final number of observations for the individual models (market model, market-adjusted model, 
and size-adjusted model) as reported in Table 3.2 differs because of different daily-return data requirements of the 
individual models. 
 
Step Description Number of observations 
1 Total initial number lines (transactions) 58,363 
2 After - assigning SEDOL numbers (identification process) 57.664 
3 non-financial firms only 47.384 
4 matched with number of shares outstanding 47.192 
5 consistency check-up for duplicate transactions 35,439 
6 Focus on ordinary voting shares 27,416 
7 Out of which:   
 purchase transactions 14,500 
 sale transactions 6,769 
8 The final sample includes transactions > 0.1% of market cap:  
 purchase transactions 2,481 
 transaction-date events 1,942 
 announcement-date events 1,889 
 sale transactions 2,668 
 transaction-date events 2,078 





Chapter 4  
Privatization and Corporate Control in the Czech 







The second part of this thesis deals with the actions that new private owners in the 
Czech Republic undertook immediately after the privatization in order to improve 
efficiency and profitability of the former state-owned enterprises. Privatization of socialist 
state-owned enterprises was an important part of the reform program in all transition 
countries that intended to transform their economies from centrally planned systems to 
market-driven economies. It is widely acknowledged in the economic profession that 
private ownership is the crucial source of incentives for corporate innovation and 
efficiency (Shleifer, 1998). Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that public 
enterprises are highly inefficient since they are under pressures from the politicians who 
control them to pursue political goals. Introduction of private owners removes these 
pressures and reinstalls the profit-maximization goal that leads to efficiency improvements 
and innovation. Megginson and Netter (2001) review many recent empirical papers 
documenting that privatization is highly successful in delivering performance 
improvements. 
After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, the Czechoslovak government opted 
for fast liberalization/reform program (shock therapy) that aimed to introduce the three 





(Sachs, 1993). Voucher privatization scheme that allowed for a relatively speedy transfer 
of ownership rights to private entities was designed as a very important (but not the only) 
part of the entire privatization program. This chapter positions the voucher scheme within 
the whole privatization process in the Czech Republic, stresses its main features and 
highlights its main consequences. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section draws the main 
characteristics of the whole privatization program in the Czech Republic that includes 
restitutions, the small-scale and large-scale privatization. Special interest is devoted to the 
voucher privatization and the role of investment privatization funds within this program. 
Section 4.3 describes post-privatization developments at the newly established Czech 
equity markets. Section 4.4 provides a short summary. 
4.2 Privatization: how it all started 
At the outset of reforms, Czechoslovakia56 was the most centrally planned country 
among communist countries in the Central Europe. At that time, the unreformed state-
administered sector, with predominantly large firms, produced as much as 97 percent of 
the country’s net material product.57 As part of the reform process, the existing industrial 
associations (VHJs) were divided into smaller entities. In fact, some 200 existing VHJs 
transformed into approximately 4,500 state-owned enterprises (SOEs).58 
These initial steps prepared the state-controlled corporate landscape for the actual 
process of privatization involving a combination of standard and non-standard methods. 
After intense discussions, three main programs, which differed in terms of methods used 
and the type and value of property privatized, were implemented. First, restitution was 
designed to return assets to their original owners who lost their property in 
nationalizations of 1945-48; second, small-scale privatization focused on small businesses,  
                                                 
56 Till January 1993, the Czech Republic was part of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist on 
January 1, 1993 when it officially split to the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
57 The Soviet concept of net material product omitted from GNP those services not directly related to 
production, such as passenger transportation, housing, and the output of government employees not 
producing material output.  
58 The legal status of the SOEs changed into ‘joint-stock company’ after the SOEs entered the privatization 
process. 




predominantly shops, restaurants and minor workshops; and, finally, large-scale 
privatization involved transfer of ownership of medium-sized and large enterprises. After 
the split of Czechoslovakia, both successor countries continued the privatization process 
within this main framework. However, large-scale privatization evolved in different 
directions in the two countries since Slovakia decided to abandon voucher privatization 
and favoured uncompetitive direct sales instead. The following sections describe the 
individual programs.59 
4.2.1 Restitution and small-scale privatization  
Restitution, a non-standard method, was designed to make up for the wrongdoings of 
the previous regime with regard to unlawful and/or immoral nationalization and 
confiscation of private property (Olsson, 1999). The property was to be returned in kind, 
or by providing financial compensation (in cases when the original property no longer 
existed). The actual value of property returned to the original owners or their heirs in the 
process of restitution is very difficult to estimate because of the complexity and 
decentralized nature of the process (Olsson, 1999).60 In the Czech Republic alone, more 
than 70,000 apartment houses, 30,000 industrial premises and small businesses, and 
almost half of state forests, agricultural land and farm property were returned within the 
process of restitution as of the end of 1995.61 Restitution was far more extensive in the 
Czech Republic than in Slovakia. The differences can be partly explained by more 
negative attitudes towards restitution among leading Slovak politicians. Also, Slovakia 
was far less developed before 1948, which naturally means fewer restitution claimants. 
Small-scale privatization that started as early as December 1990 was designed for the 
transfer of ownership of small premises such as shops, restaurants, service outlets, small 
workshops, and rarely small production enterprises.62 Here, public auction, a standard 
                                                 
59 For a detailed description of the privatization process in Slovakia see Olsson (1999). 
60 Nevertheless, OECD estimated that for the whole former Czechoslovakia some 70,000 persons would be 
eligible for compensation under the Minor Restitution Act, the first part of the process focusing on relatively 
small assets. Further, some 10 percent of all state property (around $ 10.7 billion) was to be returned under 
the Large Restitution Act, the second part of the program that in general aimed at transfer of larger assets. 
61Statistical Yearbook CR (1996). 
62 Small-scale privatization was carried out in compliance with Act No. 427/1990 On the Transfer of State 






competitive method, was the predominantly used method of privatization. In fact, this 
method was used in 87 percent of ownership transfers within the small-scale privatization 
till December 1993 (see Table 4.1).63 In total, more than 24 thousand small businesses 
were privatized within the small-scale privatization in the Czech Republic, with proceeds 
of some CZK 36 billion (USD 1.2 billion). The small-scale privatization earned 
momentum very early in the transition process: more than 14 thousand businesses (58 
percent of all units privatized via the small-scale privatization) transferred ownership 
already in 1991. 
 
TABLE 4.1: SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION. 
 1991 1992 1993 1991-93 
Number of businesses privatized 14,155 8,332 1,872 24,359 
in which privatized in auction 12,492 7,690 911 21,093 
% auctions in total 88% 92% 49% 87% 
in which shops 7,672 4,219 413 12,304 
% shops in total 54% 51% 22% 51% 
restaurants and catering 1,451 717 61 2,229 
% restaurants in total 10% 9% 3% 9% 
Total value in CZK    36 billion 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook CR (1994). 
 
4.2.2 Large-scale privatization  
Medium-sized and large enterprises were privatized within the large-scale 
privatization.64 This program involved most of the property privatized, though the number 
of privatized units is comparable to the small-scale privatization. The large-scale 
privatization allowed for a large spectrum of standard as well as non-standard methods. 
Czechoslovakia became famous for its voucher privatization, the dominant non-standard 
method. Free transfer of property to municipalities or to the original owners within  
                                                 
63 The process was formally closed when the local privatization committees were closed down in December 
1994. 
64 The main rules of the large-scale privatization are prescribed in the Act No. 92/1991 On the Conditions of 
Transfer of State Property to Other Persons. Almost all medium-sized and large enterprises were included 
into this program except of some premises of special importance as, for example, public administration 
establishments, natural resources, cultural and social establishments, post office, and water works. 




restitution is another non-standard method. However, still a relatively large part of 
property was transferred using standard methods as, for example, auctions, public tenders, 
or direct sales.  
Time-wise, the large-scale privatization was divided into two waves. The government 
approved lists of companies for both waves at the beginning of the program in 1991. 
Privatization projects of firms that were scheduled for the first wave had to be submitted 
before January 20, 1992. The deadline for the second wave was the end of 1992, which is 
also the date when Czechoslovakia as such seized to exist. Hence, the first wave of large-
scale privatization (and voucher privatization) was implemented within Czechoslovakia. 
The program continued quite smoothly in the Czech part of the former federation with the 
second wave of voucher privatization executed during 1993-94. While, in Slovakia, the 
process turned out to be quite complicated with some dramatic turns and setbacks that 
closely followed political developments and changes of government.65  
As a rule, privatization of individual enterprises was carried out according to a pre-
approved privatization project that was selected from a pool of proposals by the ministry 
for privatization. In general, any interested party could have submitted a privatization 
proposal for a state-owned enterprise slated for privatization. Each privatization proposal 
had to indicate, among other things, the proposed privatization method and the fraction of 
company to be privatized. It was compulsory for the management of the to-be-privatized 
companies to submit a privatization proposal. On average, each to-be-privatized SOE 
attracted 5 proposals indicating quite a high interest on the side of potential investors. 
Nevertheless, management proposals achieved the highest success rate – 42 percent of 
approved privatization projects were submitted by the management. Prospective buyers 
were successful in 35 percent of companies where they submitted proposals (Statistical 
Yearbook CR, 1996).  
After ministry for privatization selected and approved the projects, the National 
Property Fund (NPF) took care of the execution of the approved privatization projects. 
This, for example, meant that the NPF founded, if necessary, a new company (joint-stock 
company was the most common type), or organized an auction or a public tender. The 
                                                 





NPF also executes ownership rights of shares that temporarily or permanently remain in 
the state possession.66  
In the Czech Republic, vouchers dominated the whole process of the large-scale 
privatization, though other standard methods were used as well. Panel A of Table 4.2 
shows the relative frequency of the individual methods used within the large-scale 
privatization. According to the number of units privatized, the most common method 
involved direct sales (used in almost 50 percent of all units). However, the average book 
value per firm (CZK 7.61) indicates that these firms were relatively small. Indeed, 
auctions, public tenders, and direct sales (the standard methods) were used for the smaller 
firms privatized in the large-scale privatization. To the contrary, privatization of only 
about 9 percent of all units but essentially the largest firms (with average book value per 
firm about 40-times larger than that for the standard methods) involved creation of new 
joint-stock companies. This 9 percent of firms represents 80 percent of the total book 
value of property privatized in the large-scale privatization. The NPF was responsible for 
the establishment of ‘new’ joint-stock companies and distribution of their shares using 
standard as well as non-standard methods. In total, large-scale privatization involved 5,125 
firms. 
Panel B of Table 4.2 shows the methods used for distribution of shares in the newly 
founded joint-stock companies. A majority of the shares (66 percent with book value of 
CZK 341.75 billion) were exchanged for vouchers.67 Still, 16 percent of the shares were 
sold using standard methods (direct sales, public offers or tenders), 10 percent transferred 
for free to municipalities, and 8 percent deposited with restitution funds. Panel C of Table 
4.2 summarizes the methods used within the large-scale privatization. It turns out that the 
voucher method was used for 48 percent of property privatized (measured in book value). 
Almost a third of the property (30 percent) involved standard methods. The remaining 
property was transferred (for free) to municipalities and the restitution funds.  
                                                 
66 As of December 2002, the NPF still owned shares in 189 companies. 
67 Voucher privatization is in more detail described in the following section. 




TABLE 4.2: LARGE-SCALE PRIVATIZATION 




% in total Number of firms % in total 
Average book 
value per firm 
(mn CZK) 
Panel A: Privatization method used       
Auction 8.97 0.9% 1,934 8.4% 4.64 
Public tender 36.12 3.7% 2,171 9.5% 16.64 
Direct sale 86.90 8.9% 11,423 49.8% 7.61 
Joint-stock companies a 776.49 79.5% 1,973 8.6% 393.56 
Free transfer b 68.40 7.0% 5,425 23.7% 12.61 
Total  976.88 100% 22,926 100% 42.61 
Panel B: Joint-stock companies at NPF c     
Shares for sale, in which: 85.32 16.4%    
direct sale to a domestic buyer 26.86 5.2%    
direct sale to a foreign buyer 14.15 2.7%    
employee shares 2.2 0.4%    
public offers and public tenders 42.11 8.1%    
Shares for free transfer, in which: 433.9 83.6%    
voucher privatization 341.75 65.8%    
municipalities 53.25 10.3%    
funds d 38.9 7.5%    
Total 519.22 100%    
Panel C: Methods in total (recapitulation) e     
Standard methods 215.11 29.9%    
Vouchers 341.75 47.5%    
Other non-standard methods 162.75 22.6%    
Total 719.61 100%    
Notes: Panel A refers to book value of property approved for privatization as of June 30, 1998, whereas 
Panel B refers to book value of equity transferred as of Dec. 30, 1997. 
a This method involves incorporation of companies (mainly assigned for voucher privatization) with the NPF 
as the temporary possessor/manager of the new shares. However, some shares remain permanently in the 
possession of the NPF (hence the state). This stakes in long-term possession of the NPF are excluded in 
recapitulation of panel C.  
b Includes transfer to municipalities and restitution claims.  
c Describes distribution of shares of newly incorporated state-owned enterprises via the NPF. Total book 
value of shares in Panel B is not equal to the entry of ‘joint-stock companies’ in Panel A. The former 
includes only shares distributed, whereas the latter includes total book value of the incorporated companies 
(this includes, for example, also shares in permanent possession of the NPF).  
d Funds stands for the Restitution Investment Fund, Endowment Investment Fund, and Guarantee Relief 
Fund for Agriculture and Forestry. 
e In this panel, standard versus non-standard methods are recapitulated. ‘Standard methods’ include auctions, 
public tenders, public offers, and direct sales. ‘Vouchers’ represent value of property distributed to citizens 
for vouchers. ‘Other non-standard methods’ includes employee shares and other free transfers, for example, 
to municipalities. The numbers are calculated as follows: first, the entries from Panel B are substituted 
instead of the entry ‘joint-stock companies’ in Panel A, and, second, all the entries of extended Panel A are 
assigned to their method group (standard, vouchers, other non-standard). 





4.2.3 Voucher privatization 
Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech Republic, gained reputation for the voucher-
privatization program. As shown in the previous section, almost half of the property 
privatized within the large-scale privatization involved transfer of shares for vouchers. 
Moreover, implementation of the voucher privatization deserves interest because of its 
consequences for capital market development (see Section 4.3). It created ‘new’ joint-
stock companies that were later listed at the local stock exchanges. Also, the creation of 
investment privatization funds (IPFs) assisted in the process of collective investment 
development. The IPFs were to be of dominant importance in bringing about the resulting 
ownership concentration (see the following subsection). Furthermore, the voucher 
privatization, through mass participation of citizens in the actual process of privatization 
and later in the newly established capital market insured education of citizenry about 
securities and institutions of capital markets.  
The basic idea of this unprecedented privatization method was to provide the 
population with virtual investment capital in order to privatize fast and also to compensate 
the population for wrongdoings of communism. As part of the large-scale privatization, 
the voucher privatization was organized in two consecutive waves.  
The supply side of the first, federal wave of voucher privatization consisted of 
property worth Kcs 299 billion68 (USD 10.3 billion) in 1491 enterprises, out of which Kcs 
212 billion in 988 firms was provided in the Czech Republic and Kcs 87 billion (503 
firms) in Slovakia (see Panel A of Table 4.3). The demand side was represented by 
vouchers held by interested citizens. Every adult citizen residing in the country could buy 
a voucher booklet (for Kcs 1,000, USD 34, and a registration fee of Kcs 35, USD 1.2) with 
1000 points. With these points he/she could later directly bid for the shares of firms or 
offer them to investment funds. Some 5.9 and 2.6 million citizens in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, respectively, registered for the first wave.  
In the so-called ‘zero round’ that started on 1st of March, 1992, before demand and 
supply actually met, the participants had the option to ‘invest’ (a part of) their vouchers  
                                                 
68 Kcs (Czechoslovak Koruna) was the currency used in Czechoslovakia that ceased to exist after the split of 
the country. CZK (Czech Koruna) and SKK (Slovak Koruna) are the currencies used in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, respectively. 





TABLE 4.3: VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION. 





















Czech 943 362.2 206.42 57% 988 212.49 
Slovak 487 133.6 90.11 67% 503 86.9 
Federal 61 72.8 2.86 4%   
Together 1,491 568.6 299.39 53% 1,491 299.39 
Panel B: Second wave in the Czech Republic    









≤ 34% for 
vouchers 
> 34% but 
≤ 50% for 
vouchers 
> 50% but < 
96% for 
vouchers 
≥ 96% for 
vouchers 
Number of firms 861 185 250 109 397 105 
Total book value offered for 
vouchers (CZK billion) 
155 24.38 43.34 35.89 66.01 9.76 
% in total book value 100% 16% 28% 23% 43% 6% 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook CR (1993, 1994) and Olsson (1999). 
 
 
into investment privatization funds, which then used the vouchers on their behalf. In the 
first wave, 72 percent of all vouchers were given to 429 investment funds, which were 
often affiliated with banks. 
Demand and supply then met at a computerized market place. The system registered 
bids from directly investing citizens as well as IPFs and compared them to supply in an 
iterative process of five consecutive rounds.69 The market was designed in such a way that 
both demand and supply could influence the prices and allow considerable price 
discovery. It also induced learning on behalf of the bidders. After the fifth and final round, 
out of the total of 8.5 billion voucher points only 1.2 percent were left unused. These 
points were declared worthless. On the supply side, 21.7 million of shares (which 
represents 7.2 percent of the shares offered) remained unsold. They remained in the 
possession of the respective republic’s NPF. This was regarded to be a very positive result. 
The whole process had gone smoothly and fast. The shares were distributed to the new 
owners in April and May 1993 in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, respectively. They  
                                                 






were issued in dematerialized form and kept at the national Securities Centres that were 
also devised to register all subsequent transactions. Consequently, shares started to be 
traded at the electronic over-the-counter market and at the Prague and Bratislava stock 
exchanges.70 According to the analysis of M.E.S.A. 10 (Niznasky and Reptova, 1999), 
based on the prices during the five rounds and consequent market prices, average citizen 
participating in the first wave of the voucher privatization acquired property in market 
value of Kcs 18,400, i.e. an 18-fold return on ‘invested’ capital. 
The second wave of the voucher privatization was in this form executed only in the 
Czech part of the former federation and used the old institutional set up of the first wave. 
It started in January 1994, and ended in October the same year. This time, total book value 
of property offered was CZK 155 billion in 861 companies (Panel B of Table 4.3). While 
in the first wave, 89 percent of firms offered at least half of their shares via vouchers (see 
Table 4.6), it was only 58 percent in the second wave. The remaining shares were 
privatized in the first wave of the voucher privatization or transferred through other 
methods (e.g. direct sales). The investor participation was very similar to the first wave: 
approximately 6.2 million Czech citizens purchased voucher booklets and some 353 IPFs 
competed for the voucher points (Coffee, 1996). 
4.2.4 Investment funds in the voucher privatization 
Investment privatization funds played an important role in the process of the voucher 
privatization and later on as key players in the corporate-control structures of the 
privatized companies. The architects of the voucher privatization program were aware that 
their program with broad participation of citizens might result in dispersed ownership with 
potentially unfavourable consequences for the resulting corporate-control structures and 
managerial unaccountability. Therefore, their program of voucher privatization included 
an idea of intermediary financial institutions for collective investment modelled loosely 
after Western mutual funds. The initial intention was that the state would play no role in 
creating or staffing of these funds, other than in establishing certain minimal ground rules 
for their creation and operation (Coffee, 1996).  
                                                 
70 Section 4.3 gives more detail concerning the individual market places. 




The IPFs were established at the beginning of the first wave as joint-stock companies 
that were allowed to collect voucher points from the citizens (in the ‘zero-round’) and 
invest them during the voucher privatization. In general, one founder company could have 
established more than one investment fund. In total, 343 parent investment companies 
with 429 IPFs took part in the first wave. Some of the funds were purely private, but the 
majority of the founders (especially of the larger funds) were still state-owned domestic 
banks.  
It is commonly believed that the IPFs made the whole voucher privatization program 
popular among the citizenry and motivated many people to register and take part in the 
program. The deadline for registration was set for 15 February 1992. Still, by mid January, 
only about 2 million of participants had registered for their voucher points which was just 
half of the officially expected participation. The turning point came when IPFs started 
their aggressive campaign pursuing people to put voucher points to the funds. Their 
attractive offers convinced many to participate in the program. The final number of 
registered voucher holders was 8.5 million people in the whole federation. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the initial regulation of the investment 
funds was very limited. It specified only three basic requirements: (i) minimum own 
capital of CZK 100 thousand or USD 33.3 thousand, (ii) certain professional qualifications 
of the members of its supervisory board and its officers, and (iii) a depository contract 
with a bank. Only the big success of the IPFs’ advertising campaign prompted a legislative 
reaction. Temporary regulations requiring portfolio regulation were swiftly put together 
and adopted in January 1992, shortly before the actual rounds of the first wave started in 
May the same year (Coffee, 1996). IPFs were required to diversify their assets so that they 
did not invest more than 10 percent of their capital in any one security and were restricted 
from owning more than 20 percent of the nominal value of securities issued by the same 
issuer. One (parent) investment company (that could control several IPFs) could not own 
more than 40 percent of the nominal value of securities issued by the same issuer. The 
Law on Investment Companies and Investment Funds was approved in April 1992 and 
came too late to influence the first wave. But it had important consequences for the second 
wave. The most important modification was that the new regulation allowed the unit trust 





Then, the funds were required to appoint managing and supervisory boards and limitations 
were placed also on the permissible compensation that the IPFs could pay to their 
investment companies (Coffee, 1996). 
At the end, the IPFs attracted as many as 72 percent of all registered voucher points in 
the first wave which indicates their important role in the distribution of shares (see Table 
4.4). Table 4.4 also shows that the voucher points were concentrated in only a few large 
funds. The biggest seven (parent) investment companies (with more than 200 million 
voucher points each) concentrated 45 percent of all voucher points which is 62 percent of 
the voucher points hold by all IPFs together. The smallest 291 investment companies 
attracted together only 4 percent of the points. Still, 28 percent of the voucher points were 
not entrusted to any IPF and remained for individual investment by citizens.  
 
TABLE 4.4: VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION: CONCENTRATED DEMAND, THE INVESTMENT 
POINTS 
 # of funds Points (bn) % of total % of ICs 
Available investment points: total  8.54 100%  
Investment companies (ICs): total  6.14 72%  
   of which (mn. pts/IC in parenthesis)              
      7 biggest (>200 mn pts) 26 3.82 45% 62% 
      6 big (>100 mn pts) 23 0.85 10% 14% 
      39 medium (>10 mn pts) 65 1.16 14% 19% 
      291 small ICs (<10 mn pts) 315 0.31 4% 5% 
Individual investors (DIKs): total  2.40 28%  
Notes: Each investment company (IC) could find several investment privatization funds (IPFs) with differing 
investment profiles. In fact, 343 investment companies found 429 individual funds. 
Sources: Brom and Orenstein (1994); Centre for Voucher Privatization (1995). 
 
Table 4.5 documents distribution of the voucher points and shares among the biggest 
ten individual investment companies. The biggest investment company attracted 11 
percent of the voucher points and exchanged them for 8 percent of all shares offered via 
the first wave of the voucher privatization.71 The ten largest investment companies 
together ended up with 39 percent of all shares indicating high ownership concentration by 
the IPFs in the privatized companies. More information on resulting ownership structures  
                                                 
71 Prices differed across individual issues. These numbers indicate that this investment company purchased 
relatively more expensive shares. On pricing of shares in the first wave of the voucher privatization see 
Claessens (1997). 




in privatized companies is provided in Table 4.6. It shows that out of 842 firms that 
offered more than half of their shares via vouchers, IPFs controlled majority of all shares 
in 334 firms and 272 firms were majority owned by atomistic individuals. A single largest 
investment company controlled as much as 30 percent of shares in 9 companies. Two 
funds’ combined stakes resulted in a majority stake in 2 firms and 30-percent stake in 319 
firms. All these numbers document high control power in hands of a few IPFs. 
 
TABLE 4.5: DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT POINTS AMONG THE LARGEST INVESTMENT 
COMPANIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1992 




% of shares Investment Company  
mn. no. All in IPFs mn. all in IPFs 
Ceská státni sporitelna (CR) 950.4 1 11.1 15.6 21.4 7.7 12.2 
První investicní, a.s. (CR) 724.1 11 8.4 11.8 13.6 4.9 7.7 
Harvard group (CSFR)1 638.5 8 7.5 10.4 15.2 5.5 8.6 
VUB Invest, a.s. (SR) 500.6 1 5.8 8.2 12.0 4.3 6.8 
IKS KB, s.r.o. (CR) 465.5 1 5.4 7.6 11.9 4.3 6.8 
Kapitál. invest, a.s. (CR) 334.0 1 3.9 5.5 7.6 2.7 4.3 
Slovenské investicie, s.r.o. (SR)          333.0 1 3.9 5.4 11.0 4.0 6.3 
Cassoviainvest (SR) 168.9 4 2.0 2.8 7.7 2.8 4.4 
Creditanstalt, a.s. (Austria/CR) 166.2 1 1.9 2.7 3.6 1.3 2.0 
PSIS (SR) 117.5 3 1.4 1.9 4.9 1.8 2.8 
Total ten largest in CSFR 4,398 32 51.4 72.0 108.9 39.2 61.9 
Note: The part of federation (Czech Republic versus Slovak Republic) given in parentheses.  
Source: Lastovicka et al. (1994) 
 
TABLE 4.6: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF FIRMS PRIVATIZED VIA VOUCHERS, 1ST WAVE 
# of firms where given investor holds more than x% of shares 
 
50%  30% 10% 0% 
Investors with voucher points     
small individual investors 272 559 911 949 
investment funds, total 334 631 876 949 
single largest funds 0 9 747 949 
two largest funds 2 319 860 949 
four largest funds 196 605 873 949 
Total vouchers 842 920 946 949 
Non-voucher investors     
foreign investors 19 34 45 51 
domestic direct investors 16 28 48 58 
NPF – temporary ownership 21 50 182 293 
NPF – permanent ownership 2 7 11 21 
Note: Only firms in the Czech Republic are considered. The total number of firms is 949.  





Some of the firms offered a part of their shares also to foreign and domestic non-
voucher investors. Foreigners bought shares in 51 firms, whereas domestic (direct) 
investors in 58 firms (see Table 4.6). A relatively large fraction of these investors was 
interested in large controlling stakes: 19 (16) foreign (domestic) investors ended up with 
majority stakes. The state was (after the first wave in 1993) still an important player. The 
NPF was a majority shareholder in 23 companies and held at least some shares in as many 
as 314 companies. Some of these shares were sold in the second wave of the voucher 
privatization (see Table 4.3), some using standard methods over 1993-2002. Nevertheless, 
the state was still present in 189 firms with a book value of CZK 138 bn. (approximately 
USD 4.6 bn.) at the end of 2002. A large part of this property (CZK 121 bn.) belongs to 21 
‘strategic’ companies. As these companies are important players of the Czech economy 
and often hold a monopolistic position in their product markets (e.g., electricity, gas, 
telecommunications), the state wants to stay involved. In 49 firms, the NPF holds just one 
‘golden’ share that ensures the state a superior voting right, mostly concerning a main line 
of business or a trademark. 
In the second wave, 353 registered IPFs attracted 64 percent of all voucher points (as 
opposed to 72 percent in the first wave). Also the level of concentration of the voucher 
points in the largest funds declined relative to the first wave. The 15 largest funds 
accumulated approximately 2.5 billion points that represented 41 percent of all points in 
the second wave (compare to 55 percent to 13 largest funds in the first wave). Table 4.7 
shows that IPFs’ ownership share was lower in firms privatized in the second wave versus 
the first wave. To the contrary, individual voucher investors, the state, and other non-
voucher investors held more shares. Still, these types of investors remain relatively small. 
 
TABLE 4.7: OWNERSHIP STAKES (IN %) BY INVESTOR TYPE 
Investor type 1st wave 2nd wave 
bank sponsored IPFs 23.8 5.8 
non-bank sponsored IPFs 24.6 31.0 
foreign investors 0.1 2.1 
domestic direct investors 0.0 1.0 
NPF 2.1 7.6 
Note: Only for firms privatized via the voucher method. 
Source: Claessens et al. (1997) 
 




In summary, IPFs arose from the voucher privatization as important players in the 
Czech corporate landscape. They attracted 72 and 64 percent of all voucher points in the 
first and second wave, respectively, and, consequently acquired important stakes in 
privatized companies. This fact has several positive and negative consequences.  
The establishment of IPFs helped to overcome dispersed ownership by many atomistic 
shareholders. As collective actions of many atomistic shareholders are very costly and not 
very probable, dispersed ownership would grant incumbent managers unaccountable 
control and raise questions concerning restructuring and future firm value. The IPFs 
accommodated for concentrated ownership which is a positive side of their existence.  
Nevertheless, the IPFs’ presence also triggers several problems. The first problem 
concerns the nature of collective investment itself: who monitors the monitor? What 
motivates the IPFs managers to exert effort and pursue value-maximizing strategies 
(involving restructuring) of firms in their portfolio, especially in a very turbulent 
environment with little regulation? The second problem concerns inevitable restructuring 
of the former SOEs in the IPFs’ possession. Many observers have questioned the ability of 
IPFs to supervise this complex process that requires extensive financial resources and 
special know-how.72 The final complication arose within the voucher privatization and 
was not foreseen in advance. A special combination of bank founders, IPFs’ portfolios and 
state ownership resulted in unclear cross-ownership between banks and IPFs with 
important state control stakes. Coffee (1996) provides an illustration. The largest financial 
institution, Ceska sporitelna (the Czech savings bank) was the founder of the largest IPF in 
the first wave. In the first wave, some 37 percent of its own shares were privatized. At the 
end of the first wave, 40 percent of Ceska sporitelna’s stock remain in the NPF (the state), 
of the remaining 37 percent privatized via vouchers, roughly 80 percent (or 29.1 percent of 
its total outstanding stock) was acquired by a limited group of eight major financial 
institutions. Moreover, the IPF founded by Ceska sporitelna acquired ownership stakes in 
majority of these banks. 
                                                 
72 The following two chapters analyze activities of the new owners in the post-privatization period and, so, 
could contribute to resolving the issue of IPFs’ ability to pursue restructuring and efficiency improvements 





4.3 Development of security markets 
Establishment of organized security markets in the Czech Republic came as a natural 
consequence of the voucher privatization. The voucher privatization assigned ownership 
titles to millions of citizens, and so created demand for an organized market place. After 
the second wave of privatization, 75 percent of the Czech citizens held shares in publicly 
traded companies. Naturally, the Czech Republic early came to bolster the most highly 
capitalized security market in Central and Eastern Europe, having 955 publicly traded 
issues with a (nominal) market capitalization of around CZK 400 billion (USD 13.4 
billion) at the end of 1993. 
As it turned out, the establishment of the basic formal institutions for securities trading 
posed relatively few problems. In fact, within soon, several organized markets for 
securities trading emerged. In the first place, the official ‘national’ stock exchange was 
introduced: the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) began trading in April 1993. Another 
organized market, ‘RM-Systém’, represents electronic trading system that came into 
existence as a direct consequence of the voucher privatization.73 This electronic market 
was set up to cater for the ‘retail market’ of ordinary citizens wanting to sell or buy shares 
quickly. It allows the citizens to differ from the official exchange because it is not based 
on the membership principle. Each citizen participating in the voucher privatization is 
automatically registered at the RM-S, and can, consequently, conduct trade without the 
use of a broker. In addition to these two market places, over-the-counter trade could have 
been conducted via the Securities Center (SCP). The SCP was established in 1993 as a 
centralized register of all dematerialized securities and their owners. As it is the person 
registered with the SCP who has all ownership rights associated with a dematerialised 
security, all ownership transactions have to be registered with the SCP. In the period after 
the voucher privatization, it had been possible to register transactions directly with the 
SCP without any intermediation of the RM-S or PSE. In summary, this process shows that 
already in the early stages of the transformation process, the Czech market bolstered not 
only an impressive number of traded issues, but also several trading venues. 
                                                 
73 RM is short for ‘Registracni Misto’ (registration site); the place where registration of voucher bids by 
citizens and investment funds took place. 




Nevertheless, it started to be evident soon that the newly established security markets 
had not created environment conducive for low-cost trading, transparency and correct firm 
valuation. This came as a consequence of the government passivity towards capital-market 
supervision. The government underestimated the importance of the supportive regulatory 
framework and difficulty associated with its establishment. Moreover, even the little 
regulation in place was difficult to enforce as many listed firms faced incentive problems 
associated with the requirement of compulsory public listing/trading for all firms 
privatized via the voucher method. As the companies did not wish to be listed, they were 
not motivated to provide reliable information, and markets soon become non-transparent, 
overissued and illiquid. As a result, the markets fast lost public confidence. 
The turning point came in 1996 with the appointment of Tomas Jezek to the PSE 
Chairman. Amendments to existing PSE regulations, effective from 1 July 1996, made 
take-over bids mandatory for owners acquiring at least 50 percent of share capital and 
increased disclosure requirements. However, the PSE still struggled to improve 
enforcement of the rules. An independent watchdog that would replace the immensely 
inefficient supervision by the ministry of finance was still missing. At last, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) started its activity on 1 April 1998.74 The SEC has since 
its establishment made significant progress in cleaning up the market. A large number of 
fines and other administrative measures have been used to discipline market actors, 
especially for failing to fulfil their legal responsibility of financial disclosure.75 In 
addition, investor protection has also improved as the SEC monitors suspicious (insider) 
trading. Nevertheless, it is believed that the SEC should still become more independent 
from the ministry. 
The transparency of the capital market and protection of minority shareholders has 
further improved since the 2001 amendments of the Commercial Code and the Securities 
Act that strengthened the SEC’s position. The SEC was granted enforcement rights for the 
existing regulations which are important especially concerning mandatory take-overs and 
reporting of ownership and control rights of important stakeholders. Furthermore, the new 
                                                 
74 SEC was founded based on the Act no. 15/1998. It has five members nominated by the Ministry of 
Finance and the government but appointed by the President of the Czech republic for a period of five years. 
75 According to representatives of the SEC this has also resulted in that disclosure discipline has increased 





regulations toughened listing requirements (concerning minimal market capitalization and 
free float) that forced many firms out of the organized markets. Over 2001, 458 issues had 
to leave the RM-S and further 360 issues decided to leave the public market voluntarily. 
At the PSE, 18 firms did not meet the legal requirements for their listing and left the 
market. Finally, the SEC introduced Principles of Corporate Governance that should help 
to guide firms in establishing and maintaining sound corporate-governance practices.  
In general, the regulation of capital markets in the Czech Republic has improved 
substantially since 1996. Still, many observers believe that the Czech capital market is 
segmented, illiquid and non-transparent mainly because of its unusual institutional setting: 
a parallel existence of two trading venues (the PSE and RM-S) in a very small economy. 
Another unfavourable development in the Czech equity market is illustrated by its 
disability to introduce an initial public offering over its ten-year existence. This is a crucial 
drawback as one of the main functions of equity markets is to accommodate firms with 
ways to raise new equity capital. Moreover, the number of listed equity issues is still 
steadily decreasing as many of the listed firms have been acquired by strategic investors 
who are not interested in public tradability of the firms. 
Table 4.8 below illustrates the situation at the outset of the PSE and its development 
over the 1990s. Market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP) gives a feeling for the 
depth of a security market. In general, market capitalization of the PSE has been relatively 
steady, although there is a noticeable decline after 1995/1996 which is a consequence of 
declining prices and delistings of many shares. Still, the PSE remains among the top 
capitalized markets in the region. The process of reconciliation at the PSE is evident from 
the second indicator in Table 4.8: the number of share issues traded. Immediately after the 
voucher privatization, more than one thousand equity issues were traded at the PSE. It 
peaked in 1995 with 1670 issues when the shares from second wave of voucher 
privatization were introduced to the market. However, as a result of stricter regulation and 
listing requirements, the number if issues dropped from 1670 to 320 (due to changes on 
the free market – 3rd tier) over 1997. Since then, the numbers have declined steadily 
further as the regulation and market supervision (by the SEC) improved. Only 102 issues 
were traded on all three tiers of the PSE at the end of 2001. Market capitalization per issue 




(the following indicator in Table 4.8) increased as a consequence of the numerous 
delistings which should be considered a positive development. 
 
TABLE 4.8: KEY INDICATORS OF THE PRAGUE STOCK EXCHANGE, 1994-2000 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
market capitalization (% of GDP)        
total equity market 29.9% 34.7% 34.3% 29.7% 23.1% 26.2% 23.2% 
of which listed securities (tier 1 & 2) 15.4% 20.0% 26.9% 24.5% 19.4% 22.7% 19.7% 
# of traded issues        
total equity market 1,028 1,716 1,670 320 304 195 151 
of which listed securities (tier 1 & 2) 34 68 96 103 106 89 65 
unlisted securities (tier 3) 994 1,648 1,574 217 198 106 86 
forced delistings 14 20 30 41 72 180 317 
market capitalization per issue (mn USD)        
total equity market 12.2 10.5 11.8 44.7 45.6 68.4 75.3 
of which listed securities (tier 1 & 2) 191.0 152.6 161.4 114.4 109.6 130.2 148.9 
unlisted securities (tier 3) 6.1 4.6 2.7 11.6 11.4 16.5 19.7 
turnover ratio (% mkt. cap.)        
total equity market 12.1% 26.3% 46.3% 49.7% 41.5% 34.1% 59.6% 
of which listed securities (tier 1 & 2) 15.3% 28.6% 44.0% 53.2% 45.0% 37.9% 68.9% 
volume traded as % of GDP        
total securities market 5.2% 14.1% 25.0% 40.7% 47.8% 64.8% 64.0% 
total bond market 1.6% 5.1% 9.1% 26.0% 38.2% 55.9% 50.2% 
total equity market 3.6% 9.1% 15.9% 14.8% 9.6% 8.9% 13.8% 
average daily volume (CZK mn.)        
total equity market 264 537 1,004 985 688 644 1,061 
of which listed securities (tier 1 & 2) 173 337 749 868 625 623 1,042 
unlisted securities (tier 3) 92 200 255 117 62 21 18 
        
Source: Prague Stock Exchange; Statistical Office of the CR. 
 
Liquidity, measured by a turnover ratio (volume as a percentage of market 
capitalization), shows a significant decline during 1998-99 and recovery again in 2000. 
The turnover peaked in 1997, in the year with drastic reductions in number of issues 
traded. Despite the many delistings of (probably) the most illiquid issues, liquidity 
dropped in 1998/99, but recovered again in 2000. Liquidity of the listed issues on the first 
and second market tier (69 percent in 2000) is slightly higher relative to the whole equity 
market, but still very low compared to, for example, the Warsaw Stock Exchange with 
turnover of around 130 percent. It indicates that the free float (even) of the most frequently 





Volume traded over GDP shows ability of a securities market to attract capital on an 
economy-wide level. The total volume of the PSE increased from only 5 percent in 1994 
to 64 percent of GDP in 2000. This trend is, however, fully due to the increasing volume 
on the bond market and the equity market remains to contribute just a fraction of the total 
volume. In 2001, the total volume of equity trading was just CZK 129 billion compared to 
CZK 1858 billion of bond trading. On the equity market, most of the trading is due to the 
listed issues on the fist and second tier. Even though, the number of shares listed here 
declined, the daily volumes increased considerably. 
Table 4.9 illustrates the relative importance of the individual venues – the PSE, RM-S 
and SCP – in trading of equities. It is evident that the PSE attracts the most trading (almost 
90 percent in 2001). The polarization of trading towards the PSE has soared since 1997 as 
volume of trading has steadily increased at the PSE but decreased on the RM-S. The trend 
towards a marginal importance of the RM-S may lead to a final closure of this market 
venue. Many believe that such development would increase price transparency and 
efficiency of the Czech securities markets. 
 
TABLE 4.9: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT VENUES: EQUITY TRADING AT THE 
PSE, RM-S AND SCP, 2000-2001 
 2000 2001 
 CZK billion %  CZK billion % 
PSE 264.2 82.5 128.8 88.0 
RM-S 36.9 11.5 13.5 9.2 
SCP 19.3 6 4.1 2.8 
Total 320.4 100 146.4 100 
Source: SEC 
 
4.4 Short summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the privatization process in the Czech Republic 
and the development of equity markets that arose as a direct consequence of the 
privatization program. Privatization as a part of the reform process was designed to 
facilitate fast economic changes at the micro level. Transfer of ownership to private hands 




together with increased competition, and hardening of budget constraint should have 
motivated former SOEs to reorganize their activities so that they become efficient and 
profitable. The following two chapters analyze activities of the voucher-privatized firms in 
the post-privatization period and attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
restructuring activities. The main purpose of this chapter is to put the voucher privatization 
into a broader perspective of the whole privatization process and to stress the importance 
and consequences of some unique features of the voucher program for the future 
development on the corporate-control as well as equity-market level. 
The Czech reform process is renowned for its unprecedented voucher privatization. 
Very often, however, the voucher privatization is highlighted, as if it was the only 
privatization method adopted. The second section of this chapter positions the voucher 
privatization in the entire Czech privatization program that was, in principle, divided in 
two parts: the small-scale and large-scale privatization. The former program involved just 
around 4 percent of the total value privatized (measured in book value of assets), but 
concerned almost as many business units as the large-scale program. As the small-scale 
privatization commenced already at the end of 1990, it significantly contributed to 
increasing public confidence in reforms and increasing competition.  
Nevertheless, the economy-wide effect of the large-scale program involving around 
CZK 1000 billion (USD 33.5 billion) of property is more pronounced. Almost half of the 
property offered within the large-scale privatization was transferred using vouchers. 
Another third was privatized via standard methods (direct sales, public tenders and 
auctions). A mix of free transfers to municipalities and restitutions was used for the 
remaining firms. It is important to note that often a combination of different methods was 
used to privatize one company. For example, a foreign investor bought 30 percent of a 
firm in a direct sale, 10 percent remained in the state hands and the remainder was offered 
for vouchers. Thus, the total value of property of firms that were at least partially 
privatized using vouchers represents more than 50 percent of assets in the large-scale 
program. Unmistakably, the voucher-privatization program affected a significant fraction 
of the Czech economy. 
The voucher-privatization program cannot be mentioned without highlighting the 





public interest for participation in the voucher program, they significantly contributed to 
its overall success. Nevertheless, it is often stressed that the IPFs are responsible for 
unsound corporate-control arrangements in the privatized companies. It should be stressed, 
however, that the IPFs contributed to a higher ownership concentration that may still be 
superior to the alternative of dispersed ownership. It is perhaps the lack of regulation and 
the governmental policy of laissez-faire that should be blamed for negative consequences 
of the IPF ownership. Still, the IPFs as a group emerged from the privatization process as 
the most influential players/owners with the highest average concentration of shares in the 
newly privatized firms. 
The voucher privatization created a wide base of security owners among the Czech 
population. With the intention of easy transferability of shares among citizens in the post-
privatization period, the creators of the privatization program decided that all firms 
privatized via the voucher method should be introduced to an organized equity market: the 
Prague Stock Exchange and the RM-System. The number of traded issues on these two 
trading venues was astonishing. However, it soon turned out that public tradability of so 
many companies is perhaps not optimal and that stricter regulation and supervision of the 
market is necessary for its transparency and public confidence. The process of regulation 
strengthening has resulted in significant reconciliation at both the PSE and the RM-S. For 
illustration, the number of traded equity issues on the PSE decreased from 1716 in 1995 to 
only 102 in 2001. This development shows that concentrated private ownership (possibly 
by foreign strategic investors) is the optimal control structure for many former state-
owned enterprises with immense need for restructuring and efficiency improvements.  
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Chapter 5  
Enterprise Performance and Post-Privatization 







In large corporations, ownership and management are separated so that the managers 
control the firms’ affairs on behalf of the owners but without their direct and immediate 
supervision. This separation of ownership and management leads to the well-known 
principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which requires an effective system 
of corporate governance to be resolved (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The principal-agent 
problem took on an additional dimension in the former socialist command economies 
where owners were literally non-existent. Instead, managers of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs from now on) were supervised by government officials who, in effect, were more 
concerned about redistribution of rents and plan fulfilment rather than efficient 
management of firms’ affairs. 
Privatization, as an integral part of the complex reform process in post-communist 
economies, was designed to introduce new private owners who would push for innovation 
and improved efficiency (Shleifer, 1998). Roland (2000) argues that the transfer of  
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ownership to private hands increases efficiency in two ways: first, by improving the 
matching of managers and productive assets, and, second, by creating better incentives for 
managers. The importance of these two channels – better human capital at the top 
managerial level and improved managerial incentives – has already been tested in the 
context of transition (among others, Groves et al., 1995, in a Chinese setting, Barberis et 
al., 1996, for small Russian shops, Frydman et al., 1998, for firms in four Central-
European economies, and Claessens and Djankov, 2000, for privatized Czech companies). 
In general, these studies reach a common main conclusion that only changing incentives 
faced by the incumbent managers does not suffice, it is the change of management that 
leads to restructuring and improved performance. Moreover, the evidence provided by 
Frydman et al. (1998) suggests that privatization to insiders who then naturally resist 
changes at the top managerial positions is inferior to privatization to outsiders and also to 
state ownership.  
Our analysis further extends the empirical evidence on both the determinants and 
impact on performance of managerial turnover after privatization in a transition economy. 
In order to increase efficiency of their firms, the new private owners have to replace 
managers who perform poorly. However, this situation entails the standard principal-agent 
relationship. As the agent has some private relevant information that is not known to the 
principal (e.g., the manager’s abilities or the firm’s potential productivity) an adverse 
selection problem may arise. In addition, moral hazard may also be present since the 
manager can take actions that affect the firm’s productivity and cannot be directly 
observed by the principal. The principal (the new owner) in turn cannot distinguish 
between the potential reasons for the firm’s poor performance: inherently low productivity 
of the firm, incompetence of the manager, managerial decisions that pursue goals other 
than productivity, or pure bad luck (Groves et al., 1995).  
To shed some new light on these issues, the focus of our analysis is two-fold. First, we 
study the circumstances of the first post-privatization change of the CEO. High managerial 
turnover immediately after the transfer of ownership would indicate (at least indirectly) 
that the new private owners actively search for managers with human capital that better 
corresponds to the needs of their firms than the incumbent managers (who were appointed 
during the communist period or during the turbulent times immediately after the regime 




change). We also test whether the probability of managerial change is related to the firms’ 
past performance. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that managers of poorly 
performing firms would be at a greater risk of dismissal. Yet, the relationship between 
performance and the probability of managerial turnover is likely to depend also on the 
specific ownership/control characteristics of the firms. We conjecture that concentrated 
owners, because they typically actively monitor the firm and/or directly participate in 
running its business, have better access to inside information concerning firm value and 
abilities of the management (as shown in Chapter 3 of this thesis). Therefore, poor past 
performance may play more important role in revealing low qualities of the managers in 
firms without concentrated, monitoring shareholders. Moreover, shareholders with 
relatively low control and cash flow rights are not much motivated to exert effort and push 
through changes unless firm performance is very poor (Franks et al., 2001). 
Second, we analyze the effect of appointing a new CEO on firm performance. Groves 
et al. (1995) argue that a significant improvement of firm performance after the 
managerial change points out to the existence of unfulfilled potential of the firm prior to 
the change. Thus, ex post improvement constitutes indirect evidence of ex ante poor 
managerial performance. The owners may have private information (or intuition) about 
performance of the incumbent managers and replace them when there is a potential for 
improvement. This would document that the new private owners introduce a manager with 
human capital that more matches the firm’s productive assets as put forward in Roland 
(2000). 
An important contribution of this study is that we combine the cross-sectional analysis 
of the performance-CEO turnover relation with a panel analysis that may reveal changes 
in firm’s (total factor) productivity after CEO change relatively to productivity before the 
change. The later method may pick-up CEO turnover that is motivated by superior 
information available to the new private owners concerning the unfulfilled potential of 
their firms that goes beyond simple past performance measures of the former method. This 
is also how our analysis extends the previous work on this topic, in particular that of 
Claessens and Djankov (1999) who analyze the relationship between managerial change 
and performance in a cross-sectional setting. In particular, they compare productivity and 




Czech firms: (i) firms with a CEO from before 1990, e.g. no managerial change since the 
beginning of reforms; (ii) firms with a CEO that was replaced between 1990 and the 
privatization; and (iii) firms with managers that were replaced by the new private owners 
after 1994. They find that firms with a managerial change after 1990 (the two latter 
groups) increased their labour productivity and profitability significantly more than firms 
without a managerial change (the first group). However, performance of firms with 
managerial changes before versus after the privatization was not significantly different. 
The focus of our study is different: we consider only managerial changes introduced by 
the new owners after the privatization and consider changes that occur anytime between 
privatisation and 1998 (whereas Claessens and Djankov, 1999, consider incumbent 
managers in June 1994 and assign their firms to the three groups according to the 
beginning of their tenure). Moreover, by utilizing a panel structure of the data, we are able 
to compare productivity before and after the managerial change. With our approach, we 
can thus provide more direct evidence on the effect of managerial change introduced by 
the new private owners than would be possible with a cross-sectional analysis. 
Another contribution is that, in contrast to the previous literature, we account for the 
specific internal-control structures in place in the Czech Republic that may significantly 
influence the performance-managerial-turnover relation. The Commercial Code assigns 
executive powers and the ultimate responsibility for all business matters of the company to 
the board of directors rather than to the management. At the same time, the CEO (in the 
Czech Republic usually denoted as the general director) is not always a member of the 
board and thus does not always exercise this responsibility. Therefore, we argue, that 
besides CEO turnover, it is important to consider also changes at the post of the chairman 
of the board of directors and evaluate the relative control power of these two key persons. 
We distinguish two types of internal-control structures: strong management (whereby the 
CEO sits on the BoD) and weak management (the BoD is separated from management and 
oversees its activities). In Section 5.3, we describe the concerning regulation and explain 
how it affects our hypotheses. 
The above mentioned hypotheses are tested on a data set of 917 non-financial 
privatized firms spanning over a six-year period following the voucher privatization: from 
1993 to 1998. We show that the evidence concerning the relation between prior 




performance and top managerial turnover in the newly privatized firms is not significant in 
the first couple of years directly after the transfer of ownership. However, our results 
suggest that the performance effect becomes significant as a determinant of CEO changes 
in 1997, some 3-5 years after the privatization, especially for firms with less concentrated 
control and/or firms with IPF ownership. Our second finding confirms that CEO change 
delivers a positive shift in (total factor) productivity suggesting that the new private 
owners replace their managers when there is an unfulfilled potential for performance 
improvement. However, our third important conclusion is that the positive effect of CEO 
turnover is significant only when the CEO has a relatively strong position within the firm 
and is closely linked with the board of directors (which is ultimately responsible for all 
business affairs of the company). Replacements of the chairman of the board of directors 
also leads to greater efficiency in this type of firms. To the contrary, replacements of the 
CEO or chairman of the board do not improve productivity when the management is not 
part of the board of directors which has the ultimate responsibility for business affairs of 
the firm. In this case, the board of directors consists only of representatives of the 
shareholders who usually (in the Czech setting) do not have much experience in the 
business.  
The next section briefly describes findings and conclusions of the existing literature 
regarding privatization, in general, and its effects in transition economies, in particular. 
Section 5.3 is devoted to a discussion of the voucher privatization and existing corporate 
governance framework implemented in the Czech Republic. Section 5.4 introduces the 
data and Sections 5.5 and 5.6 present the results of our empirical analysis. The last section 
summarizes the results and presents our conclusions. 
5.2 Privatization and enterprise restructuring: theory and evidence 
Over the past 20 years, governments increasingly chose to relinquish control over 
public enterprises. After its debut in the U.K. in the early 1980s, privatization spread to 
France, Italy, Spain and other market economies. During the 1990s, this trend received a 
further impetus as formerly socialist countries initiated large-scale privatization programs. 




as the crucial source of incentives to innovate and become efficient (Shleifer, 1998). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that public enterprises are highly inefficient since they 
are under pressure from the politicians who use them to pursue political goals.76 Private 
ownership removes this pressure and reinstates the profit-maximization goal that leads to 
efficiency improvements and innovation. Megginson and Netter (2001) review many 
recent empirical papers documenting that privatization is highly successful in delivering 
performance improvements.  
So, it is not surprising that privatization constituted an important part of the reform 
program in the transition countries with the objective that the new private owners would 
quickly induce restructuring and improve performance. As Aghion et al. (1994) and 
Roland and Sekkat (2000) argue very intuitively, whether or not the incumbent 
management chooses to restructure crucially depends on the prevailing incentives. 
However, managers of the SOEs facing an end-game situation immediately before the 
privatization have an incentive to squander the enterprises assets. This threat underlay 
strives for fast privatization that would deprive managers of this option. Nevertheless, 
managers may restructure because they expect to benefit from the subsequent privatization 
and/or because they attempt to improve performance in order to convince the new owners 
of their competence and thus retain their positions after privatization. Thus, managerial 
career concerns motivate incumbent managers to restructure even in the pre-privatization 
period. Empirical evidence indicates that this is indeed the case: managers of SOEs often 
begun to restructure their enterprises even before the actual privatization took place 
(Carlin et al., 1995, Barberis et al., 1996).  
The actual transfer of ownership to private hands has further efficiency-improving 
effects that work through two channels: first, by setting better incentives for managers, 
and, second, by better matching of managers and productive assets (Roland, 2000).  
First, the new private owners are expected to introduce better managerial incentives – 
both positive and negative ones (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Owners who do not directly 
participate in the day-to-day management of firm’s affairs hold the top managers  
                                                 
76 Possible political benefits include excess employment and wages, production of goods desired by 
politicians rather than by consumers, and location of production facilities in politically desirable rather than 
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responsible for the firm’s economic outcomes. Managers who deliver satisfactory 
performance hold their posts, whereas those who do not are punished by termination and 
replacement.77 Good performance is also rewarded by higher remuneration. Introduction 
and enforcement of appropriate incentives for managers is very important in transition 
economies since it substitutes the role of other disciplinary and motivational tools – such 
as competition in product, managerial and capital markets (either through takeovers or 
bank supervision) – that are still not functioning properly in the transition period.  
Second, an effective reform must change not only the incentive environment but also 
provide a mechanism for appropriate supervision and replacement of managers who will 
be responsive to the new opportunities (Groves et al., 1995). Skills and qualifications that 
were important in a command economy are not necessarily useful in a market economy. 
Moreover, the selection of top managers under the communist regime often reflected 
political considerations as much as, or more than, managerial skills. In contrast, the new 
owners are likely to appoint managers who possess skills more appropriate for the market 
economy in general and their individual firm in particular.78 In functioning market 
economies, this task is complemented by the managerial labour market and capital market. 
As the managerial labour market and capital market are not yet sufficiently developed in 
the transition economies, the new private owners play here a pivotal role for managerial 
replacements. 
The privatization experience in Central and Easter Europe nevertheless shows that the 
relationship between transfer of ownership and improved efficiency is not straightforward. 
First, privatization, and especially the voucher method, often delivered owners who were 
unable or unwilling to exercise effective control over the privatized firms.79 Second, flaws 
in or outright absence of regulation and weak enforcement of property rights often left the 
incumbent managers entrenched and de facto in control of the firm long after privatization 
                                                 
77 Weisbach (1988) and Warner et al. (1988) present empirical evidence from the U.S.  
78 However, as Claessens and Djankov (2000) emphasize, due to the absence of high-quality business 
education, there are obvious limits with respect to skills of local managers in post-communist countries.  
79 This was often suggested in connection with the investment privatization funds in the Czech Republic 
who, through the voucher privatization, acquired minority stakes in dozens of enterprises. As a result, they 




(Earle, 1998).80 Third, even when owners took control of the privatized firm, they 
sometimes found it more attractive to divert assets at the expense of minority shareholders 
rather than maximize the net worth of the firm (Glaeser et al., 2001, Johnson et al., 2000).  
A growing body of empirical literature attempts to document the (relative) importance 
of the two channels: the introduction of new human capital at the top-management level 
and of managerial incentives. Barberis et al. (1996) analyzing data obtained from a survey 
of 452 Russian shops (both state owned and privatized) over the period 1992-93 find that 
bringing in new people with new skills is a precondition for restructuring. Only changing 
incentives faced by the incumbent managers does not suffice, it is the change of 
management and/or ownership that leads to restructuring (as their sample only includes 
retail shops, the change of ownership and management often coincides). Claessens and 
Djankov (2000) come to a similar conclusion. They investigate the effect of managerial 
turnover on performance of privatized Czech firms during 1993-97 and provide further 
evidence that appointment of new managers improves firm performance. This is especially 
the case when the managers were appointed by the new owners rather than the 
government. In contrast, they find that equity incentives (equity holdings by management) 
are not significantly related to firm performance.  
Groves et al. (1995) analyze 769 state-owned Chinese enterprises over 1980-89 and 
find evidence that supports both channels through which better efficiency is achieved. In 
particular, poor firm performance affects the selection procedure for managerial 
appointments and the conditions of managerial contracts.81 Consequently, the management 
contracts provided managers with incentives to maximize profits. They also find that the 
appointment of a new manager improves firm performance. In contrast, Frydman et al. 
(1998), based on their analysis of the determinants of firm performance in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, argue that improvements in performance stemming from 
managerial turnover are not ownership-related. They find that firms privatized to outsiders  
                                                 
80 For example, there is anecdotal evidence of managers and workers of privatized enterprises in Russia 
refusing to hand over control to new (foreign) owners and even refusing to allow them on firm’s premises, 
often with tacit or open support from local authorities.  
81 Managers in poorly performing firms were appointed for shorter periods and were required to post a 
higher security deposit. 




as well as state-owned firms significantly improved their performance following 
managerial change.  
5.3 Privatization and corporate-governance regulation in the 
Czech Republic 
The Czech government opted for a fast liberalization/reform program that aimed to 
introduce the three essential steps – price liberalization, stabilization and privatization – 
relatively rapidly (Sachs, 1993). In effect, voucher privatization introduced new private 
owners already in 1993 after the first wave and in 1994 after the second wave.82 As 
documented in Chapter 4, despite fears of highly dispersed ownership, the post-
privatization ownership structure was quite concentrated. Only around 29 percent of all 
firms involved in the first wave had more than 50 percent of their shares in hands of small, 
dispersed shareholders.83 IPFs were the most frequent blockholders, especially in the first 
years after the privatization. In an average firm, as much as 25 and 31 percent of shares 
was in hands if IPFs immediately after the first and second wave, respectively. Thus, the 
IPFs played also vital role in pursuing restructuring in general and managerial turnover in 
particular. Still, frequent ownership transactions over the years since the privatisation have 
resulted in higher concentration of ownership in hands of individuals and other domestic 
and foreign firms who challenge the vital role of IPFs. 
In order to explore the relationship between managerial turnover and firm 
performance, it is also important to be familiar with the specifics of the prevailing 
corporate governance patterns. The law restricts the design of internal-control structures in 
companies and thus has an important impact on the corporate governance patterns in 
place. In particular, the legal framework stipulates the conditions of appointment, 
responsibilities, and accountability of executive bodies, including the CEO.  
The principal piece of legislation regulating the internal-control structures in the Czech 
Republic is the Commercial Code. Limited-liability public companies are obliged to have 
a two-tier internal-control structure. In particular, the Code prescribes that two separate 
                                                 
82 For more details about the whole privatization process see the previous chapter. 




internal bodies are established: a board of directors (henceforth BoD) and a supervisory 
board (SB). The BoD is the highest executive body of the company responsible for all 
business affairs of the company. In particular, the Code stipulates that, unless regulated 
otherwise by the articles of association, the BoD members (and not the management) have 
the legal authority to sign contracts on behalf of the company. In general, members of the 
BoD are appointed by the general meeting of the company’s shareholders. However, the 
articles of association may also stipulate that members of the BoD are appointed by the SB 
instead. The chairman of the BoD is elected by the BoD members themselves in both 
cases. In turn, the SB is responsible for overseeing and monitoring of the actions of the 
BoD. Members of the SB must be appointed by the general meeting of shareholders.84 The 
Code does not regulate the role of the management.  
In practice, different types of internal-control structures are common among the Czech 
companies. This variety of internal-control structures (relative division of control/power 
between SB, BoD, and management) is due to different preferences among the important 
individual constituencies involved: the state (represented by the Fund of National Property 
– FNM), investment privatization funds (IPFs), other owners, and the management 
(Brzica, 1995). In general, two main types prevail, with each stipulating different roles for 
the BoD and the SB, the relationship between them and towards the management. In the 
first type, depicted in Figure 5.1, the management is relatively powerful because its 
members also sit on the BoD (although the positions of the CEO and the BoD chairman 
are not necessarily taken up by the same person). The SB is elected by the general meeting 
of shareholders and it in turn appoints the BoD members. Thus, shareholders have their 
representatives on the SB, which oversees and monitors the BoD. The BoD coincides with 
the management team and is the executive body of the company.  
The second type (Figure 5.2) is used when shareholders want to have higher control 
over the firm. In that case, both the BoD and SB are appointed directly by the general 
assembly of shareholders. Shareholders’ control over the firm is then indeed quite 
considerable since the shareholders have their representatives on the BoD that has the 
ultimate responsibility over the business affairs of the firm. In contrast, the management 
                                                 
84 Except for companies with more than 50 employees, in which case one third of the SB is appointed by the 
employees.  




team (that is not part of the BoD) is relatively weak with limited responsibilities.85 The 
role of the SB is limited to monitoring the activities of the BoD and the management. This 
type of internal-control structures is usually prevailing in firms with several IPFs. 
Representatives of stronger IPFs are appointed members of the BoD (effectively control 
the firm) and smaller IPFs are represented in the SB. 
 


































                                                 
85 Sometimes is the CEO also a member if the BoD but does not hold an important position (such as that of 
the chairman or vice-chairman). 
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Since the objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of changes at the top executive 
level on productivity (performance), it is instructive to summarize briefly the main 
implications of the two alternative models discussed above for the roles of the top 
management and the BoD. First, the Code assigns executive power and responsibility to 
the BoD. Second, the members of the top management do not always sit on the BoD. 
Third, even when the top management and the BoD overlap, the chief executive officer is 
not always the chairman of the BoD. Hence, analyzing the impact of top executive 
turnover on firm performance, one must control for the specifics of internal-control 
patterns in place. In fact, such an analysis may not be complete when only considering 
CEO turnover, as the key responsibility for business affairs of the firm lie within the BoD 
and the CEO is not always member of the board. 
The previous research analyzing the effects of change at the top executive level in the 
Czech Republic (Claessens and Djankov, 1999, 2000) abstracted from this, in our view, 
important aspect of the Czech corporate governance system. In the present paper, we 
contribute to the existing literature by taking these aspects into account. In particular, we 
consider changes at both posts (CEO and chairman of the BoD), and also distinguish 
CEO/BoD-chairman turnover in the two internal-control structures. In other words, we 
address the question whether it is important to change the CEO or rather the chairman of 
the BoD in order to achieve better productivity and whether the two systems have 
differing impact on top managerial turnover. 
5.4 Data 
We base our analysis on a panel of 917 non-financial firms privatized during the two 
waves of voucher privatization in the Czech Republic.86 The data span the period from 
1993 to 1998. The basic criterion for a firm to be included in our analysis was that 
information on its sales, fixed assets, number of employees, and costs had to be available 
for at least 3 years. The panel is therefore unbalanced and contains a total of 4920 firm-
year observations. The data set contains also various non-economic information about the 
firms. Importantly, we are able to identify the firm’s CEO, the date he or she assumed this 
                                                 
86 The data were purchased from Aspekt Kilcullen s.r.o. (http://www.aspekt.cz/).  




position as well as information on structure of ownership. The latter is based on a list of 
owners who hold more than 10 percent of total equity. However, ownership structure is 
only available starting with 1996 as only then it became obligatory by law to disclose this 
information. 
Unfortunately, the data have some limitation too. Besides the missing information on 
the structure of ownership before 1996, we have no information on the CEO’s professional 
qualifications (education, experience, and employment history within and outside the firm) 
or the reasons for the CEO’s departure. Therefore, while we can observe CEO changes, 
we do not know whether the previous CEO was dismissed or whether he left for other 
reasons (such as health problems, retirement or death). Yet, as the descriptive statistics 
discussed in greater detail below show, changes within the top management and the BoD 
are so frequent (ranging between 10 and 24 percent per year for the CEO and between 24 
and 37 percent for the chairman of the BoD) that health and demographics could only 
account for a small fraction of them.87  
Table 5.1 presents basic descriptive statistics. The data indicate that sales, fixed assets 
and labour productivity rose slightly from 1994 until 1998 (a period during which the 
structure of the data set is largely stable), whereas profitability (measured by return on 
fixed assets) declined from 1994 until 1996 and then increased again. The number of 
employees was falling till 1997 and only stabilized in 1998. The fact that the average 
enterprise increased its sales and improved profitability while reducing the number of 
employees by approximately 10 percent indicates ongoing restructuring effort and 
hardening of the budget constraint. Comparing means and medians for most of the 
variables in Panel A reveals that there are several large firms in the data set. As new firms 
enter the data set in the wake of the second wave of voucher privatization, the average and 
median firm sizes fall considerably, indicating that the first wave was more strongly 
dominated by large enterprises. 
                                                 
87 It is also not very probable that these high replacement rates were a consequence of low turnover in the 
pre-privatization period. In fact, Claessens and Djankov (1999) report that at least 50 percent of voucher-




TABLE 5.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
PANEL A 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of firms 509 882 896 899 887 847 
Total sales:                       mean 1035 720 741 737 767 793 
median 308 200 211 207 208 196 
st. dev. 2945 2322 2337 2334 2387 2496 
Costs of goods sold:         mean 734 557 633 662 740 786 
median 218 145 171 175 187 187 
st. dev. 1711 1595 1802 1809 2057 2262 
Gross profit margin:         mean 302 214 217 219 255 284 
median 81 53 54 55 69 67 
st. dev. 1478 1101 1139 1183 1211 1342 
Fixed assets:                     mean 848 573 589 625 650 703 
median 217 116 118 114 103 102 
st. dev. 4326 3628 4039 4556 4921 5437 
Number of employees:    mean 1253 830 796 766 739 743 
median 568 311 306 300 290 290 
st. dev. 3012 2058 1953 1952 1885 1850 
Labour productivity:        mean 946 953 1063 1165 1368 1428 
median 498 537 607 665 761 774 
st. dev. 1432 1180 1215 1562 2658 2823 
Return of fixed assets:  mean 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.46 0.57 0.64 
median 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.47 
st. dev. 0.67 0.68 1.14 2.36 1.81 1.23 
PANEL B  
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Frequency of CEO change1 9% 8% 3 10% 16% 24% 18% 
Frequency of CBD change1 27% 28% 37% 35% 29% 24% 
Number of firms with CEO (CBD) change per year:2  
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
first CEO change 6 77 71 89 174 73 
last CEO change 3 39 43 69 190 146 
first CBD change 32 184 188 256 94 61 
last CBD change 9 50 101 223 200 228 
Percentage of firms with CEO change in nth year after privatization  
year 1 2 3 4 5 6 
percentage of firms 11% 18% 18% 24% 23% 6% 
PANEL C Total CEO is BoD chairman 
CEO is BoD 
chairman or 
vicechair. 
CEO is BoD 
member  
Number of firms 917 383 590 699  
Notes: For each year in Panel A, the mean, median, and standard deviation are reported in given order. 
Sales, costs of goods sold, gross profit margin, and fixed assets are in CZK millions in constant prices of 
1993. Gross profit margin is defined as difference between total sales and costs of goods sold. Labour 
productivity is the total sales over the number of employees. Return of assets is defined as the gross profit 
margin over the fixed assets. Only changes of CEOs and CBDs after voucher privatization (i.e. after April 




1993 and October 1994 for the firms included in the 1st and 2nd wave, respectively) were considered. CBD 
stands for chairman of the board of directors. 
1 All changes of CEO (CBD) per firm considered. 
2 Change of CEO (CBD) is attributed to the following cal. year if it occurred during the 2nd half of the year.  
3 Partitioned for firms in the 1st and 2nd wave, the frequency is 11% and 3%, respectively. 
 
We are primarily interested in the pattern of managerial turnover. Compared to 
available estimates of 7.8 percent - 9.3 percent for U.S. firms (Claessens and Djankov, 
2000), the CEO turnover in the Czech Republic seems relatively high. In our sample, as 
much as 56.5 percent (518 out of 917) of firms replaced their CEO over the 5-6 years 
since privatization.88 In most cases (345 firms), the CEO was replaced only once, in 132 
firms twice, and in 41 firms three or more times. These numbers document a very 
turbulent managerial turnover in the post-privatization period. As Panel B of Table 5.1 
shows, the frequency of CEO change has an increasing trend.89 It is low immediately 
following the privatization, but increases to 24 percent in the fifth post-privatization year. 
This indicates that even though the new private owners were eventually quite eager to 
replace the top managers in their newly acquired firms, they were prepared to give them 
the benefit of the doubt by not replacing them immediately after the privatization. 
Nonetheless, it is equally plausible that it took several years until ownership structure was 
sufficiently consolidated and owners started to exercise their control effectively. On 
average, the first CEO change took place in the fourth year after the transfer of ownership 
in firms that replaced their CEO at least once.  
The lower part of Panel B (Table 5.1) shows the actual distribution of firms over years 
in which the CEO change took place. Eleven percent of firms changed their CEO in the 
first year and the median firm changed the CEO in the fourth year. Comparing the CEO 
turnover to the turnover of the chairman of the BoD (CBD henceforth), the CBD is 
replaced much more frequently and in more firms.  
Panel C looks at the incidence of the two internal-control structures discussed in the 
preceding section. Most Czech firms employ the first alternative of the internal-control 
structure with strong management. In more than a third of all firms, the CEO served also 
                                                 
88 The period 1993-98 represents 6 and 5 years in the post-privatization period for the firms privatized in the 
first and second wave of voucher privatization, respectively. Ownership rights were transferred in April 
1993 and June 1994 for the first and second wave, respectively. 




as the CBD. In nearly two thirds, he was either the chairman or a deputy chairman of the 
BoD and in more than two thirds he had a seat on the BoD. Nevertheless, when comparing 
CEO and CBD changes, we find that only in 100 cases, both CEO and CBD were changed 
at the same time.  
Table 5.2 looks at the structure of ownership by identifying the largest shareholders of 
the enterprises in 1996. Even though the Investment Privatization Funds were the most 
frequent owners of the privatized companies immediately after the voucher privatization90, 
our data suggest this was no longer the case in 1996. Apparently, considerable secondary 
ownership transfers took place since the voucher privatization.91 By 1996, domestic firms 
were the most frequent type of the largest shareholder (35 percent of firms), followed by 
the IPFs (20 percent) and the government (15 percent).  
 
TABLE 5.2: OWNERSHIP STATISTICS: THE LARGEST OWNER 










Investment Privatization Fund 169 19.58% 26.25% 33 7 
Domestic bank 14 1.62% 43.46% 9 4 
Foreign bank 14 1.62% 40.26% 9 4 
Domestic corporation 303 35.11% 45.73% 225 124 
Foreign corporation 57 6.60% 60.23% 52 40 
Individual 89 10.31% 34.24% 42 14 
National Property Fund 126 14.60% 46.51% 85 49 
Institutional investor (not IPF)  79 9.15% 36.14% 43 15 
Foreign institutional investor  12 1.39% 52.41% 8 7 
Notes:  
1 Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder.  
2 Number of firms having a controlling blockholder (one who holds at least 33.4% of shares) and majority 
owner (holding more than 50% of shares), respectively. 
 
Voucher privatization was expected to lead to highly dispersed ownership. Yet, as 
Table 5.2 shows, that is not what happened in the Czech Republic (for a more detailed 
discussion, see also Chapter 4). Except for the IPFs, the largest shareholder on average 
owns more than one third of total equity. Foreign firms in particular tend to acquire 
                                                 
90 As discussed above, approximately two thirds of vouchers were invested through IPFs rather than directly 
in the two waves.  
91 Indeed, already during voucher privatization, large ownership changes were expected. This process was 
often referred to as the third wave of privatization, or re-privatization. 




concentrated stakes, holding on average 60 percent of equity. The low average stakes held 
by IPFs in part reflect legal restrictions. The funds are prohibited from owning more than 
20 percent of any company. If several funds set up by the same legal entity hold stakes in 
a firm (as was often the case), their joint stake is to be at most 40 percent. To circumvent 
this regulation, many IPFs transformed into holding companies92. This is documented also 
by our data since some of the funds own blocking or majority stakes, even though less 
frequently than other types of owners. 
5.5 Determinants of CEO turnover 
As documented in the previous section, around 57 percent of Czech enterprises 
experienced a change of their CEO at least once during the five/six years since their 
privatization. The new private owners were thus quite active in replacing the top managers 
of their newly acquired enterprises. In the present section, we investigate the factors that 
determine CEO turnover. In particular, we investigate whether the probability of CEO 
change is related to firm performance. Finding a negative correlation between firm 
performance and CEO turnover would indicate that the new owners tend to change those 
managers who fail to deliver satisfactory results.93 Indeed, in the previous section we show 
(in Table 5.1) that the frequency of CEO change picks up considerably after 1996 (i.e. 3-4 
years after privatization, depending on whether the particular enterprise was included in 
the first or the second wave). Apparently, the managers were given some time 
immediately after the privatization to show their qualities.  
An alternative and a priori equally plausible explanation is that the new private 
owners replaced the incumbent CEOs regardless of performance so as to assert control 
over the firm and put in place management that best corresponds to the firm’s needs. In 
this case, one would expect to find little correlation between firm performance and 
managerial turnover. Still another interpretation of a nonsignificant relationship between 
firm performance and managerial turnover is possible. In particular, high managerial 
control over the firm could mean that outside shareholders are not able to push forward 
                                                 
92 Because of this, we retain such transformed IPFs in the IPF category.  
93 A negative relation between managerial change and prior firms performance would be in line with the 




changes on the top managerial positions. Thus, managerial entrenchment could lead to low 
managerial turnover and low (or non-existent) negative incentives. However, we argue 
that this is not the case in the Czech voucher-privatized firms as CEO turnover is very 
high and managerial entrenchment seems to be quite low. Claessens and Djankov (1999) 
report that the CEOs own on average only 2.5 percent of total equity, with only 1.8 
percent of managers holding more than 20 percent or more. Moreover, Brzica (1995) 
documents exercising of ownership rights and active involvement of owners (mostly IPFs) 
in monitoring of their firms. 
To test the importance of enterprise performance for the probability of CEO change, 
we estimate the following basic relationship: 
ititititiit DSizePerfDCEO εβββα ++++= −− 31211  (1) 
where DCEOit is a binary variable taking value of one if the CEO of firm i was replaced in 
year t, Perfit-1 is the firm’s performance in the previous year, Sizeit-1 is a measure of firm 
size in the preceding year, Dit is a matrix of ownership dummies (described below), αi is 
the firm-specific constant, and εit is the error term. Performance and size are both in 
natural logarithms and are industry-adjusted (divided by the industry average in the given 
year). We use three measures of performance: labour productivity, gross profit margin per 
employee, and return on fixed assets. Size is measured, alternatively, by total fixed assets 
or number of employees and is included to account for the possibility that large firms have 
a higher frequency of managerial turnover. Equation (1) thus relates the probability of 
CEO change to firm performance. A negative coefficient estimated for either performance 
measure would indicate that low performance increases the probability of CEO 
replacement and, thus, negative managerial incentives are in place. The equation was 
estimated by logit panel regressions with fixed effects.94  
The results reported in Panel A of Table 5.3 do not support the hypothesis of negative 
managerial incentives for neither of the performance measures. The effect of labour 
productivity on CEO turnover is insignificant and positive (Models 1 and 2 in Panel A of 
Table 5.3). The coefficient estimate for profit per employee in Model 3 (Panel A, Table 
5.3) does have the correct sign but is also insignificant. The only significant coefficient is  
                                                 
94 The Hausman test indicates that fixed effects are appropriate for our models. 





TABLE 5.3: IMPACT OF FIRM PERFORMANCE ON CEO TURNOVER: PANEL RESULTS 




per empl.  
return on 
fixed assets
Panel A: Panel Estimates (94-98) Model 1  Model 2 Model 3  Model 4  
Performance (lagged) 0.092  0.123 -0.012  0.175 * 
 (0.171)  (0.175) (0.112)  (0.092) 
Size (lagged)   -0.210 -0.287  0.087 
   (0.180) (0.203)  (0.334) 
Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
χ2 93.70 *** 94.35 *** 89.82 *** 81.20 *** 
Panel B: 1997 Estimates  Model 5 Model 6  Model 7  
Performance (lagged)   -0.261 ** -0.216 * -0.001  
   (0.191)  (0.114)  (0.089)  
Size (lagged)   0.099 * 0.077  0.089  
   (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.083)  
constant   -1.097 *** -1.108 *** -1.115 *** 
   (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.098)  
Fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  
χ2   6.18 ** 4.07  1.13  
Notes: Estimated with logit regressions, standard deviations are in parentheses. Number of observations is 
4105. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if CEO changed in the respective year. All 
variables are industry adjusted and in logs. Labour productivity is defined as the total sales over the total 
number of employees. Gross profit per employee is defined as the total sales less the costs over the total 
number of employees. Return on fixed assets is the total sales less the total costs over the fixed assets. Size 
stands for the fixed assets in Models 1-3 and the number of employees in Model 4. Year 1994 is the 
reference year. * denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
that obtained for return on fixed assets in Model 4 but it is positive, implying that good 
performance increases the probability of the CEO turnover. 
Panel B of Table 5.3 reproduces Models 2-4 with data only for 1997 so as to facilitate 
comparison with results that incorporate ownership information discussed bellow.95 Note 
(see Table 5.1) that 1997 was the year with the highest frequency of managerial turnover 
which may influence the results. The results in Panel B differ substantially from those in 
Panel A. It appears that negative incentives did play an important role in determining CEO 
changes during 1997 – both labour productivity and profit per employee are negative and 
significant whereas return on fixed assets is now insignificant. This pattern, however, only 
                                                 
95 Ownership data is available only since 1996. Therefore, we can only use ownership (and performance) in 




obtains for CEO changes in 1997. The results for analogous regressions with CEO change 
in other years show insignificant coefficients for all performance variables.96 Thus, we 
find some indication that negative incentives determine managerial turnover but only in 
1997. In the remaining years, it appears that if the new private owners replaced the CEOs, 
they did largely regardless of their performance. Nevertheless, this result may stem from 
the fact that the new owners needed some time to get acquainted with their firms, gather 
information and let the incumbent managers to show their abilities. Therefore, 
performance may become important only later on which is consistent with our results. 
Next, we explore whether different types of owners behave differently when it comes 
to CEO turnover. We conjecture that only blockholders with significant control who are 
involved in active monitoring have direct access to inside information concerning firm 
value and abilities of the management. Therefore, owners who do not closely monitor the 
firm’s activities are more likely to rely on performance as a signal about the CEO’s 
competence. We categorize the enterprises according to the type of the largest owner. In 
doing so, we consider also the size of the stake held by the largest stakeholder. We 
distinguish between a controlling blockholder (defined as one holding at least 33.4 percent 
of equity) and a majority blockholder (one with more than a 50 percent stake). These two 
thresholds were chosen so as to account for the relative control power of the largest 
stakeholder. Obviously, a blockholder who is in possession of more than 50 percent of 
outstanding equity is in almost complete control of the enterprise. As the Commercial 
Code requires a two-third majority to implement certain important corporate decisions, 
owning more than a third of total equity also implies considerable influence (such stake is 
often denoted as a blocking majority).  
Within these two size categories, we further distinguish between six different types of 
stakeholders: investment privatization funds (IPFs), banks, other financial institutions, 
individuals, corporations, and the national property fund (NPF). The empirical literature 
analyzing ownership/control effects of different types of owners usually distinguishes 
ownership by individuals, corporations, and financial institutions (Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988). We augment these basic groups by adding the NPF, as the state 
ownership is till important in the Czech Republic. Further, we partition financial 
                                                 
96 These results are not reported here, they are available upon request. 




institutions into the IPFs, banks, and the remaining financial institutions. As coding 
ownership structure is very time consuming and ownership data is available only since 
1996, we only investigate the effect of performance and ownership structure in 1996 on 
CEO change in 1997. This is the year with most frequent CEO changes and, as reported 
above, the only year during which the relationship between performance and managerial 
turnover was found to be positive.  
Regressions reported in Table 5.4 investigate the effect of different types of 
controlling and majority blockholders on the probability of CEO change. In order to test 
the performance-CEO turnover relation for the different types of controlling/majority 
blockholders, we augment the basic models from Table 5.3 by a set of interaction terms 
between the individual performance measures and the controlling/majority-blockholder 
types. This specification allows us to test whether different types of owners put different  
 
TABLE 5.4: IMPACT OF FIRM PERFORMANCE IN 1996 ON CEO TURNOVER IN 1997 
 labour productivity  
gross prof. per 
empl.  
return on fixed 
assets 
 
Panel A: Controlling blockholder  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Constant -1.123 *** -1.120 *** -1.091 *** 
 (0.098)  (0.099)  (0.102)  
Performance (lagged) -0.220  -0.297 * 0.067  
 (0.172)  (0.169)  (0.153)  
Size (lagged) 0.076  0.067  0.107  
 (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.088)  
Interaction terms1       
perf.*IPF -1.330 ** -0.206  -1.003 ** 
 (0.621)  (0.654)  (0.410)  
perf.*bank 0.285  2.080  -0.381  
 (0.874)  (1.342)  (0.460)  
perf.*corporation 0.233  0.247  -0.038  
 (0.251)  (0.253)  (0.222)  
perf.*individual 0.015  -0.399  0.052  
 (0.477)  (0.542)  (0.450)  
perf.*National Property Fund -0.524  0.482  0.436  
 (0.433)  (0.514)  (0.414)  
perf.*institutional investor (not IPF)  -0.304  0.013  0.171  
 (0.567)  (0.445)  (0.429)  
Number of observations 846  812  728  




Table 5.4 continued 
 
Panel B: Majority blockholder  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
Constant -1.126 *** -1.148 *** -1.093 *** 
 (0.099)  (0.100)  (0.103)  
Performance (lagged) -0.290 ** -0.327 ** 0.041  
 (0.138)  (0.140)  (0.114)  
Size (lagged) 0.082  0.058  0.107  
 (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.089)  
Interaction terms2       
perf.*IPF -4.040  -0.375    
 (2.961)  (1.018)    
perf.*bank -0.300  1.470  -0.363  
 (1.857)  (1.604)  (0.746)  
perf.*corporation 0.521 * 0.440  -0.069  
 (0.296)  (0.277)  (0.240)  
perf.*individual -0.808  -0.929  0.943  
 (0.856)  (1.123)  (1.156)  
perf.*National Property Fund -0.212  1.317 ** 0.654  
 (0.500)  (0.607)  (0.685)  
perf.*institutional investor (not IPF)  -0.398  0.093  0.645  
 (0.781)  (0.869)  (0.726)  
Number of observations 846  812  722  
χ2 13.52 * 11.13  4.75  
Notes: Estimated by Logit. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if CEO changed in 1997. 
Ownership information, firm performance, and size pertain to 1996. Labour productivity is defined as the 
total sales over the total number of employees. Gross profit per employee is defined as the total sales less the 
costs over the total number of employees. Return on fixed assets is the total sales less the total costs over the 
fixed assets. Size stands for the fixed assets in Models 1-2 and 4-5 and the number of employees in Model 3 
and 6. All variables are industry adjusted and in logs.  
1 The interaction term equals performance measure multiplied by the controlling blockholder-type dummy 
that equals one if the corresponding type holds at least 33.4% of equity 
2 The interaction term equals performance measure multiplied by the majority-type dummy that equals one if 
the corresponding type holds more than 50% of equity 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level. 
 
weight on past performance when deciding whether to dismiss the CEO. Panel A reports 
regression results for controlling blockholders and Panel B for majority blockholders. 
In Panel A of Table 5.4, we estimate the effect of controlling blockholders (that is, 
owners holding at least a blocking majority stake of 33.4 percent). Again, we use three 
different measures of performance: labour productivity (Model 1), gross profit per 
employee (Model 2) and return on fixed assets (Model 3). The only ownership variable 
that is significant (in two regressions out of the three) is the one for IPFs – enterprises that 
have an IPF as a controlling blockholder are more likely to replace their CEO after poor 




performance. After controlling for ownership effects, the coefficient on labour 
productivity (Model 1) becomes (tough it remains negative) insignificant for the reference 
category – firms without a controlling blockholder. Apparently, the negative relation 
between labour productivity and CEO turnover documented in Panel B of Table 5.3 is 
largely due to the behaviour of IPFs in controlling-blockholder positions.97 For other 
ownership types, labour productivity in previous year does not seem to influence CEO 
turnover.  
Panel B of Table 5.4 – where we analyze the impact of majority ownership categories 
on the relationship between performance and CEO turnover – provides a different picture. 
The interaction term for the IPF presence turns insignificant, which is probably due to the 
fact that only a few enterprises have an IPF holding more than 50 percent of equity. This 
conclusion is supported also by the fact that the plain coefficient estimate for labour 
productivity is significantly negative in Model 4 whereas it is not significant in Model 1 
(in Panel B, the reference category now includes also firms that have a controlling 
blockholder as the largest owner but not a majority blockholder). In contrast, the 
coefficient estimate for corporate ownership is positive in two regressions and significant 
when performance is measured with labour productivity. A similar pattern obtains for 
firms that are majority owned by the NPF – again, the coefficient on performance is 
positive in two regressions and significant in the one with profit per employee. All other 
ownership types have a negative but insignificant coefficient indicating that lower-than-
average labour productivity increased the probability of CEO change (because the 
coefficient estimated for performance is negative and significant for labour productivity 
and profit per employee). The exceptions are thus firms majority-owned by the 
government or corporations.  
The results in Model 5 (Table 5.4) for profit margin per employee show that low 
profitability enhances chances for CEO turnover for non-majority owned firms 
(coefficient of –0.327). This relationship disappears for firms with majority ownership.98 
                                                 
97 Not reported regression results indicate that the IPFs and individual stakeholders with a controlling stake 
change their CEOs more often. 
98 This result is confirmed in an unreported regression with one interaction term between profit margin per 
employee and a dummy variable for all majority owners. The corresponding coefficient is 0.46 and is 
significant at the 10 percent level. The overall performance effect of majority ownership is then 0.13 (0.46 – 




This result indicates that owners with relatively less power (non-majority-owned) tend to 
rely on negative managerial incentives more than majority blockholders who may be more 
involved in monitoring of their firms and may have more information on what suits their 
companies the best. As Model 6 provides very little explanatory power, we conclude that 
return on fixed assets is not an important performance measure in the Czech setting. 
In summary, the evidence concerning the reasons behind CEO turnover in privatized 
Czech companies is mixed. The panel results covering the period from 1993 to 1998 (in 
Table 5.3) do not support any relationship between CEO change and prior firm 
performance. The results for managerial changes in 1997, the year when managerial 
changes were the most frequent, however, indicate that poor past performance 
(productivity and profitability) do have significant effect on the CEO change. The results 
are especially strong for non-majority-owned firms and firms owned by the IPFs. Yet, in 
the remaining years, it appears that the probability of CEO turnover is not increased by 
poor performance. 
5.6 Does CEO turnover improve performance?  
In the previous section, we analyze the relationship between prior performance and 
managerial turnover in a cross-section of firms. Another important issue pertaining to 
CEO turnover is whether changes at top managerial posts succeed in delivering better 
performance. Groves et al. (1995) argue that significant improvement in firm performance 
after the managerial change may reveal the existence of unfulfilled potential of the firm 
prior to the change of management. In other words, ex post improvement is potential 
evidence on ex ante poor managerial performance. The private owners may have superior 
information on performance of the incumbent managers and replace them when there is 
potential for improvement. To analyze this hypothesis, we estimate the following 
production function:  
ititititiit DCEOLKY εβββα ++++= 321  (2) 
where Yit stands for the total sales of firm i in year t, Kit is the firm’s capital (fixed assets), 
Lit is the number of employees, αi is the firm-specific intercept (fixed effect) and εit is the 




error term. Sales, capital and the number of employees are all industry adjusted (divided 
by the industry mean of the variable in the respective year99) to account for industry-
specific factors and are all in natural logarithms.  
The variable of interest is DCEOit, which is a dummy variable taking value of one 
following the change of the firm’s CEO. More specifically, the dummy is set to one in the 
year when the change occurred if the change took place before the end of June of that 
year, otherwise, the dummy is set to one in the subsequent year. Then, the dummy remains 
set to one henceforth.100 That is, we assume that the impact of the CEO change is a 
permanent shock rather than a temporary one. A positive coefficient estimate of β3 thus 
would imply that managerial turnover causes a positive shift in a firm’s total factor 
productivity and vice versa for a negative coefficient. Note that we only consider the first 
post-privatization CEO change. We believe the first change is crucial because, unlike the 
subsequent ones, the first CEO change embodies the transfer of ownership and assumption 
of control by the new owners. While subsequent CEO turnover may also affect 
productivity, the first post-privatization change is likely to have the strongest impact. 
As emphasized in Section 5.4, the institutional framework – in particular the nature of 
internal-control structures in place – is likely to affect the relationship between CEO 
turnover and productivity. Therefore, besides estimating equation (2), we consider an 
augmented production function with additional controls: a dummy measuring change of 
the board-of-directors (BoD) chairman, a dummy distinguishing the two forms of internal-
control structure and interaction terms between the two turnover dummies and 
characteristics of the prevailing internal-control structure. The augmented production 










4321  (2’) 
where STRONGi stands for a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is strong (i.e. the 
CEO is simultaneously the chairman or deputy chairman of the BoD). We use this variable 
as a proxy for the first type of internal-control arrangements of firms depicted in Figure 
                                                 
99 Groves et al. (1995) also follow this procedure. 





5.1. DCBDit is a dummy variable indicating change of the chairman of the BoD and is 
defined analogously to DCEOit. 
Table 5.5 presents regression results based on Equations (2) and (2’), estimated with 
firm-specific fixed effects and year dummies.101 Model 1 includes only the dummy for the 
change of CEO. In Model 2, in contrast, the CEO change dummy is interacted by the 
dummy for strong management, so that it only counts changes of CEO when the CEO has 
a strong position in the firm. Model 3 combines the two specifications. We denote the 
CEO as strong when he also holds the position of the chairman or deputy chairman of the 
BoD as these are the key control positions with legal responsibilities for the firm’s 
actions.102  
In Models 1 and 2, CEO turnover leads to better subsequent performance but the effect 
is statistically significant only when the CEO is strong. Thus, the institutional framework 
is indeed important – replacing a CEO who does not hold real executive power, not 
surprisingly, does not affect firm performance significantly. In contrast, replacing a strong 
CEO raises total factor productivity on average by 5.5 percent (note that because of the 
way how the CEO change dummy is constructed, this is the average permanent gain over 
all subsequent years).  
Model 3 again introduces the interaction term between CEO change and the internal-
control structure in the firm, this time alongside the CEO-change dummy. Hence, the 
coefficient estimated for the CEO-change dummy indicates the effect of CEO turnover in 
firms without a strong CEO, whereas the coefficient for the interaction term captures the 
additional effect of replacing a strong CEO. Again, CEO change does not deliver 
significant increase in performance unless the CEO enjoys a relatively strong position. 
The measured effect of replacing a strong CEO is again more than 5 percent.103 In short, 
                                                 
101 The Hausman test indicates that fixed effects are appropriate in these models. 
102 Defining the strong CEO as one who is simultaneously a member of the BoD (i.e. not necessarily 
chairman or deputy chairman) leads to almost identical results, though the significance of the interaction 
term is slightly lower. 
103 The magnitude of the strong-CEO effect can be computed as the sum of coefficients corresponding to the 
CEO dummy and the interaction term.  




post-CEO-change productivity is higher only in firms where the CEO has a relatively 
powerful position.104 
 
TABLE 5.5: IMPACT OF CEO/CBD TURNOVER ON PRODUCTIVITY, 1993-98 
Panel A Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Capital (fixed assets) 0.351 *** 0.349 *** 0.349 *** 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Labour (# employees) 0.534 *** 0.534 *** 0.533 *** 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  
Change of CEO 0.023    -0.020  
 (0.020)    (0.028)  
Change of CEO * strong CEO   0.055 ** 0.072 ** 
   (0.024)  (0.033)  
Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2 0.73  0.73  0.73 
Panel B Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
Capital (fixed assets) 0.348 *** 0.347 *** 0.349 *** 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Labour (# employees) 0.530 *** 0.531 *** 0.532 *** 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  
Change of CEO   0.003    
   (0.030)    
Change of CEO * strong CEO   0.031  0.039  
   (0.038)  (0.025)  
Change of CBD  -0.040  -0.035    
 (0.025)  (0.027)    
Change of CBD * Strong CEO 0.083 *** 0.071 ** 0.043 ** 
 (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.022)  
Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2 0.73  0.73  0.73 
Notes: Estimated by OLS, fixed effects included in both regressions. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Number of observations is 4920. The dependent variable is the total sales. Sales, capital and labor are 
industry adjusted and in logs, sales and capital are in constant prices of 1993. CBD stands for chairman of 
the Board of Directors.  The dummy for CEO (CBD) change equals one in the year of the first post-
privatization change and in all subsequent years. Strong CEO dummy is equal one in firms where the CEO is 
at the same time also a chairman or a deputy chairman of the BoD. 
 
Panel B of Table 5.5 presents results obtained with various permutations of the 
augmented production function depicted in Equation (2’). Model 4 reports results of a 
                                                 
104 It should be noted, however, that the choice of particular internal-control arrangement could be a 
consequence of power division between shareholders. Thus, one should ideally control also for ownership 




regression that only considers changes at the post of the chairman of the BoD. The results 
are analogous to those for CEO turnover. Replacing the BoD chairman increases (total-
factor) productivity only when top management and the board of directors are closely 
interconnected. The measured impact on productivity is slightly lower now, on average 
4.3 percent. In contrast, replacing a BoD chairman who holds executive powers but does 
not actively participate in day-to-day management of the firm’s affairs has little effect (the 
coefficient is in fact negative, although it is not significant).  
Model 5 reports results of a regression that considers changes at both posts, CEO as 
well as BoD chairman (note that even when the CEO is simultaneously also the BoD 
chairman, a change at one post does not necessarily stipulate a change at the other).105 
Only replacing the BoD chairman when management is strong has a significant effect on 
productivity. This finding is confirmed also by the regression reported as Model 6, which 
only counts changes at the posts of CEO and BoD chairman with strong management. 
This is in line with the logic of the legal framework – executive authority rests with the 
board of directors, not the management. Replacing the BoD chairman shifts productivity 
again by approximately 4 percent in Models 5 and 6.  
At this point, it is important to highlight again that the CEO change (and BoD 
chairman) dummy we have used throughout our analysis measures the effect of the first 
CEO (BoD chairman) change in a given company. In order to check for consistency of our 
results we re-estimated all models using a dummy that measures the last CEO change. The 
results remain basically unchanged. The same applies to the BoD chairman dummy. 
In summary, our results suggest that changes in top managerial positions and in the 
board of directors improve enterprise productivity only when the management is relatively 
strong and is closely linked with the BoD. When comparing the impact of replacing the 
CEO and the BoD chairman, we find that only the latter causes a significantly positive 
shift in (total-factor) productivity. In contrast, replacing either the CEO or the BoD 
chairman does not improve productivity when the management is relatively weak and 
separate from the BoD.  
                                                 
105 In fact, only in 10 percent of CEO changes the same person was dismissed from the post of CBD at the 
same time.  





In this chapter, we analyze the economic background of CEO changes in voucher-
privatized enterprises in the Czech Republic immediately after the transfer of ownership. 
The analysis is carried out with a panel of 917 Czech corporations privatized by the 
voucher method, with the data spanning the period from 1993 to 1998, that is, the first 6 
years after their privatization. The results are threefold. First, the evidence concerning the 
relation between prior performance and top managerial turnover in the newly privatized 
firms is mixed. We find that across the entire data set, past firm performance does not 
significantly affect the probability of CEO change. Nevertheless, performance effect turns 
out significant as a determinant of CEO changes in 1997, some 3-4 years after the 
privatization, especially in firms without concentrated control and those with IPF 
ownership. This may stem from the fact that more concentrated stakeholders are more 
involved in running of their companies and have, consequently, more information 
concerning qualities of the incumbent managers. Thus, they may replace their managers 
when there is a potential for performance improvement even though the firm’s relative 
performance (compared to other firms in the same industry) does not suggest 
underperformance. Our second finding confirms this proposition. When comparing 
productivity before and after managerial change, we find that CEO change indeed delivers 
a positive shift in (total factor) productivity. This suggest that the new private owners act 
on their superior information regarding the unfulfilled potential for efficiency 
improvement of their firms and are able to appoint managers whose human capital better 
matches the firm’s productive assets. Finally, our third result is that the positive effect of 
CEO turnover is significant only when the CEO has a relatively strong position within the 
firm and is closely linked with the board of directors (which is ultimately responsible for 
all business affairs of the company). When considering turnover at the position of the 
chairman of the board of directors, our findings are similar – change of the BoD chairman 
improves productivity only when the BoD and management are closely linked. In contrast, 
replacement of the CEO or chairman of the board does not improve productivity when the 
management is relatively weak and is not part of the BoD which assumes the executive 




former SOEs in the Czech Republic are active in looking for new managers with better 
human capital who, consequently, improve productivity of their firms. 
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Chapter 6  








The ultimate objective of economic reforms in transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe has been to put in place a functional market system, increase production 
efficiency and improve living standards of its citizens. One of the principal areas of the 
reforms has been enterprise restructuring. That is, introduce and complete the process that 
transforms the unviable, loss making planned-economy enterprises into vigorous, 
competitive entities, the process that enables firms to operate successfully in a market 
economy (Ernst, 1996).  
This is, in fact, an extremely complex process that is not entirely unique to companies 
in transition. Companies all over the world constantly face the challenge of maintaining 
their efficiency, competitiveness, and profitability. They are constantly under pressure to 
improve and restructure in order to survive (Demsetz, 1983). Why is then restructuring of 
the former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in transition so special? First of all, the extent 
of distortions in the SOEs after the era of the planned economy is incomparable to 
problems experienced in private firms in a functioning market economy. Managers of the 
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SOEs in a command economy were facing incentive schemes that have not motivated 
them to maintain profitability and adjust production towards the efficient frontier. 
Consequently, a restructuring of immense magnitude has been needed in the SOEs across 
the region. Furthermore, all these adjustments ought to be done simultaneously within a 
relatively short period of time. This time concentration of restructuring in a majority of 
firms in the region makes the process even more complicated and complex with 
significant macroeconomic consequences. Finally, managers and new private owners of 
the former SOEs do not often possess enough experience, expertise, and financial 
resources to carry out such an important, difficult, and multidimensional task like the 
restructuring of an old command-economy dinosaur. These three attributes make the 
restructuring process in transition unique and motivate many researchers to explore it and 
gain new knowledge. 
At the onset of the reforms, the sequencing of reforms especially that of privatization 
and restructuring was the focus of discussions. Experience with privatization projects in 
the Western Europe showed convincingly that private enterprises perform better than state 
owned enterprises (Hutchinson, 1991, Megginson et al, 1994, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
This evidence motivated, on the one hand, the advocates of a big bang approach (Lipton 
and Sachs, 1990, Blanchard et al., 1991), who argued that only private ownership would 
put in place proper incentives for enterprises to restructure. Therefore, they stressed the 
importance of speedy privatization. On the other hand, the supporters of a gradual reform 
(Roland, 1994, among others) insisted that privatization per se is not the remedy for the 
problems of the SOEs. Accordingly, while privatization is important, a healthy financial 
system imposing hard-budget constraints on the enterprises is a necessary prerequisite of 
enterprise restructuring.  
Several studies focused on the strategies that SOEs followed in order to survive and 
become competitive (see, for example, Grosfeld and Roland, 1995, Carlin and 
Landesmann, 1997). Case-study evidence (Carlin et al., 1995, Barberis et al., 1996, 
Aghion et al., 1994) documents that the SOEs pursued some restructuring already in the 
pre-privatization period. It helped them to cope with the bad existing situation. The 
evidence indicates that managers of these enterprises undertook measures to reduce costs. 




However, arguments were raised that this was just an adjustment106 instead of forward-
looking ‘real’ restructuring (Blanchard, 1997). The latter type of restructuring, also called 
strategic or deep restructuring, entailing activities based on a ‘thoughtful business strategy 
leading to a profound redeployment of assets’ (Grosfeld and Roland, 1995) was found 
only in companies privatized by a foreign investor (Carlin and Aghion, 1996).  
Frydman et al. (1999) analyzing the effect of privatization in three Central European 
economies (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) argue that what matters is not only 
privatization as such, but also the type of owner to whom it gives control. In particular, 
when the effect of privatization in general is measured, one reaches the misleading 
conclusion that privatization in itself is good for the enterprises. However, distinguishing 
particular types of owners reveals that only foreign investors and private domestic 
financial firms perform better than state. To the contrary, insiders do not perform better 
than the state. 
The literature dealing with the activities of firms after privatization focuses almost 
exclusively on the relationship between improved performance on the one hand, and 
ownership structure, on the other (Claessens, 1997, Earle, 1998, and Djankov and Murrell, 
2002, among others). The general conclusion of the studies is again that privatization per 
se is not enough in order to secure improved performance. Foreign ownership proved to 
consistently outperform the other types of private investors. The common approach of 
these papers is that they regress some measure of performance on ownership or 
ownership-concentration dummies. Thus, they document the relationship between 
particular types of new owners and (improved) performance. To my knowledge, however, 
none of the studies so far, tried to analyze what it is that the successful types of owners do 
that distinguishes them from the unsuccessful owners. In this paper, I would like to 
document the restructuring activities in firms after privatization and, in particular, show 
which specific restructuring activities induced improved performance of the firms.107 The 
need to explore the sources of restructuring was stressed, for example, by Earle and Estrin 
(1998).  
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This paper analyzes the channels of restructuring in a panel of 750 former SOEs 
privatized in the Czech voucher privatization. It identifies the activities, which have had a 
positive effect on productivity (performance) of the former SOEs since 1993, the year of 
the transfer of ownership rights after the first wave of the voucher privatization, until 
1998. The main findings of the present analysis are fourfold. First, asset sale, employee 
incentives, and CEO change are associated with improvements in enterprise productivity. 
Second, fixed asset investments of the SOEs have negative effect on productivity. Third, 
availability of bank loans does not have any effect on productivity, which can be 
interpreted as indication of soft budget constraint imposed on the companies. Finally, the 
results do not offer any support for presence of efficient inventory management in the 
companies. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, the aggregate 
developments with respect to restructuring in the Czech Republic are reviewed. The 
hypotheses about potential restructuring channels are discussed in Section 6.3. The data 
are introduced in Section 6.4. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 discuss methodology and main results, 
respectively. Whereas Section 6.7 concludes and outlines suggestions for further research. 
6.2 Aggregate developments in the Czech Republic 
The transfer of ownership from state to private hands together with increased 
competition and the hardening of the budget constraint have long been regarded as the 
major determinants of enterprise performance and efficiency. The disciplining role of 
these three mechanisms was acknowledged not only for market economies, but even more 
so for transition economies (Earle and Estrin, 1998). Therefore, the reforms were designed 
as to accomplish the liberalization of prices and trade, the reduction of state subsidies and 
bailouts and also the privatization of SOEs.  
In the Czech Republic, price and trade liberalization was introduced early in the 
transition process. According to the EBRD Transition Report 1998, the Czech Republic, 




along with Hungary, has progressed furthest in term of overall liberalization, reaching an 
average liberalization index of 3.63.108  
Privatization policy also reflected the government’s commitment to the reforms. As 
documented in Chapter 4, the privatization program resulted in a swift transfer of property 
rights. In the period from 1990 till 1993, a centralized economy with 96.7 percent of 
output produced by SOEs was transformed into an economy with 67 percent of output 
produced by ‘private’ firms. However, many doubts have been expressed about the ability 
of new owners, predominantly investment privatization funds, to improve performance of 
the former SOEs. As Coffee (1996) points out, many of the most important IPFs acquired 
a stake in the main Czech banks, which in turn controlled the IPFs. This phenomenon 
resulted in a strange and non-transparent system of cross-ownership between the major 
banks and the IPFs. Furthermore, the IPFs were regarded as neither the optimal nor final 
owners because of their lack of access to finance for restructuring and inadequate 
expertise (Carlin and Aghion, 1996), and therefore additional reshuffling of ownership 
was said to be desirable.109 
The implementation of the hard-budget constraint is ambiguous. On the one hand, state 
subsidies were abolished early in the transition process. On the other hand, the 
government’s policy toward bankruptcies and bank-bailouts was rather ‘soft.’ First, the 
incidence of bankruptcies in the Czech Republic has been very low compared to Hungary 
or Poland. The government evidently protected insolvent firms against bankruptcy. 
Second, the problems of large state banks with high ratio of classified loans were solved 
by state bailouts rather then by bank privatization. Hence, the credit policies of major 
banks did not harden the budget constraint of the SOEs, rather the opposite was the case.  
In contrast to Poland and Hungary, no particular restructuring program was 
implemented. It was generally expected that changes in ownership together with 
increasingly competitive environment would evoke and improve efficiency. Consequently, 
                                                 
108 The EBRD assesses progress in eight areas: large-scale and small-scale privatization, 
governance/enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange liberalization, 
competition policy, banking reform and securities markets. The indicators take values from 1 (little progress) 
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two questions arise. First, how has the Czech economy performed relative to the other 
leading transition economies in Europe? Second, has privatization alone been sufficient in 
achieving effective ownership structures leading to deep restructuring in the Czech 
Republic? In the present study, the latter question is addressed. Nevertheless, although the 
former question is not the subject of this paper, it is informative to look at the 
development of some aggregate economic indicators in the Czech Republic, and compare 
it to the development in Hungary and Poland. 
Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of real GDP in the three countries. In order to get the 
correct perspective, time was measured as the number of years since the beginning of 
reforms. For Poland and Hungary, 1990 is considered to be the first year of transition, 
whereas 1991 is the starting point for the Czech Republic (cf. Blanchard, 1997). During 
the first years of transition, the Czech economy was performing relatively well. GDP did 
not drop as low as in the other two countries, and started to recover in the third year, in 
1993. However, GDP growth has deteriorated in the more recent years, in particular, since 
1996. Moreover, it became negative in 1998. In contrast, the Polish economy has 
experienced more dynamic growth. 
 
FIGURE 6.1: DEVELOPMENT OF GDP 
 
 Notes: In constant prices of 1990. 1990 is considered to be the first year of transition in Poland and 
Hungary, 1991 in the Czech Republic. Correspondingly, GDP in 1989 = 100% in Poland and Hungary; 





















FIGURE 6.2: AGGREGATE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Notes: In constant prices of 1990. 1990 is considered to be the first year of transition in Poland and 
Hungary, 1991 in the Czech Republic. Correspondingly, GDP per worker in 1989 = 100% in Poland and 
Hungary; GDP per worker in 1990 = 100% in the Czech Republic. 
 
Figure 6.2, giving the evolution of aggregate labour productivity,110 might indicate the 
reason for low dynamics of Czech GDP growth. Czech aggregate labour productivity 
performance was poor when compared to Poland and Hungary. This suggests that firms 
across the Czech Republic have not been as flexible in terms of labour shedding as firms 
in the two other countries. The poor labour productivity growth in the Czech Republic 
perhaps reflects soft governmental policy towards bankruptcies and bank bailouts as well 
as low bank discipline.  
Also, the development of fixed capital formation has not been as dramatic in the Czech 
Republic as in Hungary or Poland. This might suggest low long-term orientation, and 
hence low level of restructuring in the Czech Republic.  
6.3 Enterprise restructuring: hypotheses and previous evidence  
The aggregate data discussed in the previous section suggest that the Czech economy 
encountered some problems, which led to a slow down of its aggregate output and labour 
productivity growth since mid 1994. Many observers believe that one of the main reasons 
                                                 
110 Aggregate labour productivity was computed as GDP in constant prices divided by the number of 



















behind the slow down of transformation is slow microeconomic restructuring (Dlouhy, 
1999). In order to provide more profound conclusion about the extent of restructuring at 
the micro level, it is necessary to examine firm level data. 
Earle and Estrin (1998, p. 14) point out that, “[t]he impact of competition, ownership, 
and budget constraints on labour productivity may […] work through several channels, 
including actions to enhance efficiency by reducing input waste, to increase sales […], 
and to augment the quantity and quality of the capital stock and improve the technology 
through new investment.” To identify these channels in the privatized Czech SOEs is the 
main aim of the present paper. In particular, the paper identifies restructuring activities the 
new private owners pursue in order to induce higher productivity of their companies.111 In 
other words, the paper provides answer to the question whether certain patterns of 
restructuring activities prevail in successful firms as opposed to poorly performing firms. 
The production function framework augmented by additional variables measuring the 
effect of restructuring activities is used for this purpose.  
Studies on enterprise restructuring in transition (e.g. Carlin et al., 1995, Grosfeld and 
Roland, 1995, and Pohl et al., 1997) document that companies have engaged in a wide 
variety of restructuring activities before as well as after privatization. In order to simplify 
the analysis and to generalize the findings, Carlin et al. (1995) handle restructuring as 
actions taken along four main dimensions. The first dimension entitled internal 
organization encompasses activities associated with getting rid of unproductive assets, 
such as unbundling and shedding of social assets (e.g. social housing, catering, or day-care 
facilities). The second dimension groups activities concerning employment policies (e.g. 
labour shedding, wage differentiation), the third dimension concerns output-related 
activities, such as introduction of a marketing department, changes in product mix. 
Finally, the fourth dimension concerns new investment into productive assets (e.g. in 
wholesale network, capital equipment). The strategy of categorizing restructuring 
activities into several groups proves useful also in Kang and Shivdasani (1997), a study on 
restructuring in underperforming Japanese corporations. The latter study uses seven 
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categories of restructuring activities,112 however, most of them correspond to the 
categories used in Carlin et al. (1995).  
In the present analysis, I use a categorization of restructuring obtained by combining 
the two above-mentioned studies. The set of restructuring types used here consists of five 
categories. They include all four dimensions used in Carlin et al. (1995), which correspond 
to the fist four groups of Kang and Shivdasani (1997), plus a category reflecting changes 
in control (the firth category in the latter study).113 The five categories used here are 
labelled according to Kang and Shivdasani (1997). Each of the following subsections is 
devoted to one of the dimensions and contains a discussion of the expected effect of the 
corresponding dimension on company productivity. 
6.3.1 Asset contraction policies 
This dimension of restructuring activities refers to the sale of assets, spin-offs of units, 
and plant closures. For a large socialist-type SOE, all of these activities may be an 
important source of performance improvement. In order to improve efficiency, it is 
desirable to downsize, sell the least productive assets, and focus on the most profitable 
products (Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). All of these activities are also used in companies in 
market economies. Kang and Shivdasani (1997) report that 23 percent of the Japanese and 
49 percent of the American companies in their sample114 undertook an activity along this 
restructuring dimension. The main reason why a Japanese or U.S. company may decide to 
adopt an asset contracting policy is that some of the firm’s operations could have become 
economically unviable. However, many of the SOEs’ assets accumulated over the socialist 
times are by definition unviable or unprofitable. Social assets (e.g. day care centers, 
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113 The remaining two categories of the latter study are not covered here. The ‘miscellaneous actions’ 
category is too heterogeneous, and I believe the activities covered there play only a minor role in the total 
effect of restructuring. To the contrary, the ‘external control activity’ category, including for example block 
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114 Their sample consists of 92 Japanese manufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and 114 
U.S. manufacturing firms listed on the New York American Stock Exchanges during 1986 to 1990. Sample 
firms had a ratio of pretax operating income to assets that exceeds the industry median in a given year and 





recreational facilities) may serve as an example. Hence the need to use this kind of 
restructuring and its positive effect on productivity/performance is even more profound in 
the case of a former state-owned enterprise facing a new, changed environment. 
The privatization policy adopted in the Czech Republic had a special effect concerning 
restrictions on assets sales, which deserves to be mentioned here. In particular, the Czech 
government decided to forbid asset sales in the companies until after the privatization 
(Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). The main reason was that privatization was regarded to be of 
higher priority and importance than restructuring. At the same time, this regulation served 
as an insurance against unfair dealings of managers immediately before privatization when 
they were relatively independent and with limited supervision. On the other hand, the 
program explicitly encouraged split-ups, which was reflected in a remarkable increase in 
the number of enterprises just before approval of privatization projects.115  
These facts have obvious consequences for the present analysis. Since so many split-
ups and hardly any asset sales occurred prior to the privatization, one can, without a 
substantial loss of information, focus only on asset sales when analyzing the restructuring 
activities in the companies after their privatization. 
6.3.2 Changes in employment policies 
Changes in employment policies include employee layoffs, wage differentiation or 
changes in incentive (compensation) schemes, and other actions that significantly affect 
the composition or compensation of the firm’s employees.  
Since labour hoarding was endemic in companies in planned economies, the need for 
labour shedding in the SOEs was obvious at the beginning of reforms (Pohl et al., 1997, 
Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). It was even strengthened by severe demand and price shocks 
resulting in significant fall in sales in the first years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is 
documented that SOEs across the region (even before privatization) indeed responded to 
the fall of their sales by lowering output, and consequently by considerable decrease of 
their labour levels (Carlin et al., 1995). Pursuing this line of argumentation, a negative 
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relationship between employment change and (total factor) productivity can be expected 
in the companies where labour hoarding is still prevalent.  
I argue that the privatized Czech companies experience excess employment even in the 
period after 1993, that is, at least two years after the first transition changes. Hence, I 
argue that labour hoarding is indeed still a problem in most of the newly privatized Czech 
companies in the early post-privatization period. Primarily, one might question the extent 
of labour shedding in the Czech companies before the privatization. Low unemployment 
levels116 indicate that the companies laid off only as few employees as was necessitated by 
the fall of sales and output, but did not go any further in order to improve labour 
productivity. Consequently, after the sales of companies started to rise again, employment 
levels increased again proportionately. Of course, it might be argued that the low (in 
relation to Central European standards) unemployment was a result of faster job creation 
in the private sector. However, the problems at the end of 90s in the Czech Republic and 
revelation of existence of soft-budget constraints faced by the privatized companies rather 
suggest the first explanation (Dlouhy, 1999). Hence, I conclude that a negative effect of 
employment change on enterprise productivity can be still be conjectured even in the post-
privatization period. Unfortunately, the framework of the production function estimation 
used in this study does not allow formally testing this type of restructuring activity. 
The introduction of proper employee incentives is another restructuring activity that 
belongs to this group. The only evidence so far on the policies concerning changes in 
employee incentive schemes are case studies (Carlin et al., 1995). They document many 
examples where managers try to introduce some kind of wage differentiation. 
Furthermore, the case study evidence also documents the pressure for higher wages from 
the side of private sector forcing the SOEs not willing to lose skilled labour to increase 
wages.  
Based on these facts, a positive relationship between labour costs and productivity can 
be conjectured. The argumentation is as follows. A natural way for a firm to introduce 
performance-improving incentives for its employees is to link wages to performance. This 
in turn means a widening of wage differentials. At the same time, however, there is a 
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pressure from the private sector to increase wages of well performing employees. 
Otherwise the well performing and skilled workforce switches to the better paying private 
sector. Consequently, employee incentive schemes and wage differentiation are associated 
with an increase of the total wage bill. A further argument in favour of this conjecture is 
the low unemployment level in the Czech Republic indicating that it is generally not 
difficult to switch jobs. Hence, a positive relationship between wages and enterprise 
productivity- is hypothesized in the present analysis. 
6.3.3 Expansion policies 
Actions along the expansion policy category enhance the scope or scale of operations. 
Such actions include the construction of new plants, increased output or capital 
expenditures. 
The need for new investment (modernization of equipment or construction of new 
lines of production) in the former SOEs in transition countries was expressed in many 
studies (e.g., Blanchard, 1997, Grosfeld and Roland, 1995, and Carlin and Aghion, 1996). 
This fact is also supported by the very high obsoleteness of the firms’ fixed assets.117 At 
the same time, evidence (Carlin et al., 1996, and Zemplinerova et al., 1995) suggests that 
before 1993, the Czech SOEs undertook almost no major investment projects. 
Consequently, the need for investment in the post-privatization period is straightforward. 
Hence, I expect a positive relation between investment and productivity: the higher is the 
level of investment, the higher is the productivity of the company. 
Evidence in the literature so far does not support this positive relationship for the 
Czech economy. Carlin and Landesmann (1997) point out that the high economy-wide 
ratio of investment to value added failed to translate into rapid productivity growth in the 
Czech Republic. The relatively high levels of investment in the Czech economy puzzled 
also Blanchard (1997). Carlin and Landesmann (1997) argue that a very large initial 
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with 25 and more employees is 44,2% for 1993. The number is computed based on sectional statistics 
published by the National statistical office, and includes both newly established firms as well as former 
SOEs. Since fixed assets of new firms are by definition relatively less obsolete and there has been 
considerable growth in the number of new firms in the Czech Republic since 1991, one may imply that the 
equipment obsoleteness of the old SOEs is remarkable. 




devaluation of the national currency provided protection for all companies and thus 
enabled spreading of investment across all firms instead of its concentration in the most 
promising enterprises. Dlouhy (1999) provides another explanation. He argues that, in the 
Czech Republic, the amount of the ‘productive investment’ was relatively low, since total 
domestic investment was dominated by infrastructure and ecological investment (very 
often of mandatory nature). This fact then explains that the direct effect of investment on 
productivity could have been very weak (or even not present at all). Nevertheless, it is 
expected in the present analysis that modernization of equipment has positive effect on 
enterprise productivity. 
6.3.4 Changes in control 
The issue of changes in the top management and their association with improved 
performance is quite elaborated in the literature for developed economies (for an overview 
see Jensen and Zimmermann, 1985). In general, the findings support a positive 
relationship between changes in the top management and corporate performance or market 
valuation. However, in transition economies, the managerial labour market, the market for 
corporate control, and also the product market are not developed enough to create proper 
motivational pressures for managers. Instead, it is believed that new private owners 
achieve efficiency improvements by appointment of better managers and introduction of 
better incentives for the managers (Roland, 2000). 
Several studies (e.g. Carlin et al., 1995, Claessens and Djankov, 1999) document that 
the market for managers is still underdeveloped in transition countries, and quality of 
managerial skills of the available managers is quite low. A survey of managerial positions 
conducted by Aspect kilcullen s. r. o.118 illustrates the situation in the Czech Republic. 
According to this study, almost all incumbent managers (in 1995) were native Czechs. 
Only 5 percent of them had foreign university education, and less than 10 percent had 
some type of managerial education. Furthermore, a vast majority of the managers (around  
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90 percent) were appointed to the position in the pre-privatization period and survived also 
the change of ownership.  
Furthermore, the literature provides a limited support for the hypothesis that bringing 
in new human capital is important in improving enterprise performance (for example, 
Barberis et al., 1996, Groves et al., 1995).119 In the present analysis, I expect a positive 
shift in productivity after a change of the top manager.  
6.3.5 Changes in internal organization 
Internal reorganizations involve a restructuring without downsizing or enhancement of 
scale of the firms operations (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997). Examples of such activities 
include cost-cutting efforts, incorporating technological advances, changing production 
methods, or lowering of inventory levels. Many activities along this category are difficult 
to measure, in fact they often require development of qualitative rather than quantitative 
measures. These reasons together with data availability force me to focus only on 
inventory management here. As mentioned already in the sections above, resource 
wastage was endemic for the planned-economy enterprises (Carlin et al., 1995). Thus, a 
better inventory management should be one of the restructuring activities bring up better 
company performance. I conjecture that decreasing inventory levels are associated with 
increased productivity. 
6.4 Data 
The data used in the present analysis were purchased from Aspect kilcullen s.r.o., a 
consulting firm specializing in collecting accounting and trading data of firms traded at the 
Czech capital market. The database contains information on 1748 Czech firms. Several 
requirements were imposed on firms to be included into my sample. In particular, the 
sample contains only non-financial firms privatized via the voucher method for which 
financial report entries, information on CEO change, and data concerning number of 
                                                 
119 Barberis et al. confirm this hypothesis on a sample of privatized Russian shops. Since the entities studied 
are not representative for the whole population of enterprises, generalization of the findings may not be 
possible. 




employees is available for at least 4 years over the period from 1993 to 1998. In this way, 
I ended up with an unbalanced panel of 750 firms with 3220 observations. 
Average values of basic indicators characterizing the firms over the whole time span 
and separately for each of the years are presented in Table 6.1 and Table 6.3, respectively. 
Table 6.2 lists the definitions of the variables used in the previous tables. The basic 
indicators reveal wide variation among the firms. The book value of total fixed assets of 
an average firm over the studied period (expressed in prices of 1993) was slightly more 
than CZK 800 million (approximately USD 28 million120). In general, the value of fixed 
assets increased steadily over the studied period. Average sales were CZK 934 million, 
with an increasing trend. Average employment was approximately 930 people. The total 
labour force was decreasing till 1996, thereafter increased slightly. One employee was 
able to produce CZK 1.03 million worth of sales (sale efficiency in constant prices of 
1993) and was on average paid CZK 136 thousand per year (labour costs per employee). 
Sale efficiency was growing steadily, from CZK 0.96 million per employee in 1993 to 
CZK 1.12 million in 1998 (in constant prices of 1993). The wage bills of the companies 
were increasing in real terms over the whole period, though, with a decreasing rate. On 
average, the firms earned a gross margin of CZK 300 million, which constitutes  
  
TABLE 6.1: BASIC STATISTICS FOR THE WHOLE TIME SPAN 1993-98 
 units # of obs. mean st. dev. min max 
total sales1 mill. CZK 3220 934.44 2,725.11 0.140 46,400.0 
sale efficiency1 mill. CZK 3220 1.03 1.24 0.001 19.7 
gross margin1 mill. CZK 3171 300.96 1,256.67 -1,716 28,200.0 
labour 3220 927.54 2,187.99 7 34,147.0 
capital1 mill. CZK 3220 803.08 5,308.79 0.144 123,000.0
asset sale 3220 0.104 0.975 -0.036 51.636 
labour cost1 mill. CZK 3220 126.01 374.05 0.001 6,310.5 
labour cost change  3220 1.131 0.601 0.000 16.010 
capital expenditures 3220 0.121 1.081 0.000 52.497 
inventories 3220 0.110 0.107 -0.288 0.658 
inventories change  3220 0.002 0.032 -0.660 0.307 
bank 3220 0.171 0.148 0.000 0.884 
Notes: Definitions of the variables are listed in Table 6.3. Growth variables defined as follows: change=vart / 
var t-1. 1 values are in constant prices of 1993. Logarithmic transformation is used in the regressions. 
                                                 





TABLE 6.2: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Description 
total sales total sales in const. prices (log) 
sale efficiency total sales in const. prices / # of employees (log) 
gross margin (total sales – cost of sales) in const. prices (log) 
labour number of employees (log) 
capital book value of total fixed assets in cost. prices (log) 
asset sale book value of fixed assets sold / total fixed assets 
labour cost price adjusted wages and wage taxes (log, lagged) 
labour cost change wages and wage taxes / wages and wage taxes lagged 
capital expenditures increase in fixed assets / total fixed assets 
inventory level raw material or supplies level / current assets 
inventory change raw material or supplies change over year / current assets 
bank book value of bank loans / total assets 
CEO change dummy variable that is set to one following a CEO change  
 
approximately one third of their total sales. This indicates a quite low profitability level of 
the firms in the sample. Moreover, the gross margin was declining from CZK 448 million 
in 1994 to 270 million in 1998 (in constant prices of 1993). 
On average, the firms in our sample sold 10 percent of their fixed assets per year. 
Table 6.3 indicates an increasing trend of asset sales, with a peak in 1996 when 16 percent 
of the firms’ fixed assets were sold. This indicates that firms were quite active in their 
asset contraction policies. To the contrary, capital expenditures constituted, on average, 12 
percent of total fixed assets every year. Generally, capital expenditures experience a 
declining trend, with only 6 percent of fixed assets in 1998. Nevertheless, firms seem to 
invest into fixed assets relatively the same amount as they divest. Bank loans represented 
17 percent of total company assets. The firms slightly increased the funds borrowed from 
banks from 16 percent to 18 percent of their assets over 1994-98. 
In summary, the basic statistics in Tables 6.1 and 6.3 indicate that the privatized firms 
increased their performance and productivity in the 5-6 years following their privatization. 
The tables also document some restructuring efforts of the firms concerning asset 
contraction, labour shedding, investment and managerial turnover. 





TABLE 6.3: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE MAIN VARIABLES BY YEARS 
 units 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
number of observations  478 709 741 657 635 
total sales1 mill. CZK 1,085.22 877.13 853.36 941.65 972.08 
  (2,975.46) (2,605.39) (2,552.39) (2,738.43) (2,840.89) 
sale efficiency1 mill. CZK 0.96 0.97 1.01 1.09 1.12 
  (1.10) (1.11) (1.14) (1.36) (1.43) 
gross margin1 mill. CZK 448.05 303.20 261.43 262.92 270.82 
  (1,621.81) (1,246.13) (1,181.90) (1,117.44) (1,159.22) 
labour  1,189.63 891.49 867.13 883.86 886.17 
  (2,551.97) (2,065.14) (2,130.74) (2,162.30) (2,108.55) 
capital1 mill. CZK 892.09 704.37 732.39 833.23 897.58 
  (4,876.77) (4,529.09) (5,010.09) (5,705.85) (6,267.15) 
asset sale  0.050 0.067 0.161 0.117 0.105 
  (0.130) (0.147) (1.911) (0.574) (0.425) 
labour cost1 mill. CZK 140.25 113.48 117.82 130.39 134.30 
  (372.36) (336.28) (360.47) (402.86) (399.60) 
labour cost change  1.294 1.144 1.130 1.099 1.031 
  (1.236) (0.334) (0.362) (0.568) (0.204) 
capital expenditures  0.136 0.142 0.107 0.161 0.063 
  (0.911) (0.777) (0.409) (2.064) (0.164) 
inventories  0.098 0.118 0.122 0.109 0.099 
  (0.116) (0.118) (0.105) (0.095) (0.098) 
inventories change  0.006 0.013 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 
  (0.038) (0.037) (0.028) (0.033) (0.019) 
bank  0.157 0.162 0.177 0.178 0.177 
  (0.127) (0.141) (0.147) (0.156) (0.162) 
Notes: Number of observations for profit margin is 478, 709, 738, 654, and 592 for the years 1993-98, 
respectively. Standard deviations in brackets. Definitions of the variables are listed in Table 6.3. Growth 
variables defined as follows: change=vart / var t-1. 1 values are in constant prices of 1993. Logarithmic 
transformation is used in the regressions. 
6.5 Methodology 
A wide variety of measures of performance improvement in companies in transition 
countries have been used in the relevant literature. The prevalently used measure is the 
labour productivity, defined as real sales per employee (Earle and Estrin, 1998, Pohl et al., 
1997, Frydman et al., 1998, and Linz and Krueger, 1998, among others). Usually, 





use labour productivity level instead of change, arguing that because of hyperinflation and 
massive changes in relative prices, productivity growth is hard to measure (Earle and 
Estrin, 1998).  
In the present study, a production function framework is used to assess the 
performance-improving effect of different restructuring activities. This is a standard 
method used in the empirical IO literature (see for example Nickell, 1996) that allows 
connecting the assessed effects (coefficients) of individual restructuring activities with the 
total factor productivity. At the same time, it is still comparable to the common measures 
mentioned above. The basic regression equation has the following form: 
log Yit = αi + β1 log Kit + β2 log Lit + Restit γ+ εit (1) 
where Yit represents the total price adjusted sales of firm i in year t, Kit stands for the firm 
price adjusted capital (fixed assets), Lit is the labour (number of employees), αi is the firm-
specific constant (fixed effect), and εit is the error term. The basic production function 
framework is augmented by variables measuring the restructuring activities in firms. In 
equation (1), they are represented by the matrix Restit. Consequently, γ represents a vector 
of the coefficients of interest. 
Frydman et al. (1998) highlight the importance of the revenue side of profit statements 
as the one with a much more direct relation to the entrepreneurial ability of managers to 
manoeuvre in a new environment. Moreover, the authors argue further that cost relations 
are more predictable for company insiders, and are often only a matter of will and standard 
procedures, especially if large inefficiencies are obvious. In order to follow this line of 
reasoning, I estimate another alternative of equation (1). In particular, in addition to total 
sales (price adjusted) I include also profit margin (price adjusted), as the dependent 
variable.121 
Table 6.4 lists the five basic groups of restructuring activities that are discussed in the 
hypothesis section. Moreover, the table provides the basic proxies measuring the activities 
along these dimensions, and their expected effect on firm productivity. I include bank 
loans as an additional variable into the analysis in order to measure softness of firms’ 
budget constraint. 
                                                 
121 Value added is also sometimes used as measure of output in the production-function framework (see, for 
example, Basu and Fernald, 1995). 




TABLE 6.4: CHANNELS OF RESTRUCTURING AND THEIR MEASUREMENT 
Channel of restructuring Variable  Expected effect on 
performance 
Asset contraction policies Asset sale positive 
Changes in employment policies: 
employee incentives 
 
Labour cost, lagged 



















Fund availability / soft budget constraint Bank loans ? 
Notes: Definitions of all the variables are listed in Table 6.3. A question mark indicates that the relationship 
is ambiguous. 
 
Equation (1) is estimated using fixed-effects panel regressions. This method of 
estimation provides better estimators than simple OLS (and random-effects estimates) 
when the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term. It is quite probable that 
there is correlation between unobservable individual characteristics of the firms (which are 
captured by the error term of the OLS regression), and some of the explanatory variables 
in my data set. For example, a good manager (individual effect) could be more able to 
attract skilled employees and differentiate wages (labour cost is explanatory variable). 
Therefore, if OLS were used, coefficient estimates would be biased. In particular, in the 
case of the correlation between wages and managerial abilities, the effect of wages on firm 
performance would be overestimated. A fixed-effects model can solve the problem of 
correlation. In the fixed effects model, the differences across firms are captured by the 
differences in constant term (see Greene, 1993, pp. 444-485 as a general reference on 
panel-data regressions). Hence, the part of the error term causing correlation with the 
explanatory variables is taken out and included in the regression as a set of individual 






Table 6.5 summarizes the regression estimates. The first two columns correspond to 
equation (1) with logarithm of total sales in constant prices as the dependent variable. The 
model in the first column includes time dummies, while the second model (in the second 
column) includes a separate dummy for each industry-year to correct for possible industry 
biases. The last two columns correspond to similar models with profit margin as the 
dependent variable. The Hausman test (not reported) suggests that fixed-effects models 
should be used in all specifications. 
 
TABLE 6.5: FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATES 
 sales profit margin 
labour 0.272 *** 0.291 *** 0.352 *** 0.295 *** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.089)  (0.091) 
capital 0.480 *** 0.492 *** 0.464 *** 0.469 *** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.047)  (0.048) 
asset sales 0.067 *** 0.066 *** 0.052 *** 0.051 *** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)  (0.013) 
employee incentives 0.067 *** 0.069 *** 0.094 *** 0.080 *** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.022)  (0.022) 
fixed asset investment -0.017 ** -0.017 ** 0.013  0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)  (0.013) 
CEO change 0.073 *** 0.047 ** -0.050  0.018 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.041)  (0.043) 
inventory management 0.381 * 0.465 ** 0.639 * 0.593 
 (0.196) (0.198) (0.379)  (0.381) 
bank loan -0.009  -0.075 -0.206  -0.052 
 (0.095) (0.097) (0.275)  (0.275) 
time dummies yes  yes    
time-industry dummies  yes   yes  
number of observations 3220 3220 3171  3171 
R2 0.205 0.239 0.113  0.160 
Notes: Estimated by OLS, fixed effects included in both regressions. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Employee incentives are measured by labour cost change, inventory management by inventory level. 
Definitions of all the variables listed in Table 6.3. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level. * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
In general, these two variants of the production function show similar results (except 
for the CEO-turnover effect) leading to the same conclusions concerning the productivity 




effect of the restructuring activities. The first two columns indicate that asset sales have 
positive effect on firm productivity. This means that firms that get rid of assets (most 
probably unproductive assets) are associated with higher (total factor) productivity and 
constitutes evidence that the newly privatized firms take asset-contraction actions that lead 
to higher productivity.  
To the contrary, capital expenditures are associated with a negative effect: firms that 
enlarge their fixed-asset base perform poorer.122 This is against my expectation and 
suggests that firms do not invest in order to become more productive. The expansion 
policies do not work yet. This result may confirm the conjecture drawn by Dlouhy (1999) 
that firms invest in unproductive, ecological assets (investments of compulsory nature that 
reduce ecological damage to environment). At the same time, the finding supports the 
conclusion of Carlin and Landesmann (1997) that investment in the Czech companies is 
not distributed among companies in order to improve performance but rather scattered 
across all the firms without any effect on performance. However, one has to be careful not 
to draw very strong conclusions, as the regression estimates only the productivity effect of 
an investment over the last year. Still, it may well be that the impact of an investment 
project is spread over a longer time period or/and the impact becomes pronounced only in 
later years as it may take some time for the investment to become functional and effective. 
Employee incentives, measured by labour cost changes are found to have a 
significantly positive effect on productivity.123 Also, CEO change delivers higher 
productivity indicating that the new owners are able to appoint managers with better skills 
that more suit the productive assets of the companies. The positive coefficient documents 
a positive productivity shift caused by the managerial change: productivity after the 
change is higher compared to the pre-change productivity. Control changes are an 
effective restructuring tool. 
The coefficient corresponding to the inventory management variable has a positive 
sign, which contradicts my expectation. Decreased inventory levels should indicate better 
inventory management that should increase productivity. 
                                                 
122 The coefficient estimates in the third and fourth columns are positive but insignificant leading to the same 
conclusions. 





Finally, the results suggest that bank loans are not associated significantly with firm 
productivity. This indicates that bank loans are distributed among companies regardless of 
their performance/productivity. A positive relationship would indicate that higher 
availability of bank loans impacts productivity in a positive way: firms that are able to 
increase their bank loans consequently increase their efficiency. Hence, a positive 
coefficient would indicate that the bank funds are used in an efficient way. To the 
contrary, the estimated insignificant coefficient, at least weakly, documents the non-
existence of a hard budget constraint among the firms. It may also indicate that banks do 
not allocate their loans based on an efficiency criterion (the more productive firms get 
more loans). To the contrary, the banks rather extend (refinance) their existing loans to 
inefficient firms.124  
In summary, most of the results are in line with what is expected. Asset sales are 
positively associated with performance, positive wage changes motivate employees to 
reach higher productivity, and also CEO change improves performance. In contrast, fixed 
asset investment and inventory management have an opposite effect to what is expected. 
So, my results indicate that the privatized-firms’ activities along the expansion-policy and 
internal-reorganization dimensions are not sufficient in order to impact productivity in a 
positive away. Finally, the insignificant regression estimate for bank loans documents that 
bank loans are not related to productivity. This suggests, at least weakly, the existence of a 
soft budget constraint. 
The regression results for models in the second two columns lead to only one 
important difference that deserves mentioning. The coefficient corresponding to the CEO 
change dummy turns to be insignificant in this specification. It indicates that even though 
the new managers are able to increase (total factor) productivity, this effect turns 
insignificant once costs of goods sold are accounted for. It may lead to a conclusion that 
managers do not watch costs, they rather focus on increasing sales. In accordance with the 
argument of Frydman et al. (1998), costs should be relatively predictable. Therefore, costs 
reduction should be only a question of the will of managers. However, Nickell (1996) uses 
the effect of competition to provide another plausible explanation: an increasingly 
                                                 
124 Roland (2000) argues that this strategy may indeed be optimal for banks with a large portfolio of non-
performing loans and high prospects of bailout by the state. 




competitive environment may have profitability decreasing effect (higher competition 
means lower profit margins) but encourages efficiency improvements. Plausibly, 
competition in the Czech economy has increased since the onset of reforms. It may, in 
fact, have negative effect on profitability of firms despite their increasing productivity. 
Thus, our findings may not be contradictory: the new owners introduce new managers 
who increase productivity but increasing product-market competition causes that the profit 
gains are insignificant. 
6.7 Conclusions 
In summary, the results of the present study are fourfold. First, the study identifies that 
asset sales, employee incentives, and CEO change have a productivity improving effect. 
However, when output is measured by the profit margin (instead of total sales), the effect 
of the CEO change turns insignificant. This result may indicate that increased product-
market competition may have negative effect on profitability but still positive effect on 
productivity. 
The second main conclusion is that fixed-asset investment of the newly privatized 
firms has, contrary to my expectation, a negative effect on productivity. This finding 
supports the conjecture of Carlin and Landesmann (1997) that an investment in the Czech 
economy is dispersed among all firms and does not concentrate only in the best firms with 
the highest returns. Third, the availability of bank loans does not have any effect on 
performance, which can be interpreted as an indication that hard-budget constraint is not 
imposed on the companies. Finally, the results do not offer any support for presence of 
efficient inventory management in the companies. 
A possible implication of the present analysis is that the ownership structures may not 
be efficient in delivering deep restructuring connected with efficient investment policies. 
However, based on the results of the present study, it is not possible to draw clear and 
definitive conclusions concerning the corporate-governance structures employed by the 
companies. Further research is desirable to shed some light on the relationship between 
ownership patterns and channels of restructuring leading to improved efficiency. In 





in a similar analysis. Such an exercise might indicate how different policies in terms of 
privatization, liberalization, and enforcement of the budget constraint affect the extent and 
speed of restructuring. 
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Moerland (1997, pagina 661)125 definieert corporate governance ofwel 
vennootschappelijke besturing als “het geheel van structuren, regelingen en conventies dat 
bepalend is voor de wijze waarop en de effectiviteit waarmede een vennootschap – door 
middel van een door prikkels en tucht geregeerde interactie tussen stakeholders – wordt 
bestuurd en gecontroleerd”. Bij de vennootschappelijke besturing is een bijzondere rol 
weggelegd voor grootaandeelhouders. Hoewel vaak wordt verondersteld dat grootaandeel-
houderschap een belangrijk onderdeel vormt van het Continentaal Europese corporate 
governance bestel, is de grootaandeelhouder van toenemend belang in de Anglo-Saksische 
markteconomieën met wijder verspreiding van het aandelenbezit.  
In deze dissertatie wordt de rol van grootaandeelhouders vanuit twee gezichtspunten 
bestudeerd. In het eerste gedeelte van de dissertatie staat de rol van grootaandeelhouders 
in het Verenigd Koninkrijk centraal. Anders dan in Continentaal Europa, kent het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk een lange traditie van wijde verspreiding van het aandelenbezit. Er 
wordt gekeken naar of de koersreactie die volgt op het bericht van handel met voorkennis 
verschilt al naar gelang er een grootaandeelhouder deel uitmaakt van de 
eigendomsstructuur. Het tweede gedeelte van het proefschrift handelt over de rol van 
nieuwe particuliere eigenaren bij het herstructureren van voormalige staatsbedrijven in een 
transitie economie. In een transitie economie bestaat de noodzaak tot het doorvoeren van 
                                                 
125 Moerland, Piet W., 1997, ‘Corporate Governance: Schakering, Reikwijdte en Definiëring,’ Maandblad 
voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 71, 657-665. 




efficiency verbeteringen door kundige managers. De hoge mate van onzekerheid over de 
toekomst en informatie asymmetrie vereisen een effectieve vennootschappelijke besturing. 
Ondernemingen en hun stakeholders worden in een transitie economie geconfronteerd met 
gebrekkige markt instituties en moeten op zoek naar vervangende mechanismen (zoals 
contract naleving, reputatie, concurrentie in de product markt en de arbeidsmarkt voor 
managers). Geconcentreerd aandeelhouderschap lijkt eveneens een oplossing te bieden. 
Ondanks deze twee uiteenlopende perspectieven omtrent grootaandeelhouderschap zijn de 
twee onderdelen van het proefschrift in hoge mate complementair en verschaffen tezamen 
een diepgaande analyse van de rol van grootaandeelhouders. Hierna volgt een korte 
samenvatting van de resultaten van de twee studies. 
De belangrijkste bijdrage van het eerste gedeelte van het proefschrift is dat het twee 
onderwerpen combineert – enerzijds handel in eigen aandelen door interne aandeelhouders 
en anderzijds corporate governance. Interne aandeelhouders, gedefinieerd als managers en 
directeuren (in de Verenigde Staten ook grootaandeelhouders) beschikken vaak over 
superieure informatie over de onderneming en haar vooruitzichten in vergelijking tot 
externe minderheidsaandeelhouders. Deze informatie voorsprong kan door interne 
aandeelhouders in klinkende munt worden omgezet door te handelen in de eigen aandelen. 
Dit roept vragen op omtrent de rechtvaardigheid en efficiency van financiële markten en 
heeft geleid tot een grote hoeveelheid theoretische en empirische onderzoeken. Hoofdstuk 
2 biedt een overzicht van deze literatuur. 
Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeert de koersreactie die volgt op de bekendmaking van handel in 
eigen aandelen door directieleden in dienst van beursgenoteerde bedrijven uit het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk gedurende 1991 tot 1998. De resultaten onderschrijven eerdere 
bevindingen dat handel in eigen aandelen door directieleden nieuwe informatie verschaft 
over de toekomstige vooruitzichten van de onderneming. Zowel aankopen en verkopen 
door directieleden gaan gepaard met significante koersreacties. De koersreactie voor 
aankopen van eigen aandelen is echter hoger. De markt lijkt minder informatie inhoud toe 
te kennen aan verkopen door directieleden aangezien een gedeelte van de verkopen kan 
worden verklaard door de wens van directieleden om hun persoonlijke vermogen te 
spreiden. 




De voornaamste bijdrage aan de literatuur is echter de studie naar hoe de aanwezigheid 
van een externe grootaandeelhouder op de informatie inhoud die valt toe te kennen aan de 
handelstransacties van directieleden. Hierbij wordt gekeken of de cumulatief abnormale 
rendementen volgend op de aankondiging van een handelstransactie verschillen bij de 
aanwezigheid van verschillende soorten grootaandeelhouders. We verwachten dat 
beleggers de aanwezigheid van een grootaandeelhouders meenemen bij het reageren op de 
informatie die uitgaat van de handelstransactie van directieleden. Onze resultaten 
ondersteunen deze hypothese. Beleggers maken een onderscheid tussen 
grootaandeelhouders die toezicht houden op het management en die grootaandeelhouders 
die geen toezicht uitoefenen. Indien ondernemingen, of particuliere beleggers of families 
zonder band met het management als grootaandeelhouder fungeren, is de koersreactie die 
gepaard gaat met de aankoop en verkoop van eigen aandelen door directieleden minder 
groot. Dit doet vermoeden dat deze grootaandeelhouders de informatieasymmetrie 
mitigeren. De aanwezigheid van financiële instellingen als grootaandeelhouder heeft het 
tegenovergestelde effect: de markt reageert meer positief (negatief) volgend op aankopen 
(verkopen) van directieleden. Dit betekent dat financiële instellingen de informatie 
verschil tussen externe beleggers en interne aandeelhouders niet weten te overbruggen, 
maar dat zij de handelstransacties van directieleden volgen. 
Bovendien tonen onze resultaten dat de markt de machtspositie van en verantwoording 
door interne aandeelhouders belangrijk acht om de informatie inhoud van de 
handelstransacties van directieleden te bepalen. Voor ondernemingen met omvangrijk 
aandelenbezit door interne aandeelhouders, wordt het positieve nieuws van de aankoop 
van eigen aandelen door  directieleden gemitigeerd doordat deze door de aankoop extra 
macht verwerven en zich minder hoeven te verantwoorden jegens de overige 
aandeelhouders. Tegelijkertijd reageert de markt minder negatief wanneer interne 
aandeelhouders met een groot aandelenpakket een gedeelte van hun aandelenbezit 
verkopen. De verkoop verkleint immers de machtspositie van interne aandeelhouders 
binnen de onderneming.  Tot slot, vinden we een grotere koersreactie wanneer de 
onderneming slecht presteert (verliesgevend is of haar dividend vermindert), zich op de 
rand van faillissement bevindt (gering interestdekkingsgetal) of een onderneming is met 
hoge groei. 




Het tweede gedeelte van deze dissertatie handelt over de acties ondernomen door 
particuliere eigenaren in Tsjechië om efficiency verbeteringen en winstgevendheid te 
vergroten in voormalige staatsbedrijven. De privatisering van staatsbedrijven vormt een 
belangrijk onderdeel van het hervormingsprogramma in alle transitie economieën met als 
doel hun centraal geleide economieën te veranderen in markteconomieën. In Tsjechië, 
heeft de voucherprivatisering gezorgd voor een relatief snelle overdracht van eigendom 
van de staat aan private eigenaren. Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft het voucher 
privatiseringsprogramma, het privatiseringsproces en benadrukt de belangrijkste 
eigenschappen en gevolgen van het programma. 
Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 analyseren de herstructureringsactiviteiten van de geprivatiseerde 
Tsjechische bedrijven in de periode na de privatisering. De dataset bestaat uit 917 
bedrijven gedurende de periode 1993 tot 1998. In markteconomieën, bepalen de financiële 
prestaties van ondernemingen mede of de het dienstverband van de topmanager zal 
worden voortgezet. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de relatie tussen de financiële prestaties van 
de onderneming en het vertrek van de topmanager. We testen of de nieuwe private 
eigenaren bij de keuze of de manager moet worden vervangen worden beïnvloed door de 
relatieve prestaties van het bedrijf. De resultaten tonen dat de invloed van de geleverde 
prestaties gedurende de eerste jaren na de privatisering niet van invloed zijn op de keuze 
de manager al dan niet te vervangen. Echter in 1997 (zo’n 3-4 jaar na de privatisering) 
wordt het effect wel significant. Dit is met name het geval voor ondernemingen met 
minder geconcentreerde eigendomsstructuren en ondernemingen waarin 
privatiseringsfondsen belangrijke aandeelhouders zijn. Wij verklaren dit doordat 
grootaandeelhouders nauwer betrokken zijn bij de onderneming en over meer informatie 
beschikken over de kwaliteit van de manager. Deze grootaandeelhouders gaan derhalve  
over tot vervanging van de topmanager als er een mogelijkheid bestaat tot 
prestatieverbetering alhoewel de relatieve prestatiemaatstaven (in vergelijking tot andere 
bedrijven in de bedrijfstak) geen slechtere prestaties tonen. 
Onze tweede bevinding bevestigt deze propositie. Wanneer de productiviteit van de 
onderneming voor en na de vervanging van de topmanager wordt bekeken, vinden we dat 
er een positieve verandering plaatsvindt in (totale factor) productiviteit. Dit suggereert dat 
de nieuwe particuliere eigenaren handelen op basis van superieure informatie over het 




onvervulde potentieel tot efficiency verbetering en in staat zijn managers te benoemen die 
deze verbeteringen weten te realiseren. De derde bevinding is dat deze 
efficiencyverbetering door benoeming van een nieuwe topmanager alleen dan significant 
is wanneer de oude topmanager een relatieve sterke positie heeft binnen de onderneming 
en een nauwe relatie heeft met de andere directieleden (die gezamenlijk verantwoordelijk 
zijn voor het ondernemingsbeleid). 
De literatuur over transitie economieën beschrijft uiteenlopende mogelijkheden tot 
herstructurering in de pre-privatiseringsperiode.  Hoofdstuk 6 toont een analyse van de 
verschillende kanalen om te herstructureren in de post-privatiseringsperiode voor een 
steekproef van Tsjechische bedrijven. De resultaten tonen dat de verkoop van activa, 
prikkels voor werknemers, en vervanging van de topmanager als kanalen tot verbetering 
van de (totale factor) productiviteit dienen. Daarentegen leiden investeringen in activa en 
voorraadbeheer niet tot verbeterde productiviteit. Daarnaast toont het onderzoek aan dat de 
beschikbaarheid van bankleningen geen verbetering van de productiviteit tot stand brengt. 
Dit kan worden gezien als een indicatie dat ook minder goed presterende ondernemingen 
in staat zijn om bankleningen aan te trekken.  
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